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FOREWORD
 
This report summarizes the results of a Phase II study conducted
 
by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the Department of Energy to analyze
 
the nontechnical issues of industrial cogeneration for 12 industrial
 
firms in California- The issues, identified by these firms in the
 
Phase I study, are institutional, environmental, and economic.
 
The project manager was Herbert S. Davis. The key participants
 
and their primary areas of responsibility were as follows:
 
Edward Edelson, institutional and environmental issues
 
Ali K. Kashani, environmental regulations and constraints
 
Marie L. Slonski, economic analysis
 
The duration of the study was approximately eight months and
 
involved 16 man-months of effort. The project coordinators were
 
Alan J. Streb, Department of Energy, Headquarters, and Terry Vaeth,
 
Department of Energy, San Francisco Operations Office.
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ABSTRACT
 
The nontechnical issues of industrial cogeneration for 12 California
 
firms are analyzed under three categories of institutional settings:
 
(1) industrial ownership without firm sales of power, (2) industrial
 
ownership with firm sales of power, and (3) utility or third party owner­
ship. Institutional issues are ,analyzed from the independent viewpoints
 
of the primary parties of interest: the industrial firms, the electric
 
utilities and the California Public Utilities Commission. Air quality
 
regulations and the agencies responsible for their promulgation are
 
examined, and a life-cycle costing model is used to evaluate the economic
 
merits of representative conceptual cogeneration systems at these sites.
 
Specific recommendations are made for mitigating measures and regulatory
 
action relevant to industrial cogeneration in California.
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SECTION I
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
A. BACKGROUND
 
Current trends suggest that California industry and electric
 
utilities will require substantial quantities of fuel oil and natural
 
gas in the future to meet their energy needs. Construction of industrial
 
cogeneration plants over the next 5 to 10 years, along with shifts in fuel
 
use from gas and oil to coal, can lead to more efficient use of these
 
scarce fuels, reduced capital and operating costs, and significant
 
reductions in the lead-times now required for large electric utility
 
plants.
 
Cogeneration is generally recognized as a proven technology with
 
demonstrated benefits. The industrial firms surveyed, however, indicated
 
that significant institutional, environmental; and economic issues must be
 
resolved before they will regard the concept as desirable. The objective
 
of the present study is to analyze these issues in order to assist the
 
federal government and the State of California in making policy decisions
 
in matters relating to cogeneration.
 
The diversity of institutional issues identified by the surveyed
 
firms suggests that industrial cogeneration can be meaningfully analyzed
 
by independently examining the following three categories of institutional
 
settings: 
Category A: 
(1) 
Industrial Ownership Without Firm Sales of Power 
The industrial firm owns and operates the cogeneration 
system. 
(2) The cogeneration system partially satisfies the firm's 
electrical demand. 
(3) Additional power, if required, is purchased from an electric 
utility. 
(4) Excess by-product power, if and when available, is sold to 
the utility. 
(5) Standby power is purchased from the utility. 
Category B: Industrial Ownership with Firm Sales of Power 
(1) The industrial firm owns and operates the cogeneration 
system. 
(2) All cogenerated power or excess by-product power is sold to 
the utility as firm power. 
(3) The industrial firm purchases all its required power from 
the utility. 
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Category C: Utility or Third Party Ownership 
(1) The utility company or a third party owns and operates the 
cogeneration system. 
(2) The industrial firm purchases both steam and electricity 
from the utility or third party. 
As a result, the issues, both institutional and environmental, as
 
well as the economic considerations are seen to apply in different
 
degrees for different categories of industrial cogeneration.
 
B: 	 OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
 
Based on the results of this study, the following observations and
 
conclusions are made relative to industrial cogeneration in California:
 
(1) 	 Industrial firms with captive energy sources have greater
 
opportunities for economically viable cogeneration systems
 
than those using purchased fuels.
 
(2) 	 Because of the delay in enacting the National Energy Act,
 
the provisions of that Act directed at encouraging cogenera­
tion have in fact had the opposite effect.
 
-(3) 	 California's three major investor-owned electric utilities
 
have widely divergent views on industrial cogeneration,
 
particularly with respect to incorporating cogeneration
 
capacity into their resource planning and establishing a
 
price for purchasing cogenerated power.
 
(4) 	 Air quality regulations, particularly the New Source Review
 
(NSR) rules, do not recognize the potential of industrial
 
cogeneration to reduce air pollution and conserve energy.
 
(5) 	 A favorable purchase price for excess by-product power is
 
not as critical an issue as industry perceives it to be.
 
The majority of cogeneration systems considered in this
 
study did not produce excess by-product power; those that
 
did had relatively low calculated break-even prices for its
 
sale.
 
(6) 	 The economic viability of industrial cogeneration with
 
utility or third party ownership is highly sensitive to the
 
price charged for process steam.
 
(7) 	 Assuming applicable corporate discount rates, after taxes,
 
of between 10% and 15%, conceptual cogeneration systems with
 
lower life-cycle costs than the corresponding base (non­
cogenerating) systems were identified for 9 of the 12 indus­
trial firms considered in this study.
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(8) 	 Assuming 100% financing, a 6% interest loan is a greater
 
incentive than a 20% investment tax credit for cogeneration
 
projects larger than about 1 megawatt. However, neither
 
form of incentive is effective for cogeneration projects
 
that would not be viable without these incentives.
 
C. 	 RECOMMENDATIONS
 
The intent of the following recommendations is to respond to the
 
concerns, expressed or implied, of the representatives of the organiza­
tions interviewed during the course of this study. Appropriate local,
 
state, or federal authorities should consider:
 
(1) 	 Passing legislation clearly exempting industrial cogenerators
 
from regulation as public utilities.
 
(2) 	 Clarifying their position on changes in natural gas priori­
ties for industrial cogenerators.
 
(3) 	 Encouraging utility or third party ownership as well as
 
industrial ownership of cogeneration facilities.
 
(4) 	 Defining the required trade-off ratios for different pollu­
tants in different regions.
 
(5) 	 Allowing an emissions credit for industrial cogenerators
 
based on the number of kilowatt-hours of utility energy
 
displaced.
 
(6) 	 Developing and maintaining a'list of best available control
 
technology (BACT) and/or a set of guidelines for evaluating
 
individual industrial cogeneration projects.
 
(7) 	 Expanding the conceptof trade-offs to include cross­
pollutant and inter-basin trade-offs.
 
(8) 	 Analyzing in detail the economic viability of industrial
 
cogeneration using an analytical model that can simulate
 
the computation of rates and load fluctuations on a daily
 
or even an hourly basis.
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SECTION II
 
INTRODUCTION
 
A. - BACKGROUND 
Three major national studies (References 1, 2, 3) have estimated
 
that industrial cogeneration* can provide both substantial fuel savings
 
and reductions in the required capital expenditures for the generation
 
of electrical power. In-an effort to understand the implications of
 
these study results for the State of California, a two-phase study was
 
initiated by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the CaliforniA Energy
 
Commission and the U.S. Department of Energy. The primary effort of the
 
first phase (Reference 4) was a survey of 12 representative, major energy­
consuming industrial firms in California (see Table 2-1). The informa­
tion collected was organized into four categories: technical, economic,
 
environmental, and institutional. The technical aspects of cogeneration
 
systems were analyzed for each site using topping or bottoming cycles.
 
These conceptual alternative systems were then compared to a base (non­
cogenerating) system for which thermal and electrical energy is purchased
 
to meet each plant's demand. The results-of this technical analysis
 
showed that substantial energy savings,t relative to existing plant opera­
tions, could be achieved with cogeneration systems. The results of the
 
industrial survey indicated that while near-term.implementation of
 
industrial'cogeneration is technically feasible, significant institu­
tional, environmental, and economic issues must first be resolved before
 
industry will regard the concept as desirable.
 
B. APPROACH
 
The issues associated with industrial cogeneration may be real or
 
perceived, depending on the institutional setting. For example, regula­
tion by the Public Utilities Commission of an industrial firm-that sells
 
cogenerated power can be discounted by considering utility ownership of
 
the cogeneration facility. Utility ownership, however, raises other
 
issues. The approach used in this report first defines the ownership
 
arrangement of the cogeneration system and then examines the associated
 
institutional and environmental issues. This approach also simplifies
 
the discussion of the economic considerations relatedto industrial
 
cogeneration, particularly the selling and purchase prices of cogener­
ated power.
 
*See Appendix A for definitions of this and other relevant terms.
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Table 2-1. Selected Cogeneration Sites in California
 
Selection Criteria
 
Type Reported
 
Cogeneiation Air Electric Cogeneration Thermal Estimate of
 
Cycle Pollution Utility Study Energy Use Cogeneration
 
Control Under Rank In Capacity,
 
Industrial Firm Industry Location Topping Bottomlng District PGE SCE EDGE Municipal Existing Planned Study California MWe
 
California Paperboard Santa Clara X Bay Area X X 46 10
 
Paperboard Corp. Products
 
California Portland Cement Molave X Kern Co. X X 3 100
 
Cement Co. Manufacturing
 
flxon Co., U.S.A. 	 Petroleum Benecia X Bay Area X X 1 40
 
Refining
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, 	 rood Fullerton 
 X South Coast X X 6 0.7 
Inc. Products 
Husky Oil Co. 	 Enhanced Santa Maria X Santa Barbara X X 1 300 
Oil Recovery Co. 
Kai'er Steel Corp. 	 Steel Fontana X South Cost X X 4 60 
Kelco Co. 	 Organic and San Diego X San Diego X 3 2 12 
Inorganic Co. 
Chemicals 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. 	Class Oakland X Bay Area X x 7 ---

Containers
 
Simpson Paper Co. 	 Pulp and Anderson X Shasta Co. X X 46 19 
Paper 
Simpson Timber Co. Timber Arcata X 	 Humboldt X X 20 ---

Co.
 
Spreckels Sugar Co. 	 Sugar Beet Manteca X San Joaquin X X 5 4.2 
Refining Co. 
Union Oil Co. 	 Petroleum Wilmington X South Coast X X 1 40 
Refining 
Totals 	 10 2 --- 6 3 1 2 1 4 7 ...... 
Through a review of the literature, meetings with the electric
 
utilities and the California Public Utilities Commission, a number of
 
institutional settings appropriate to industrial cogeneration were
 
identified. From this list, three major categories of industrial
 
cogeneration were selected for use in this report and are described
 
here:
 
Category A: Industrial Ownership Without Firm Sales of Power
 
(Section III)
 
(1) The industrial firm owns and operates the cogeneration 
system. 
(2) The cogeneration system partially satisfies the firm's 
electrical demand. 
(3) Additional power, if required, is purchased from an electric 
utility. 
(4) Excess by-product power, if and when available, is sold to 
the utility. 
(5) Standby power is purchased from the utility. 
Category B: Industrial Ownership with Firm Sales of Power (Section IV) 
(1) The industrial firm owns and operates the cogeneration 
system. 
(2) All cogenerated power or excess by-producf power is sold to 
the utility as firm power. 
(3) The industrial firm purchases all its required power from 
the utility. 
Category C: Utility or Third Party Ownership (Section V) 
(1) The utility company or a third party owns and operates the 
cogeneration system. 
(2) The industrial firm purchases both steam and electricity 
from the utility or third party. 
This report is structured around these three categories of
 
institutional settings. The relevant institutional and environmental
 
issues, as well as the relevant economics, are discussed for each
 
category in order to provide the reader with a clearer understanding
 
of the ramifications of industrial cogeneration for these 12 California
 
firms.
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C. 	 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
 
The 12 industrial firms that were surveyed identified nine issues
 
that were categorized as institutional. The diversity in the identifi­
cation of issues can be seen in Table 2-2. This diversity implies that
 
either:
 
(1) 	 The firms' level of understanding of the institutional issues
 
is embryonic, or
 
(2) 	 Each firm faces a very different institutional environment
 
and, hence a unique set of institutional issues.
 
The institutional issues in this report are discussed, within each
 
category, in the order of their relevance -- whether they are primary,
 
secondary, or inappropriate (see Table 2-3). When appropriate, the dis­
cussion includes the points of view of the institutions with primary
 
decision making responsibility, i.e., the industrial firm, the local
 
electric utility, and the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC).
 
In January 1978 the PUC took what it called a "significant first
 
step" 	to promote cogeneration by issuing Resolution No. E-1738. This
 
resolution directs electric utilities to augment cogeneration projects
 
by (1) proposing rate schedules for expanding interruptible electric
 
service, (2) proposing other "rate proposals to enhance cogeneration,
 
including revision of standby rates," (3) submitting "guidelines cover­
ing the price and conditions for the purchase of energy and capacity
 
from cogeneration facilities owned by others," and (4) submitting a
 
report on guidelines for development of utility owned cogeneration
 
facilities." These are very important steps and demonstrate the active
 
interest of the PUC. (Appendix B provides more detail on the responsi­
bility and authority of the PUC.) The reaction of the electric utilities
 
to this move by the PUC and to the very enthusiastic reports on cogenera­
tion differs markedly from one company to another, even within the state.
 
(Appendixes C, D, E, and F provide more detail on the outlook of the
 
electric utilities.)
 
D. 	 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
 
Nine of the 12 firms surveyed identified New Source Review (NSR)
 
as an environmental issue. For example, the City of Santa Clara, owner
 
of the cogeneration equipment located at the California Paperboard
 
Corporation,. called the NSR rules the "most critical factor," and Hunt-

Wesson indicated that if application of the NSR rules requires them to
 
reduce production in order to install cogeneration, they would not
 
proceed with the project. Union Oil Company also noted that the NSR
 
rules tend to reduce the. attractiveness of cogeneration.
 
For many of the firms, it is not the idea of the NSR rules, regard­
less of the specific emission limit, which concerns them. Rather, it is
 
the prevailing uncertainty created by the application of the rules.
 
Both Union Oil and Simpson Paper noted the problems created for invest­
ment decisions by the ambiguity in the NSR rules.
 
2-4
 
Table 2-2. Diversity of Institutional Issues Identified by Firms Participating in This Study 
Industrial Firm
 
Total 
California Number 
Identified California Portlnnd Enon Kaiser Owens- Simpson Simpson Spreckels Union of Sites 
Institutional Paperboard Cement Co. Hunt-Wesson Husky Oil Steel Kelco Illinois, Paper Timber Sugar Oil Identifying 
issues Corp. Co. U.S.A. Foods, Inc. Co. Corp. Co. Inc. Co. Co. Co. Co. Issues 
Rate for Selling Power x X X X 4 
Standby Power Charge X X X x 4 
Wheeling X X X 3 
Natural Gas Priorities X N X 3 
Long-Term Agreements X X x 3 
Steam Sales X X 2 
Regulation XN 2 
National Energy Act N x 2 
Rate Design I 
Number of Issues
 
Identified per Firm 3 6 2 3 1 1 1 0 3 2 0 2
 
01 
Table 2-3. 

Institutional Setting 

Category A:
 
Industrial Ownership 

Without Firm Power 

Sales
 
Category B:
 
Industrial Ownership 

With Firm Power Sales 

Category C:
 
Utility or Third Party 

Ownership 

Correspondence of Institutional Setting and Institutional Issues
 
Institutional Issues
 
Primary Secondary Inappropriate
 
Standby power charge Natural gas priorities Rate for selling power
 
National energy act Rate design Long term agreements
 
Steam sales
 
Regulation
 
Wheeling
 
Rate for selling Rate design Standby power charge
 
power Wheeling Steam sales
 
Regulation National energy act
 
Long term agreements
 
Long term agreements National energy act Rate for selling power
 
Steam sales Regulation'
 
Standby power charge
 
Natural gas priorities
 
Wheeling
 
Rate design
 
What are these NSR rules that industry is so concerned about? ­
rules that Tom Quinn, Chairman of the California Air Resources Board
 
(ARB), has characterized as the "single most important" set of air pollu­
tion regulations in the state* and which appear to be the only way of
 
confronting the dilemmas of keeping a non-attainment air basin attractive
 
to industry while continuing to improve air quality? NSR rules are one
 
of five air programs implemented by the U.S. Environmental Protection
 
Agency (EPA).** The Clean Air Act of 1970 explicitly recognizes that
 
emissions limitations alone are not sufficient in non-attainment areas
 
to attain and maintain air quality standards. In formulating its 1971
 
basic guidelines for the content of state implementation plans,*** EPA
 
stated that "other measures necessary to insure" achievement and main­
tenance of the ambient air quality states to implement regulations to
 
subject new air pollution sources to preconstruction review, and to
 
prohibit the construction of a new or modified stationary source which
 
would interfere with the attainment of the air quality standards. This
 
then is the underlying rationale of NSR rules: attainment of ambient
 
air quality through control of point sources. The complete text of the
 
original model NSR rules (Rule 213) for California appears in Appendix
 
G.**** Appendix H contains additional background information on NSR
 
rules as well as other environmental regulations that can affect the
 
implementation of cogeneration.
 
The environmental sections of this report concentrate 9n the
 
interpretation-and application of the NSR rules. Industrial firms have
 
already expressed***** their confusion over the way the NSR rules would
 
be applied and their concern that the rules would inhibit investment in
 
industrial cogeneration. As with the other issue areas discussed in
 
this report, institutional and economic, the subject matter cannot be
 
considered in isolation. Meeting the NSR requirements implies increased
 
costs associated with the cogeneration investment. Simpson Paper, for
 
example, anticipated that 25% of the capital cost of its cogeneration
 
project would be directed towards complying with environmental regula­
tions. Such costs can be considered either as an environmental barrier
 
or as an economic barrier. The emphasis here is on describing the
 
environmental regulations that will give rise to such costs.
 
*ARB Bulletin, January 1978.
 
**The five programs are (1) existing sources, (2) new source per­
formance and standards (NSPS), (3) new source review (NSR),
 
(4) prevention of significant deterioration (PSD), (5) natural
 
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAP).
 
***40 CYR 51.18.
 
****As discussed in the text, several modifications have already been
 
made to the model rule by the California Air Resource Board.
 
*****The interviews with the 12 firms performed earlier in this study
 
obcurred prior to the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1977. More con­
cern might now exist for other provisions, e.g., the application
 
of the prevention of significant deterioration program.
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Understanding-industry's concern about the NSR rules requires some
 
background on the environmental regulators: the U.S. Environmental
 
Protection Agency (EPA), the California Air Resources Board (ARB), and
 
the local Air Pollution Control Districts (APCD).* The EPA sets national
 
standards; the ARB is responsible for ensuring that state programs are
 
established to meet these standards. Local agencies have the primary
 
responsibility for the design and enforcement of programs that relate to
 
stationary sources.** The interrelationships of these agencies in deal
 
ing with a request for a permit to construcf a cogeneration unit are
 
illustrated in Figure 2-1. Also identified in the figure is the basic
 
legislation involved, the air pollution abatement programs identified by
 
this legislation, and the regulations set up by the enforcement agencies
 
to carry out these programs.
 
Eventually, all enforcement will be in the hands of the state.
 
However, until the state implementation plan is approved, the EPA retains
 
the responsibility for carrying out the programs shown in the figure.
 
But, as is indicated by the arrows in the figure, a portion of this task
 
has been delegated to the ARB, which has, in turn, delegated it to the
 
ABCDs. The EPA retains the responsibility for enforcing the PSD program
 
because the state has not yet set up the necessary regulations. How­
ever, PSD applies to a limited number of cases.
 
Both the EPA and ARB can enter into the permit process when they
 
determine that the district has operated incorrectly. The ARB also
 
becomes involved in a permit decision when it concerns a source which
 
requires an air-quality impact analysis (i.e., one which increases
 
emissions by more than 25 lb/hr or 250 lb/day of any of the air con­
taminants specified under Rule 213). In these cases, both the ARB and
 
the EPA must be given notice of the district's intent to issue permits
 
to construct and may submit their comments prior to the actual issuance­
of the permits.*** Some articles have indicated that the ARE has the
 
"final say" (see Los Angeles Times, "Unique Pact May Finally Pave Way
 
for Oil Terminal," Aug. 18, 1978). This misconception has arisen
 
because the ARE does retain the authority under the California Health
 
and Safety Code**** to review rules and regulations of a district to
 
determine whether they make reasonable provision to achieve and main­
tain state air quality standard. The ARB has used this authority for
 
implementing NSR rules in both the South Coast Air Quality Management
 
District and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District. Table 2-4
 
-shows the status of the New Resource Review rules in the APCDs of inter­
est to this study.
 
*The local air pollution agency in Southern California is the South
 
Coast Air Quality Management District. However, APCD is used in
 
this report to indicate the local authority.
 
**The ARB is responsible for the enforcement of non-stationary source
 
programs.
 
***R. J. MacKnight, South Coast Air Quality Management District, per­
sonal communication, Dec. 20, 1977. Note, however, that some of the
 
exemptions specified in the NSR require EPA and ARE concurrence.
 
For example, the Sohio Oil Terminal is being reviewed under one of
 
the exemption clauses in the NSR rules.
 
****Paragraphs 41500, 41502, and 41504.
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Issuance of Permits to Construct Cogeneration Units
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Table 2-4. New Source Review Status for Air Pollution Control
 
* Districts in This Study
 
Date Date 
Adopted Adopted 
APCD by ARB by APCD 
Bay Area 12/20/77* 
Santa Barbara Co. 1/26/77 
South Coast AQMD 10/08/76 ---
Kern Co. --- 12/28/76 
San Joaquin Co. --- 6121/77 
Shasta Co. --- 10/15/74 
Humboldt Co. 6/13/76 

San Diego Co. --- 11/04/76 
*Also approved by EPA. 
Major Problems
 
No BACT requirements
 
Definition of stationary source
 
differs from ARB
 
No BACT definition
 
ARB disagrees with definition
 
of stationary source
 
Cutoff is 100 tons/year rather
 
than hourly and daily
 
No BACT requirements or
 
definition
 
No trade-off provisions
 
No definition of stationary
 
source
 
Cutoff is 25 tons/year rather
 
than hourly and daily
 
No allowance for trade-offs
 
Definitions of BACT and
 
stationary source differ
 
from ARE
 
ARB disagrees with definition
 
of BACT
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In this report, the NSR rules have been divided so that the sections
 
most appropriate to each cogeneration category are discussed in that chap­
ter. Under Category A - industrial ownership without firm power sales
 
(Section III) - the best available control technology (BACT) provision of
 
the New Source Review rule is discussed. It has been assumed that pro­
posals considered in Category A involve no more net emissions but are
 
just modifications of existing facilities. Under Category B - industrial
 
ownership with firm power sales (Section IV) - the Air Quality Impact
 
Analysis provision is discussed. Here, it is assumed that the modifica­
tion necessary for industrial cogeneration will result in increased fuel
 
usage and therefore an increase in the net emissions from the stationary
 
source. The discussion of BACT in Section III is also applicable in
 
this section. Under Category C (Section V) the local electric utility
 
owns the cogeneration equipment and it is the utility, then, rather than
 
the industrial firm that becomes involved in obtaining the required air
 
pollution control permits. However, in some cases the firm can become
 
involved because of the need for trade-offs under the Air Quality Impact
 
Analysis.
 
E. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
 
The life-cycle cost approach used in this report (described in
 
Appendix I) computes the present value, for a specified year, of all
 
costs included in the purchase, installation, and operation of a-partic­
ular system. This approach "collapses" a distribution of cash flows over
 
the system lifetime into a single number by taking into account the time
 
value of money, and thus allows a cost comparison of various systems.
 
All system costs and financial obligations, including income taxes,
 
depreciation, non-income taxes, insurance, and other capital related
 
charges are included in this approach and are described in Appendix J.
 
The analysis is treated only from the viewpoint of each industrial firm
 
and not from the viewpoint of the utility or a third party.*
 
The internal rate of return for a project is defined as that dis­
count rate at which the net present value is equal to zero. A cogenera­
tion system is not usually expected to generate sufficient revenues to
 
offset all its costs, but rather to reduce costs when compared to a
 
base system. Thus, a cogeneration system is not usually expected to have
 
a positive net present value. However, the incremental cost/revenue
 
difference between a cogeneration system and a base system is expected
 
to result in a positive net present value and the incremental internal
 
rate of return can be determined.
 
*In particular, this study is not designed to answer the question of
 
whether cogeneration is "desirable" from the social perspective. Such
 
an examination would require a detailed analysis of the impact of
 
cogeneration on utility system costs and a careful environmental trade­
off analysis, neither of which are within the scope of this study.
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Two financial incentive schemes, a 20% investment tax credit and
 
a 6% interest loan, were evaluated for each site that required a capital
 
investment for the cogeneration system.* Though neither of these incen­
tives are necessarily recommended, they.do provide a good test of the
 
individual investment decisions related to major tax and financial
 
incentives. For the low interest loan, it was assumed that 100% financ­
ing would be available; the advantage of this type of financing was
 
incorporated into the life-cycle cost calculation. In each case, the
 
effect of the incentive on the life-cycle cost of the cogeneration
 
system was determined.
 
A total of 14 economic analyses was performed for the 12 sites.**
 
The breakdown of these analyses for each firm by cogeneration category
 
is shown in Table 2-5. The life-cycle cost analyses of.Category A do
 
not include receipts from the sale of by-product power; Category B
 
life-cycle cost analyses do include these receipts. Category C analyses
 
include receipts from steam sales. Site-specific data from these anal­
yses are given in Appendix K.
 
Estimates of the cost of air pollution abatement equipment are
 
taken from a previous study (Reference 3) and may not be realistic,
 
depending on the application of environmental regulations as discussed'
 
in.the environmental sections of this report. Nevertheless, the analy­
sis represents a first step in assessing the site-specific costs for
 
implementing industrial cogeneration in California.
 
*Husky Oil and Spreckels Sugar did not require a capital investment.
 
**Only those conceptual cogeneration systems developed in Phase I of
 
this study (Reference 4) were analyzed.
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Table 2-5. Economic Analysis Performed in This Study
 
Category B:
 
Industrial Ownership
 
with Firm Power
 
Category A: Sales
 
All Category C:
Industrial Ownership Excess 

Without Firm Power Power Power Utility or Third Party
 
Industrial Firm Sales Sold Sold Ownership
 
California Paperboard Corp. X X X X
 
California Portland Cement Co. X X
 
Exxon Co., U.S.A. X X
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. X* X** X*
 
Husky Oil Co. X
 
Kaiser Steel Corp. X X
 
Kelco Co. X X X X
 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. X X
 
Simpson Paper Co. X X X
 
Simpson Timber Co. X X
 
Spreckels Sugar Co. X X
 
Union Oil Co. X X
 
*Three alternatives analyzed.
 
**Two alternatives analyzed.
 
SECTION III
 
ANALYSIS OF CATEGORY A: INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP
 
WITHOUT FIRM SALES OF POWER
 
Under Category A, the cogeneration system meets the plant steam
 
demand and also produces a portion of its own electrical demand. The
 
firm buys standby power from the local utility to back up its cogenerated
 
electrical capacity; additional power, if required, is also purchased
 
from the utility company. All bottoming cycles appear to fit this
 
arrangement.
 
Of the three, Category A is the most ea§ily implemented because of
 
the available industrial steam loads, and the potential avoidance of
 
environmental issues*, and, as shown in this section, of institutional
 
issues. On the other hand, the least'amount of primary fuel savings and
 
the smallest reduction in the delay or avoidance of future capital
 
expenditures for electrical generation are realized.
 
A. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
 
The determination of the price of standby power is the most impor­
tant institutional issue because it influences the expected return to
 
the firm from cogeneration. Related to this issue is the effect of
 
changes in the firm's electrical expenses as utilities employ new rate
 
structures. As the firm's payments to the electric utility increase, any
 
investment that offsets the bill will become more important. The lack
 
of a finalized National Energy Act has also been influential. Potential
 
cogenerators are still waiting to see if a tax investment credit is a
 
possibility and what guidelines and rules are going to be prescribed by
 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
 
The price of electricity sold by the industrial firms to the grid
 
does not appear to be an appropriate issue because most of the return to
 
the firm is the result of the reduction in electric bills. Another non­
issue is the regulation by the PUC or the FERC. Without the firm sale
 
of electricity to the grid, it would be difficult to consider the indus­
trial firm as an electric corporation or as having dedicated its facili­
ties to the public. There is no concern over agreements with respect to
 
long-term arrangements in the contracts because a firm agreement between
 
the industrial firm and the utility is unnecessary. As a result, the
 
utility will be reluctant to look upon the firm's cogeneration potential
 
as part of its capacity. Because of the need to supply standby power,
 
the electric utility must still plan on the same reserve margin as that
 
required without cogeneration. The amount of reserve might be reduced
 
as the electric utility company recognizes that there is a low probabil­
ity that all the cogenerators would require standby simultaneously.
 
*Although bottoming cycles do not increase emissions, the firm might
 
still be required to install BACT to meet the New Source Review rules.
 
See Section III-B.
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1. Primary Issues
 
a. Standby Power Charges. Standby power charges are paid on the
 
basis of the portion of the connected load that is designated standby.
 
This capacity is analogous to the fees paid by a firm for a financial
 
line of credit. For example, if a plant cogenerates 50% of its electri­
cal power, it would like to have that 50% of its capacity on standby
 
from the local utility. Then if its cogeneration facility must be shut
 
down, it can rely on its standby capacity without affecting production.
 
If the price for standby power is too high, firms will be discouraged.
 
On the other hand, if the price is too low then the firm will not be
 
paying its fair share of the capacity required by the utility's system.
 
Other ratepayers would be responsible for the difference.
 
The Industrial Firm's Viewpoint
 
Simpson Timber Company pointed out that the problem lies in trying
 
to establish a standby charge that is mutually acceptable t6 them and to
 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). Union Oil Company noted that
 
the cost and availability of standby power is an important factor and
 
could greatly influence the profitability of its cogeneration project.
 
Simpson Paper Company felt that the current PG&E rate for standby
 
service was too high. California Portland Cement Company was more open­
minded in its approach of what would'be a "favorable" charge although
 
they did point out that any cogeneration agreement with the utility would
 
depend on obtaining such a favorable charge. One reason that standby
 
charges for'cogeneration might be excessive is that the utility views
 
each kilowatt of standby capacity independently. If five firms each
 
required 10 kW of standby capacity, the utility charges for a total of
 
50 kilowatts of standby capacity. The likelihood of all five firms
 
demanding their standby power simultnaeously is an event that can be
 
described by some probability distribution. If the capacity of the
 
industrial firms is aggregated and reduced to the statistical maximum
 
likelihood of standby capacity required, the amount to be paid by each
 
industrial firm for standby would be reduced.
 
The Electric Utility's Viewpoint
 
The existing standby charges for the three public utilities dis­
cussed in this report are as follows:*
 
Utility Standby Charge for: 	 Per Meter Per Month
 
PG&E 	 First 25 kW of contract capacity $2.74/kW
 
Next 100 kW of contract capacity 2.08/kW
 
Over 124 kW of contract capacity 1.64/kW
 
SCE 	 First 20 kW of contract demand 2.OO/kW
 
All excess kW of demand 1.50/kW
 
SDG&E 	 First 20 kW of contract demand 3.44/avg kW
 
All excess kW of demand 2.74/kW
 
*Reference 	5, p. 15.
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Each utility values standby somewhat differently. The utilities
 
maintain that they have set these rates to assure that their other cus­
tomers are not subsidizing those on standby. With rising construction
 
costs, the provision of standby power, upon request, can be expensive.
 
If those firms utilizing standby do not pay for the utility!s investment
 
in extra capacity, the other ratepayers will be forced to finance the
 
investment.
 
The PUC has requested these three utilities to provide revisions
 
to their standby rate. "SCE's and SDG&E's standby tariffs already have
 
exemption clauses which permit the customers to operate in parallel (as
 
required by some cogeneration systems) with the utility system without
 
paying standby charges. PG&E's standby tariff does not provide for the
 
exemption." (Reference 6, pg. 14.) The PUC resolution on cogeneration
 
states that "Rates for standby service and prices paid for energy pur­
chased from cogeneration may not be appropriate to stimulate the develop­
ment of potential projects." (Reference 7; emphasis added.)
 
The utilities felt that the standby issue was artificial. Most of
 
their customers, according to the utilities, view standby as a form of
 
insurance. Because the alternative is for the firms to install twice
 
the required capacity to provide their own standby, the insurance,is
 
considered by many firms to be reasonable.
 
Summary
 
Industrial firms considering cogeneration appear to feel that the
 
standby charge will not be established at a rate favorable to their
 
interests. Utilities are changing their perception of standby as a
 
result of the PUG resolution.
 
Standby, however, is not a charge for a fictitious product. The
 
issue is how that charge is determined and how much of the product a
 
cogenerator or a group of cogenerators require. These are questions
 
related to system reliability and utility accounting which have been,
 
and will remain, debatable topics.
 
b. The National Energy Act. During the industry survey, the
 
National Energy Act was referred to as an institutional constraint.
 
Considering that this legislation has been under discussion for over a
 
year and that legislation on cogeneration and electric utility rate
 
reform and regulatory improvement have been discussed in the U.S.
 
Congress for several years, such legislation appears to fit a working
 
definition of an institutional issue. The relevant aspects of the
 
National Energy Plan and the early legislation are discussed in detail
 
below to provide the reader with an understanding of the legislative
 
issues. One important example is the definition of cogeneration.
 
In President Carter's National Energy Plan, cogeneration was
 
selected as a major portion of the plan for promoting conservation and
 
energy efficiency. The plan notes that a "variety of institutional
 
barriers impede (cogeneration's) development," even though it is
 
economical today. Therefore:
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"A Program is proposed to remove these barriers by assuring
 
that industrial firms generating electricity receive fair
 
rates from utilities for both the surplus power they would
 
sell and for the backup power they would buy. Industries
 
using cogeneration to produce electricity could be exempted
 
from State and Federal public utility regulation, and would
 
be entitled to use public utility transmission facilities
 
to sell surplus power and buy backup power. ... Finally,
 
industriah firms and utilities which invest in cogeneration
 
equipment tould be exempted from the requirement to convert
 
from oil and gas in cases where an exemption is necessary
 
for cogeneration." (Reference 8, pg. 45.)
 
In the legislation proposed to establish a comprehensive national
 
energy policy, a cogeneration facility was defined as
 
"A facility which produces ­
(a) 	 electric energy and
 
(b) 	 other forms of useful energy (such as steam or heat)
 
which is, or will be, used for industrial, commercial
 
or space heating purposes." (Reference 9, see 107 (b)(1).)
 
A "qualifying cogeneration facility" was defined as
 
"a cogeneration facility which the (Federal Power) Commission
 
determines ­
(a) 	 meets such requirements respecting minimum size and
 
fuel efficiency as the Commission, by rule prescribes;
 
and
 
(b) 	 in the case of a cogeneration facility which is, or
 
will be; directly connected to an electric utility,
 
the owner or operator of such facility has offered
 
such utility an opportunity to construct and operate
 
such facility on terms which are agreed upon by the
 
parties." (Reference,9, see 107 (b)(2).)
 
The earlier legislation required the Federal Power Commission (FPC)* to
 
"prescribe rules requiring electric utilities to offer to sell electric
 
energy to the owner or operator of a qualifying cogeneration facility
 
and to offer to purchase electric energy from such owner or operator."
 
(Reference 9, Section 107 (a).) These rules were to be completed within
 
two years after the date of enactment of the bill. Several other rulings
 
related to cogeneration, and addressed later in this section, were also
 
to be prescribed by the FPC.
 
*The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has since assumed
 
these planned responsibilities.
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Hearings on the legislation demonstrated several concerns. A
 
representative of Houston Lighting and Power Company felt the bill was
 
inflexible in regard to allowing electric utility ownership of cogenera­
tion facilities. (Reference 10, page 326.) On the other hand, others
 
felt that "the specific definition of qualified cogenerators will pre­
vent any enthusiastic response by industy" because it pays "too much
 
deference to utility company interests." (Reference 10, pages 332 and
 
335.)
 
In the summer of 1977, both Senate and House versions of bills
 
related to cogeneration were voted on and sent to conference. Although
 
no bills have been issued from the conference (it is customary that
 
bills are not issued separately but as a complete package), a significant
 
amount of work has been completed on two bills that relate to cogenera­
tion. They are H.R. 5146 on coal conversion and H.R. 4018, which dis­
cusses the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1977.
 
The November 21, 1977 draft (approved by the conferees) of the
 
major provision of H.R. 5146 discusses exemptions from coal conversion
 
for major fuel-burning installations and electric power plants:
 
"Permanent exemptions are to be granted for new cogeneration
 
electric power plants or major fuel-burning installations
 
where its economic and other benefits cannot be obtained
 
with coal or other fuels." (Reference 11, page 12.)
 
H.R. 4018 addresses several issues related to cogeneration includ­
ing wheeling and interconnection as well as cogeneration itself. The
 
definition used for a "cogeneration facility" is:
 
"A facility owned 'by a person not primarily engaged in the
 
generation or sale of electric power. ..., which facility
 
produces (A) electric energy, and (B) other forms of useful
 
energy (such as steam or heat) which is or will be used for
 
industrial, commercial or space heating purposes."
 
(Reference 12, Section 113 (d)(l).)
 
The definition excludes utility-owned cogeneration plants from qualifying
 
under this act even though a clause in the definition states "that
 
nothing in this section is meant to prevent utilities from producing
 
electricity by cogeneration." This is not very significant because the
 
bill does not provide any incentives that are useful for an electric
 
utility.
 
A qualifying cogeneration facility is still a loosely defined
 
concept. The qualification of size, fuel use, and fuel efficiency are
 
to be prepared by the Federal Power Commission after the legislation is
 
enacted.
 
3-5
 
The most notable change from the original legislation is that
 
guidelines, as opposed to rules, are to be developed by the Secretary of
 
Energy. Specifically, within one year of enactment the Secretary of
 
Energy is required to:
 
(1) 	 "... recommend to the State regulatory authorities guidelines
 
requiring where he deems appropriate, electric utilities to
 
offer to sell electric energy to any qualifying cogenerator
 
... and to offer to purchase electric energy from such
 
cogenerators...
 
(2) 	 "... prescribe rules exempting qualifying cogenerators ... in
 
#hole 	or in part from the Federal Power Act and for the
 
Public Utility Holding Company Act, if the Administrator
 
determines such exemption is necessary ... provided, however,
 
that power producers of over thirty megawatts may not be
 
exempt from the Federal Power Act; and provided further that
 
a Federal license must still be required under the Federal
 
Power Act, regardless of whatever other exemptions may be
 
granted." (Emphasis added.)
 
(3) "... recommend to State regulatory authorities guidelines
 
for the purpose of preventing utilities from engaging in
 
any conduct which results in unreasonable or discriminatory
 
rates or pricing structures or practices against consumers
 
that utilize power facilities or sources other than those
 
provided or otherwise supplied by any such utility." (Refer­
ence 9, Section 113.)
 
Thus it appears that the Federal government still intends to play
 
a major role in the implementation of cogeneration.
 
In addition to the rules and guidelines listed above, the act
 
calls for "a full and complete analysis of the economics, social,
 
environmental and technological feasibility and consequences of imple­
menting, on a nationwide scale, various waste heat energy recovery and
 
use techniques." (Reference 12, Section 115.)
 
Other 	aspects related to cogeneration include:
 
(1) 	 Interconnection - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission can
 
"direct an electric utility to establish physical connection
 
of its transmission facilities with the facilities of any
 
other electric utility or qualifying cogenerator." (Refer­
ence 12, Section 122 (a).)
 
(2) Wheeling - an electric utility can be ordered to wheel by
 
the FERC if it finds that such action is in the public
 
interest. (Reference 9, Section 241.)
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Two "of the firms surveyed expressed concern with the legislation.
 
Both firms indicated a desire to wait until the legislation is finalized
 
before making a decision on cogeneration. The legislation indicates
 
that the FERC will play a significant role in determining who qualifies
 
as a cogenerator. It is ironic that the cogeneration provision directed
 
at encouraging cogeneration has had the opposite effect because of the
 
delay in enacting the legislation. Even after the bill is finalized,
 
it could be another year before the FERC prescribes its guidelines on
 
cogeneration.
 
2. Secondary Issues
 
a. Natural Gas Priorities. All users of natural gas receive
 
their fuel on a priority basis established by the PUC. The lowest pri­
ority (priority 5) is for electric power plants, with industrial firms
 
generally at a higher priority (see Table 3-1). The questions are:
 
If a firm uses natural gas to provide its process heat before installing
 
a cogeneration system, should its priority status be lowered if it also
 
uses natural gas in its cogeneration equipment? Would the change in
 
priority depend on whether it sells electricity to the utility or whether
 
all the electricity is used in-plant?
 
The Industrial Firm's Viewpoint
 
Several of the firms expressed concern over the lack of clarifica­
tion on the answers to the above questions.* California Paperboard
 
Corporation was concerned about a change from their present priority;
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., was also concerned, but they indicated that
 
their concern goes beyond cogeneration. A fuel shortage during the
 
canning season could severely impact the firm. Therefore, if the PUC
 
granted them a higher priority if they cogenerate, Hunt-Wesson Foods,
 
Inc., would have a large incentive.
 
The Public Utilities Commission's Viewpoint
 
The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has the authority to estab­
lish, and therefore to modify, the priorities for delivery of natural
 
gas. Natural gas priorities could be used as an incentive; that is, a
 
firm that cogenerates could receive a higher priority than it would if
 
it were not cogenerating. The PUC, however, has not taken any related
 
actions.
 
The role of the federal government dominates the future of natural
 
gas. The Natural Gas Act gives the FERC almost complete control over
 
natural gas activities. Therefore, state action, especially in Cali­
fornia, a state that imports must of its natural gas, is quite limited.
 
However, at the federal level, the efforts to modify natural gas acti­
vities are directly tied to the National Energy Act legislation.
 
*Simpson Paper Company was not concerned about this issue since it
 
expects 100% curtailment within five years. Owens-Illinois also
 
expressed some concern over future curtailments of natural gas.
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Table 3-1. Natural Gas Priorities 
(Effective May 31, 1976) 
Priority 1 Domestic customers, small commercial 
and institutional customers, and small 
industrial customers using less than 
100 Mcf of a peak day and who are pre­
sently on firm service. 
Priority 2A Institutional, commercial, and indus­
trial customers with peakday usage 
greater than 99 Mcf who are presently 
firm customers; 'electric utility start­
up and igniter fuel; feedstock custo­
mers ­ gas used in the production of 
ammonia, hydrogen, and.methanol. 
Priority 2B Customers who currently have the 
standby capability 'to use LPG, includ­
ing the following major industries: 
Glass container industry, automobile 
industry, metals industry, fruit and 
vegetable dehydration, that portion of 
the petroleum refineries use that is 
required for equipment which is not 
presently capable of using fuel oil ­
primarily feedstock and cracking 
equipment. 
Priority 3 Commercial and institutional custo­
mers with a present capability of 
using fuel oil (primarily boiler fuel) 
Industrial users for equipment other 
than industrial boiler fuel. Includes 
portions of equipment in: chemical 
industry, petroleum refineries, and 
glass industry. 
Priority 4 Industrial boiler fuel ­ includes par­
tial or total requirements in: sugar 
refineries, petroleum refineries, paper 
industry, chemical industry, food pro­
cessing industry, lumber industry, and 
cement plants. 
Priority 5 Steam-electric plants and electric 
utility gas turbines. 
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One part of the National Energy Act concerned with natural gas
 
provides for special treatment for firms that cogenerate: H.R. 5146,
 
the Natural Gas and Petroleum Conservation and Coal Utilization Policy
 
Act of 1977, described those facilities which must convert to coal. This
 
legislation has not yet been issued from conference, but by the end of
 
1977 the conferees had agreed to a permanent exemption for "new cogenera­
tion electric power plants or major fuel-burning installations where its
 
economic and other benefits cannot be obtained with coal or other fuels."
 
(Reference 11, pg. 12.) If such an exemption is not approved, any dis­
cussion of changes in natural gas priorities might become moot as major
 
fuel-burning installations are forced to convert to coal.
 
Summary
 
The natural gas issue is part of a larger problem facing industry ­
the uncertainty over the price and availability of fuel. A change in
 
either that could adversely affect the firm's fuel supply will be
 
avoided. The PUC realizes this and has indicated that natural gas
 
availability may be used as an incentive to cogenerate.
 
Admittedly, there is some subjectivity to the assignment of natural
 
gas priorities. However, to modify the scheme just to encourage one
 
technology only increases the arbitrariness. If cogenerators receive
 
special attention, will that not open the door to other firms seeking
 
an increase in their priority?
 
On the other hand, decreasing the natural gas priority of a cogen­
erator where the sale of. electricity is a small percentage (if any) of
 
its total sales also appears to be discriminatory despite the fact that
 
such action could be considered a literal interpretation of the priority
 
table. Because of the possibility of such an interpretation, the firms
 
perceive a need for PUC clarification of natural gas priorities for
 
cogenerators.
 
b. Rate Design
 
"Regulators are examining electric utility rate designs
 
and load controls more closely than ever before because
 
of dramatic changes in the economy -- particularly the
 
inflation of plant construction costs and higher fuel
 
costs for generation. State commissioners are asking
 
how well various load management approaches serve the
 
objectives of rate-making in light of these changes.
 
Moreover, because of fundamental shifts in society's
 
concerns about such issues as conservation, some
 
regulators are questioning the relative importance of
 
various and conflicting objectives." (Reference 13,
 
page 9.)
 
This introduction to the Electric Utility Rate Design Study is an
 
example of the dynamic nature of the PUlC's recent concern over new rate
 
designs including lifeline rates and time-of-use pricing. What effect
 
will rate-design changes have on the motivation of industrial plants to
 
consider cogeneration? The answer will depend on the rate design estab­
lished and on its effect on the price of electrical power to-iarge
 
industries.
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Only Union Oil, served by the Los Angeles Department of Water and
 
Power (LADWP), raised this issue. The LADWP has recently gone through a
 
review of its rate design (Reference 14). The Mayor's Blue Ribbon Com­
mittee recommended that a flat time differentiated rate block rather than
 
a declining rate structure be adopted. The PUC has already ordered time­
of-use rates and lifeline rates for the investor-owned utilities under its
 
jurisdiction.
 
Such price increases can only help motivate an industrial firm to
 
consider energy conservation techniques such as cogeneration. However,
 
if industrial firms begin to cogenerate and by so doing remoVe their
 
demand from the utilities' system, residential customers could see their
 
rates increase to cover the expenditures of a system with excess capacity
 
and a deterioriated load curve. The overcapacity situation would be
 
temporary; the utility would defer future expansion until its existing
 
capacity is at the required level. In the interim, present ratepayers
 
would be paying an "excess" amount for electricity so that future rate­
payers could have less expensive electricity. Such discrimination has
 
been a problem for the PUC in the case of allocating the costs of long­
term construction problems.
 
Because of the lack of any trends towards cogeneration or toward
 
large industrial firms removing their demand from the system, the issue
 
was not explored with the PUC or the utilities; however, it could become
 
important if such trends develop.
 
3. Inappropriate Issues
 
a. Rate for Selling Power. The amount of electric power avail­
able for sale is a function of the variability in the firm's individual
 
demand from its cogeneration system. If and when by-product power
 
becomes available, the firm would like to be able to receive benefits
 
(income) from the electric generation. A firm's ability to negotiate a
 
satisfactory price for the firm sale of excess by-product power could
 
make this category of cogeneration more attractive. This issue is dis­
cussed in Section IV-A-l.
 
b. Guaranteed Long-Term Agreements. The least amount of inter­
action between the firm and the electric utility is required when there
 
is no firm sale of electric power. Therefore, the importance of recon­
ciling the difference in the planning horizons of the firm and the
 
utility is minimized. (This issue is discussed in more detail in Sec­
tion V-A-l). It is important for the utility to have some assurance of
 
the future continuity of the industrial's reduced firm electric demand
 
on the system and its increased standby demand. However, the utility
 
has a mandate to supply electricity and therefore is not in a position to
 
offer resistance based on the lack of assurance of long-term demand.
 
Nevertheless, implementation of cogeneration systems that do not sell
 
firm power could deteriorate the shape of the utility's load curve as
 
the continuous load of large industry is removed, thus reducing the
 
utility's peak demand in the short run and increasing the demand uncer­
tainty in the future.
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c.. Steam Price. No steam transactions occur for this category
 
of cogeneration.
 
d. PUC Regulation. Some observers of industrial cogeneration
 
have questioned whether existing legislation would require the PUC to
 
regulate an industrial firm selling electricity to an electric utility
 
or to another firm. One interpretation of the California public utili­
ties code implies the need for such regulation. However, the relatively
 
small amount electricity sold compared with the amount utilized directly
 
by the firm should make the prospect of direct regulation of the firm
 
unlikely because of the cost involved to the PUC and the small impact on
 
the utility's expenditure for purchased electricity.

I 
e. Wheeling. The small amount of the electric power available
 
for sale and its unreliability make it unlikely that the industrial
 
cogenerator will be able to find an electric utility outside its service
 
area or another firm in the same area willing to negotiate a sales agree­
ment that would require wheeling of electricity over the transmission
 
facilities of the local utility. Therefore, this issue should not
 
be a barrier to firms considering this category of industrial
 
cogeneration.
 
B. 	 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
 
1. 	 Introduction and Description of the Best Available Control
 
Technology (BACT) Provision of the New Source Review
 
Under the New Source Review rules, permits for further construc­
tion can be denied unless existing sources are "cleaned up." Since the
 
sites visited in the initial phase of this study would fall under the
 
category of modifications to existing stationary sources (as opposed to
 
new stationary sources) only those appropriate provisions will be
 
examined here.
 
The first step in this procedure is to examine the total emissions
 
of the stationary source* after the modification to one of the units
 
that make up the source. If the source will emit more than 15 pounds
 
per hour or 150 pounds per day of nitrogen 6xides, sulfur oxides, organic
 
gases (hydrocarbons), or particulates, or 150 pounds per hour and 1500
 
pounds per day of carbon dioxide, the permit will be denied unless the
 
applicant meets several criteria. These criteria are described in the
 
best available control technology (BACT) provision. It should be noted
 
that 15 pounds per hour is a restrictive limitation for a large indus­
trial source which might cogenerate. Thus, if a firm already exceeds
 
these limits, and does not increase its emissions further after the modi­
fication, it would still be required to meet the BACT provision. The
 
BACT provision requires that the modification utilize the best available
 
control technology and that the applicant meets one of the following
 
four conditions:
 
*Stationary source is defined in Appendix G.
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(1) 	 The modification would not result in a net increase in
 
emissions of any pollutant affected by this rule; or
 
(2) 	 That best available control technology is being or is to be
 
applied to all existing units of a stationary source, or
 
(3) 	 That emissions from all of the existing units of the sta­
tionary source are controlled by use of technology that is
 
at least as effective as that generally in use on similar
 
stationary sources and that the cost of installing best
 
available control technology on existing units is economi­
cally prohibitive and substantially exceeds the cost per unit
 
mass of controlling emissions of each pollutant through all
 
other control measures; or
 
7
 (4) 	 That the stationary source is a small business, that emis­
sions from all existing units of the stationary source are
 
controlled through application of the best technology that
 
is economically reasonable to apply to that stationary source
 
and that the cost of employing best available control tech­
nology is economically prohibitive.
 
The first condition might be met by this category of cogeneration
 
because (by our definition) there is no net increase in emissions as a
 
result of the modification. Thus, the only expense is that related to
 
placing BACT on the equipment being modified. The other conditions
 
become more important when there is an increase in emissions, as dis­
cussed in the next section. However, even firms meeting the first con­
dition can incur additional expenses as a result of a modification made
 
by the ARB when it adopted the NSR rules for the Bay Area in December
 
1977. This change from the rules previously adopted for the South Coast
 
Air Quality Management District states that the permit will be denied
 
unless the applicant:
 
demonstrates that all facilities in the air basin which
 
are owned or operated by the applicant are in compliance with
 
all applicable district rules, regulations in order, and all
 
applicable requirements of the state implementation plan
 
approved or promulgated by the Federal Environmental Protec­
tion Agency."
 
This provision again shows that the NSR rules are perceived by the
 
ARB as being an important means for reducing emissions from sources and
 
that they are not just being applied to the modifications at existing
 
units of a source. The ARB has indicated that this change will soon be
 
incorporated in the NSR rules for the South Coast Air Quality Management
 
District.
 
The second condition could prove to be quite expensive for the firm.
 
Note that it applies to all units at the source and not just those that
 
are modified. The South Coast Air Quality Management District has
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interpreted this condition* to mean "that BACT must be applied to the
 
total plant or to sufficient equipment so that there is no resultant
 
net increase of air contaminants after the installation has been com­
pleted and has been put into operation." (Emphasis added.)
 
The third and fourth conditions encompass other factors such as
 
"economically prohibitive" and "economically reasonable." These terms
 
have neither been .explicitly defined in the rules and regulations of the
 
local agencies nor have they been interpreted. They are therefore a
 
source of uncertainty for a firm applying for permit to construct.
 
2. Concerns About Best Available Control Technology
 
The ARB model NSR rules define BACT as
 
"... the maximum degree of emission control for any air con­
taminant emitting equipment, taking into account technology 
which is known but not necessarily in use, provided that the 
air pollution control officer shall not interpret best avail­
able control technology to include a requirement which will 
result in the closing and elimination or inability to con­
struct a lawful business which could be operated with the 
application of the best available control technology cur­
rently in use."** (Emphasis added.) 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1971 state that a control tech­
nology must be adequately demonstrated before it is defined as BACT.
 
EPA regulations defined "adequately demonstrated" to require that at
 
least 10 different sites be found where the equipment has been installed
 
and is operating. Use in the field is thus the EPA's sole economic
 
criterion for the definition of BACT.
 
The ARB's definition cited above is even stricter than the EPA
 
BACT definition since the technology can be known anywhere in the world;'
 
thus BACT for the control of nitrogen oxide in the boiler could be
 
defined as ammonia injection, a technology applied in eight installations
 
in Japan including boilers firing LPG and LNG, gas-fired annealing fur­
nances, an iron ore sintering plant, and several fuel oil boilers.***
 
The use of undemonstrated technology presents problems for evaluatingi
 
the efficiency and reliability of future emissions reductions because
 
empirical data are not available. This problem is exacerbated by the
 
requirement of an air quality impact analysis (discussed in Section IV-B).
 
*R. MacKnight, South Coast Air Quality Management-District, personal
 
communication, December 20, 1977.
 
**Based on discussions with the Air Resources Board, it appears that
 
the concept of "closing and elimination" of a firm is the definition
 
of "economically prohibitive." However, it should be clear that con­
ditions causing one person to decide to close and eliminate a business
 
could have less influence in another person's decision.
 
***Energy Daily, p. 2, July 20, 1978.
 
3-13
 
Despite the strictness of the ARB definition of BACT, there is
 
still confusion as to what BACT really means. In an attempt to define
 
BACT for various industrial processes, the ARB formed a joint ARB/APCD
 
BACT committee to establish a list of BACT with the ARB serving as the
 
statewide clearing house. Although a preliminary list was developed,
 
the ARB appears to have stopped further development. Jan Bush, the Air
 
Pollution Control Officer for Ventura County, requested in a letter dated
 
Sept. 10, 1977, that the ARB reestablish the joint committee. According
 
to the San Diego Air Pollution Control District, the ARB never responded
 
to this request. This leaves the APCDs and California industry without
 
a consistent or predictable list of the applicable BACT. -Thus the local
 
APCDs are open to review by the ARB for not applying the New Source Review
 
correctly with respect to BACT. Because of the work being done by the
 
EPA and the pollution control industry, BACT will always be advancing.
 
This dynamic nature of BACT adds to the uncertainty over the ruling on a
 
firm's application for authority to construct under the NSR rules.
 
A list of BACT would be helpful from the firm's standpoint. How­
ever, even a list might not solve the firm's problems for there is a
 
fourth definition of BACT: that which appears in the Federal Regulations
 
on the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) and which the EPA has
 
indicated might be applied to the NSR rules in the future. The PSD
 
definition for BACT requires a case-by-case determination. This deter­
mination would include considerations of energy, environmental and eco­
nomical factors. Although this definition might be useful for promoting
 
cogeneration activities, it might also lead to greater uncertainty in
 
the outcome of each firm's NSR applications.
 
The San Diego Air Pollution Control District provided a list of
 
eight other issues they consider as unresolved with respect to applying
 
BACT. These are:
 
(1) 	 Common definition of BACT -- A common definition of BACT for
 
use in NSR rules is desirable. Is it reasonable to assume
 
that the NSR rules of all participating districts can be
 
amended to include a common BACT definition?
 
(2) 	 Different BACT in different areas -- Can BACT be different
 
in different areas (e.g., rural vs. urban) within the same
 
district?
 
(3) 	 Standing committee for unusual BACT decisions -- Should a
 
standing committee be formed to provide advice to APCDs in
 
unusual circumstances? If so, then at whose initiative
 
should the committee be convened?
 
(4) Other environmental effects/indirect emissions -- Are other
 
areas of environmental concern to be involved in determina­
tion of BACT? (e.g., solid waste disposal and water quality
 
control associated with air pollution control equipment).
 
Should emissiohis produced by the power company in generating
 
the electricity required to run the control equipment be
 
considered in determining BACT?
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(5) 	 Existing equipment/additional increments of control -- In
 
cases where BACT must be applied to existing equipment, is
 
it justifiable to require new control equipment for small
 
increments of reductions and emissions? If not, then what
 
is the definition of "small increments"?
 
(6) 	 Which pollutants are subject to BACT? - When a source emits 
more than one pollutant, should BACT be required for all 
pollutants or only for the one(s) causing the source to 
become subject to NSR? 
(7) 	 Task force product - guideline vs. list -- What should be
 
the output of the task force? Should it be a list of BACT
 
as it is seen today, or should it be a set of decision
 
guidelines to be applied by the APCD in making a decision on
 
a case-by-case basis?
 
(8) 	 Economics -- To what extent should cost enter into a deci­
sion regarding BACT? When is the cost of installing BACT
 
to be considered economically prohibitive?
 
3. 	 Application to Industrial Cogeneration
 
The industrial firms see the BACT provision as a hardship since
 
it penalizes them for installing an energy conservation measure. They
 
question why they should pay for more environmental control equipment
 
when in fact they are helping to mitigate the total emissions because
 
of their reduced electrical generating demands on the local utility.
 
When industrial firms see unresolved issues related to implementing the
 
BACT provision they are even more cautious about implementing energy con­
servation measures such as cogeneration.
 
The ARB and the APCDs are concerned with a very different problem ­
achieving-clean air. The BACT provision is'seen as a very useful tool 
for cleaning up existing air basins. However, the reduced net emissions 
claimed by firms as a result of the reduced electrical generation by the
 
local utility is not relevant from the regulators' standpoint for the
 
following reasons: First, the reduction in electric generation might
 
not occur in the air basin in which the industrial firm is located.
 
Second, even if a powerplant located in the air basin could be identi­
fied as the one where reduced generation takes place, the decreased
 
emissions of pollutants such as particulates or sulfur oxides at the
 
powerplant might not benefit the area near the industrial firm. These
 
two pollutants are usually considered site specific, unlike reactive
 
hydrocarbons which can affect the entire air basin.
 
One would like to be able to ask if industrial cogeneration is
 
properly evaluated under BACT. That is, are the total benefits of
 
applying BACT to industrial cogeneration greater than its total costs?*
 
*Economic efficiency would be indicated if the marginal benefits of
 
applying BACT equal the marginal costs.
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The answer to such a question is elusive because of the disagreement not
 
only over the definition of BACT but also over the definition of costs and
 
benefits. To the environmental regulators, the existing emissions are
 
very costly and reductions at the site are benefits. To the firm, clean­
ing up its source (and as noted above, all its sources in the air basin)
 
is the cost and the major benefit is energy conservation.
 
The discussion of BACT in this section assumes that there is no net
 
increase in emissions with the implementation of cogeneration. Air
 
Quality Impact Analysis, discussed in Section IV-B, is applicable to
 
Category A cogeneration systems if there is a net increase in emissions.
 
C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
 
The life-cycle cost comparison of'the cogeneration system and the
 
base system reveals whether or not, on a cost basis alone, the cogenera­
tion system saves money for the industrial firm in the form of reduced
 
costs. Receipts from the sale of any excess by-product electricity avail­
able from the cogeneration system are not included in this comparison.
 
Thus, 11 of the 12 industrial sites and 13 of the 14 cogeneration sys­
tems can be evaluated considering industrial ownership with no firm
 
power sales.*
 
'The life-cycle cost .comparisons for the base system and cogenera­
tion system at each applicable industrial site are presented in Table 3-2.
 
Eight of the sites had cogeneration systems with a lower life-cycle cost
 
than the base system currently in operation at the plant.** The three
 
exceptions are California Paperboard, Kaiser Steel, and Kelco; California
 
Paperboard and Kelco each have another alternative available to purchase
 
steam which will be discussed later. Kaiser Steel is the only exception
 
without an alternative. However, it -should be noted that the extremely
 
high capital cost*** of $63 x 106 is probably due at least in part to
 
Kaiser's unique environmental problems. Nevertheless, the life-cycle
 
cost for the cogeneration system is only about 2.75% higher than for the
 
base system. Thus, under the assumptions reflecting capital investments
 
and electricity, O&M and fuel costs described in Appendix J, eight of the
 
11 industrial sites having the ownership option open to them could
 
reduce energy costs by implementing cogeneration with no firm sales of
 
power.
 
*Husky Oil was the only site where an industry-owned cogeneration sys­
tem was not discussed or even considered.
 
**Spreckels Sugar currently has a cogeneration system and for this
 
site the base system was a hypothetical non-cogeneration system.
 
***Under the same assumptions used-to estimate capital cost for all the
 
other cogeneration systems, Kaiser's capital cost would be only
 
$29.7 x 106, less than half the amount indicated in the site report.
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Table 3-2. 	 Life-Cycle Cost Comparisons: Industrial Ownership
 
Without Firm Sales of Power
 
Life-Cycle Cost,
 
106 dollars
 
Cogen-

Base- eration
 
Industrial Firm 	 System System
 
California Paperboard Corp. (1 )  	 27.6(2) 34.5
 
46.7 29.6(2)
California Portland Cement 'Co. 

156.4 	 66.6(2)
Exxon Co., U.S.A. 

(1) (3)  
Hunt-Wesson 	Foods, Inc.-canning season 40.5(2) 79.6
 
48.6 44.9(2)
Hunt-Wesson 	Foods, Inc.-all year, alt.1 (4 ) 

Hunt-Wesson 	Foods, Inc.-all year, alt.2 (1) (5 )  48.6(2) 121.6
 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 199.1(2) 204.6
 
Kelco Co. (1 )  
 57.0 75.5
 
40.5 31.4(2)
Owens-Illinois, Inc. 

121.9 	 23.1(2)
Simpson Paper Co. (1 ) 

29.2 28.3(2)
Simpson Timber Co. 

51.6(2)
Spreckels Sugar Co. 	 63.4 

186.7 	 70.5(2)
Union Oil Co. 

(1) 	The option of firm sales of power for these cases is analyzed
 
in Section IV.
 
(2) 	Most attractive system on a cost basis alone.
 
(3) Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam require­
ment and operates only during canning season.
 
(4) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet off-season steam requirement
 
and operates all year.
 
(5) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam require­
ment and operates all year, dumping steam during off-season.
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Table 3-3 presents the incremental internal rate of return for
 
each site evaluated for Category A. Note that for each site that has a
 
cogeneration life-cycle cost less than that for the base system, the
 
calculated internal rate of return is greater than the required rate of
 
return.
 
Table 3-4 compares life-cycle costs for the base system and the
 
cogeneration system for the currently allowed 10% investment tax credit
 
and two investment incentives: a 20% investment tax credit and 6% inter­
est loan (100% financing).
 
As expected, the larger the capital investment, the greater the
 
impact of both the 20% investment tax credit and the 6% loan. Smaller
 
projects, like that of Hunt-Wesson, sized to meet the off-season load,
 
and of Simpson Timber., involving capital investments of less than one
 
million dollars, are not significantly affected. Thus, both forms of
 
incentive will encourage and favor large cogeneration projects over
 
small ones.
 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
1. Institutional
 
Category A is the simplest form of industrial cogeneration to
 
implement from a nontechnical perspective. There appear to be few policy
 
problems. One necessary action is that the utilities justify their
 
determination of standby rates for cogeneration. This rate should com­
pensate the utility for maintaining the necessary capacity. The utility­
should not overcharge cogenerators who might require only a fraction of
 
their aggregated capacity at any given time. In addition, final action
 
on the National Energy Act and on the resolution of the rate design for
 
each utility is important for providing a more certain decision
 
environment.
 
Category A makes the smallest contribution to energy conservation,
 
the smallest reduction of future capital expenditures, and represents a
 
financial savings only to the firm, leading to either a higher return to
 
its stockholders, lower prices to its customers or a combination of both.
 
Therefore, available market mechanisms should be adequate to encourage
 
this type of cogeneration once the actions identified above are com­
pleted. The PUC has already initiated discussions among the utilities
 
to establish fair standby rates for cogenerators.
 
One remaining question is whether policies directed toward encour­
aging firms not to consider this scheme are appropriate because of the
 
relatively small contribution it makes to energy conservation and reduced
 
capital expenditures. Once investments are made by a firm, 15-20 years
 
could pass before a new cogeneration system that is more energy and cost
 
efficient is considered again (Reference 10, page 342). Such disincen­
tive policies might be important if delays are anticipated in developing
 
the proper decision environment for alternative cogeneration systems.
 
However, these policies should be directed only toward those firms having
 
steam loads compatible with cogeneration systems which have firm sales
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Table 3-3. Calculated Incremental Internal Rate of Return:
 
Industrial Ownership Without Firm Sales of
 
Power 
Required 
Incremental Internal Rate of Return 
Industrial Firm Rate of Return*, % (After Tax), % 
California Paperboard Corp. <0 12.5 
California Portland Cement Co. 23.3 10.0 
Exxon Co., U.S.A. >40 12.5 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. -
canning season <0 10 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. -
all year, Alt. 1 >40 10 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. -
all year, Alt. 2 <0 10 
Kaiser Steel Corp. <0 15 
Kelco Co. <0 15 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. 17.3 12 
Simpson Paper Co. >40 12 
Simpson Timber Co. >40 12 
Spreckels Sugar Co. >40 10 
Union Oil Co. >40 10 
Additional power purchased at base system rate. 
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Table 3-4. Effects of Two Financial Incentives: Industrial Ownership Without Firm Sales of Power
 
Life-Cycle Cost, 106 dollars
 
Financial Incentive
 
Capital Current 6% Low
 
Investment, Base 10% Investment 20% Investment Interest Loan
 
Industrial Firm 106 dollars System Tax Credit Tax Credit (100% Financing)
 
California Paperboard Corp. 3.7 27.6 34.5 33.8 32.2 
California Portland Cement Co. 9.1 46.7 29.6 27.7 25.6 
Exxon Co., U.S.A. 9.4 156.4 66.6 56.8 51.2 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. ­
canning season 13.7 40.5 79.6 76.9 73.7 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. ­
all year, Alt. 1* 0.3 48.6 44.9 44.9 44.8 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. ­
all year, Alt. 2 13.7 48.6 121.6 118.9 115.7
 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 63.0 199.1 204.6 192.0 154.5
 
Kelco Co. 8.2 57.0 75.5 73.9 69.0 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. 3.7 40.5 31.4 30.7 29.2 
Simpson Paper Co. 8.1 121.9 23.1 21.5 18.3 
Simpson Timber Co. 0.14 29.2 28.3 28.2 28.2 
Spreckels Sugar Co. --- ---.- ** ** 
Union Oil Co. 15.4 186.7 70.5 67.4 63.8 
*Cogeneration system sized to meet the off-season steam requirement and operates all year.
 
**Financial incentives were not evaluated for Spreckels Sugar because they already have cogeneration
 
installed.
 
of excess power or are utility owned. This selectivity requirement
 
probably would make any policy implementation cumbersome and expensive.
 
2. Environmental
 
What can be done to help a firm implement industrial cogeneration
 
and still keep the intent of the BACT provision? Several initiatives
 
are suggested here for future study.
 
First, the ARB should reestablish the joint BACT committee to
 
establish a set of guidelines for determining BACT and deal with the
 
eight indicated issue areas. In addition, the joint committee should
 
work toward developing a BACT list and establish a procedure for evalu­
ating the status of the BACT list so that a firm would know how long the
 
existing list will be current state of knowledge. If a case-by-case
 
determination is held to apply to BACT, the joint committee should then
 
be authorized to develop a list of operational guidelines for evaluating
 
the cases.
 
The joint committee should be expanded to be a standing committee
 
with staff and resources and should include representation from industrial
 
and environmental interest groups.
 
Second, the ARB should consider a more flexible definition of BACT
 
which recognizes its energy conservation benefits, e.g., the relevant
 
BACT must be adequately demonstrated at several similar plants before
 
it can be applied to an industrial cogeneration modification.
 
Third, the ARB and the APCDs should consider the benefits of
 
reduced emissions from a utility powerplant resulting from industrial
 
cogeneration. In other words, because cogeneration itself is a form of
 
control technology for the utility, the industrial firm should be given
 
credit for expenditure for the modification. An emissions credit in
 
lb per hour could be established for each kilowatt-hour of utility energy
 
displaced by industrial cogeneration. The credit need not be the full
 
value, but at least some percentage of this should be applicable.* Formal­
izing these credits would acknowledge the total social contribution of
 
industrial cogeneration and could provide the motivation for increased
 
industrial participation. These initiatives should be explored and analy­
zed; they point to areas where compromise is possible without diminishing
 
the intent of the New Source Review rules.
 
*The percentage for each pollutant should be based on environmental
 
grounds similar to those implied under the air quality impact analysis.
 
These air basin benefits and cross-air basin benefits are discussed in
 
the next section.
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SECTION IV
 
ANALYSIS OF CATEGORY B: INDUSTRIALkOWNERSHIP WITH
 
FIRM SALES OF POWER
 
In this institutional setting, the industrial firm sells cogenerated
 
electricity that meets specific contractual conditions related to the
 
reliability and availability of the power. Because of these contractual
 
stipulations, the firm can either meet all of its internal electrical
 
requirements and commit to the utility only that capacity over and above
 
its own demand, or it can commit all of its capacity to the utility and
 
continue to buy electricity from the utility. The difference between
 
the price paid by the firm for electricity and the price offered by the
 
utility is an important consideration in the determination of the alter­
native chosen. If the price offered by the utility is less than the
 
price paid by the firm, the firm can reduce its net expenditures by first
 
offsetting its electrical demand. However, other factors, such as the
 
price of standby power, couldreduce this price differential. Topping
 
cycles are usually associated with this form of industrial cogeneration.
 
To clarify the discussion of the institutional issues, it is
 
assumed that the firm commits all of its capacity to the local utility
 
and continues to purchase all of its electricity from the firm. The
 
advantage for the firm is the increased reliability of the purchased
 
electricity in comparison to the electricity produced by its own cogen­
eration plant. The advantages for the utility company include the
 
continuity of both the supply of electricity and the demand for power.
 
A. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
 
The relevant issues appear to be the selling price for electricity
 
delivered to the utility's distribution system by the cogenerator, the
 
nature of the long term agreement, and the determination of the regula­
tory status of the cogenerator. The subject of wheeling, the possibility
 
of changes in natural gas priorities, and changing electric rate design
 
are also important.
 
Category B, the most difficult of the three categories to imple­
ment, provides the greatest savings in energy and capital expenditures
 
and involves the most interaction between the utility, the firm, and the
 
Public Utilities Commission.
 
1. Primary Issues 
/ 
a. Selling Price for Excess Electricity. The price offered 
for electricity produced by industrial cogeneration is important in
 
determining the economic benefits of implementing cogeneration and in
 
determining whether or not the firm will sell excess electricity con­
tinually or intermittently. The price will be determined through
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negotiations between the firm and the electric utility company. In
 
addition, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is playing an influen­
tial role in requiring utilities-to establish tariffs. (See Appendix B.)
 
The Industrial Firm's Viewpoint
 
Several firms viewed pricing as a key issue. Exxon qompany, U.S.A.
 
felt that the current price of 1.4Q/kW-hr offered by the utility (Pacific
 
Gas and Electric Company) for by-product power was inadequate since it
 
barely covered fuel costs. California Portland Cement Company agreed
 
with this view although it is serviced by Southern California Edison
 
Company (SCE).
 
Three companies expressed views on whetheroiN not favorable prices
 
would be obtained. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., felt that the utility
 
company would not be willing to pay a reasonable price for (industrially
 
generated') power. Simpson Paper Company, however, was under the
 
impression that the present attitude of their utilitycompany (PG&E was
 
more receptive.
 
Utilities might have to begin to offer higher prices if they are
 
to retain their large customers. Otherwise, the large customers could
 
remove their demand from the system and supply their own needs through
 
cogeneration, leading to a deterioration in the utility's load curve.
 
The Electric Utility Company's Viewpoint
 
The utilities have made some dramatic changes in their views on
 
the purchase of energy from industrial firms. In the past this activity
 
was frowned upon and only as a result of capacity shortages caused by
 
the recent drought did some of the utilities begin to reconsider purchase
 
of industrially generated power. However, even in these cases, indus­
trially generated power was considered to be inferior to utility genera­
ted power. A PG&E representative noted that "industrial operating
 
practices are different in most cases and in many ways incompatible with
 
good utility operating practices." (Reference 15, pg. 35.)
 
Changing circumstances have forced the utilities to reconsider the
 
value of the capacity and the energy produced by industrial cogeneration.
 
For each utility, this value will be different and within each utility
 
system the value of energy varies on a daily, seasonal, and annual basis.
 
On a daily basis, the utility goes from periods of peak demand, where
 
more expensive power plants must be operated, to mid-peak and off-peak
 
periods where less expensive base load power provides the major portion
 
of the supply. Accordingly, the Southern California Edison Company has
 
suggested that the price it will pay will vary depending on the time of
 
day the electricity is delivered to the system. On a seasonal basis,
 
the availability of inexpensive hydro-power can become an important
 
factor in determining the value of industrially generated power. Thus,
 
PG&E would like to retain the ability to reject industrial power if less
 
expensive power is available,. In addition, peak periods vary with the
 
seasons. On an annual basis, the relationship between the utility's
 
capacity and demand are changing, especially as additional capacity is
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delayed in coming on-line. For example, in the first quarter of 1978,
 
the number of kW-hrs of electricity sold by the major electric utilities
 
in California was 5.8% less than the comparable period of 1977. (Refer­
ence 16). Thus, it is reasonable that the price the utility pays should
 
fluctuate over time. (A more detailed description of the differences
 
between the utilities appears in Appendix C.) As noted above, the
 
Public Utilities Commission has requested the electric utilities to
 
submit guidelines covering the prices and conditions for the purchase of
 
energy from industry-owned cogeneration facilities.
 
From the industrial firm's point of view, fluctuating value may
 
be of concern. In essence, they are evaluating the return on an invest­
ment for a new "product line." They would like'to know with a degree of
 
certainty the revenues that can be expected as a result of the invest­
ment. Although a time-dependent rate incorporated into the original
 
contract would probably be acceptable, the possibility of going without
 
any revenue for a period of time might be too risky.
 
Again, from the utility company's point of view, agreements that do
 
not allow for price fluctuation due to external conditions could force
 
them to buy overpriced electricity in comparison to other available
 
sources. Such a situation would be reflected in higher costs to the'util­
ity's customers. However, at the same time, the utility needs to be con­
cerned with keeping its established industrial customers. Industrial
 
customers are highly valued by the utilities because their demands are
 
usually continuous and large in comparison to residential customers.
 
Historically, this has been expressed as a reduced price for industrial
 
customers.. Therefore, the potential loss of such a customer needs to be
 
evaluated by the utility. In the long term, the utility will be able to
 
adjust for such losses. In the short term, which is specified by the
 
length of the rate hearing process, the result could be a loss of net
 
revenue for the utility. The utilities might minimize that loss by
 
offering more attractive rates to industrial customers for the purchase
 
of all their cogenerated electricity.
 
The purpose of this discussion is to show the difficulties that
 
must be overcome before the firm and the utility can enter into an
 
agreement over the price of cogenerated electricity. All of the prices
 
suggested by the Utilities fall below the rate at which they, the
 
utilities, sell electricity. Therefore, a firm would prefer to offset
 
purchased power with cogenerated power instead of selling directly to
 
the utility because it would be a greater benefit (a negative cost).
 
This evaluation is adjusted by the necessary standby charges described
 
previously. Even as the ratio of electricity cogenerated to electricity
 
demanded increases, the firm can maximize the return on its cogeneration
 
investment by first offsetting its electrical demand and then selling
 
the excess electricity.
 
These conclusions rest on the assumption that cogenerated elec­
tricity is priced as some percentage of the utility's total average cost
 
or average cost of oil and gas generating facilities. The percentage
 
reduction represents the administrative charges incurred by the utility.
 
However, it is a well known fact that "the average price of energy has
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now fallen well below the still rising replacement cost of energy
 
supplies." (Reference 17, pg. 112.) Should cogenerated electricity be
 
evaluated as a percentage of the replacement costs? If so, and assuming
 
no radical change in the utility's rate design, the economic incentive for
 
utility ownership could be sufficient.
 
The situation described, with firms receiving a higher price for
 
the sale of electricity than for the purchase of electricity, could raise
 
questions by the other ratepayers. This would especially be true if the
 
firm achieves a very high rate of return on its cogeneration investment.
 
Ratepayers are accustomed to utilities earning a 8-10% return on investment
 
Realizing this concern, industrial firms will want assurance that they
 
are not going to be regulated by either the Public Utilities Commission
 
or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
 
b. Regulation. When a firm owning a cogeneration system sells
 
electricity either to another firm or to an electric utility company it
 
could conceivably come under the definition of an "electric corporation"
 
found in the Public Utilities Act (Paragraph 218):
 
"Electrical corporation includes every corporation or person
 
owning, controlling, operating or managing any electrical
 
plant for compensation within the State, except where
 
electricity is generated on or distributed by the producer
 
through private property alone, solely for his own use or
 
the use of his tenants and not for sale to others."
 
When such an electrical corporation performs a service for the public it
 
is a "public utility" (as defined in Paragraph 216) and subject to the
 
Public Utilities Act. (See Appendix C for a description of a public
 
utility.) The issue is whether or not an industrially owned cogenera­
tion facility should be regulated.
 
The Industrial Firm's Viewpoint
 
The uncertainty created by the language of the Public Utilities
 
Act has been the cause of much concern on the part of several firms.
 
Exxon Company, U.S.A. stated that it has no interest in becoming an
 
electrical public utility. California Portland Cement Co. called the
 
reaction of the PUC to the sale of electric pbwer outside of its plant
 
their biggest uncertainty. There appears to be little, if any, willing­
ness on the part of industrial firms to allow their practices to come
 
under the direct jurisdiction of the PUC.
 
The Public Utilities Commission's Viewpoint
 
Before looking at the recent activities by the PUC on this issue,
 
it is appropriate to reexamine the case of Richfield Oil Corporation
 
vs. Public Utilities Commission (Reference 18). In this case the PUC
 
had found that Richfield Oil Corporation was a public utility as a
 
result of its 1959 contract with SCE to provide natural gas for a period
 
of 25 years. To do this, Richfield had to build a pipeline. Southern
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Counties Gas Company, the certified public utility in the area, filed a
 
complaint with the PUC based on Section 1001 of the California Public
 
Utilities Code. That section stipulates that a certificate of public
 
convenience and necessity must be acquired before a public utility can
 
build a pipeline. The PUC agreed that Richfield was a public utility
 
and ordered that a certificate of convenience was required.
 
Richfield petitioned the California Supreme Court. The Court held
 
that the commission's order should be annulled. The decision hinged on
 
the definition of dedication. A law review article on the case, noted
 
that:
 
"Dedication had originally been incorporated into the law
 
to satisfy a constitutional question but that question is
 
no longer an issue. However, since the codification of
 
the original Public Utilities Act in i911 the legislature
 
.has repeatedly enacted the pertinent code Section of 207
 
and 216, defining 'public' and 'public utility' in
 
substantially the same form, saying nothing of dedication
 
even in light of judicial interpretations requiring
 
dedication since 1912. This strongly suggests
 
legislative intent in accord with the case holdings."
 
(Reference 19, pg. 328.)
 
The article goes on to note that, under the California Code of
 
Civil Procedure, a court cannot "write into a statute, by implication,
 
express limitation which the legislature itself has not seen fit to
 
include in the statute." (Reference 19, pg. 331.) This, however,
 
appears to have been done in the case of dedication. The article
 
concludes:
 
"If the legislature would define dedication with respect
 
to becoming a public utility, that meaning would be
 
binding in the courts, and corporations desiring not to
 
become regulated-utilities would have a more concrete
 
basis on which to plan their business activities."
 
Without such a definition each case must be considered separately.
 
As noted in a PUC memorandum by William N. Foley, Assistant General
 
Counsel of the PUC:
 
"Whether a privately-owned cogenerating industrial company
 
which sells electricity to a public-owned or privately­
owned utility is itself a public utility will depend on
 
the facts and details of the arrangement between the two
 
parties. A firm which operates only one cogeneration
 
facility in the state might be held not to be a public
 
,utility, particularly if its agreement with the
 
purchasing utility is for the sale of surplus power on
 
an infrequent basis at a price to be determined
 
separately for each sale. On the other hand, if the
 
company has two or more cogeneration facilities in the
 
state and sells power on a firm basis, it might well be
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held to be a public utility. This might be true even if
 
the cogenerator has only one powerplant, but agrees to
 
sell power on a firm basis at a fixd price for a
 
substantial period of time. If the company operates
 
several cogeneration facilities and sells power to more
 
than one utility it could be heid to be a public
 
utility. The legal results will depend on the
 
operational facts and the details of the sales contract
 
involved in each individual case."*
 
Mr. Foley concludes that legislationclarifying the utility status
 
of cogeneration is required.
 
The PUC is aware of the concerns over legislation by California
 
firms considering cogeneration. In its staff report on cogeneration the
 
Utilities Division states that:
 
"Industry has shown resistance to cogeneration projects
 
for fear it might be considered a public utility and
 
subject to PUC jurisdiction." (Reference 5.)
 
The staff of the Utilities Division of the PUC goes on to say that
 
it
 
"does not regard the customer who generates all or a
 
portion of electricity for his own use and sells surplus
 
energy to a utility as a public utility and subject to
 
Commission regulation." (Reference 6.)
 
The PUC and the state legislature are looking into this matter.
 
However, the PUC has shown some reluctance due to a concern that legis­
lation might be premature and therefore might foreclose socially bene­
ficial implementation of cogeneration systems. The PUC would prefer to
 
provide firms with an opportunity to experiment with many cogeneration
 
arrangements before any legislation is produced. The only problem is
 
that without the legislation, the development of cogeneration might be
 
significantly inhibited in its development and not reach its full
 
economic potential.
 
Through its review of all special contracts, the PUC has some
 
indirect control over firms that sell electricity. How far the PUC will
 
need to go to establish that the electric utility company is paying a
 
fair and equitable price for the electricity is still an open question.
 
Therefore, even if the PUC or the state legislature decides not to
 
regulate cogenerators, the industrial firms might still be reluctant
 
to cogenerate because of the required review of their operating and
 
financial records.
 
*Memo to PUC Commissioner Claire Dedrick, from William N. Foley,
 
March 3, 1978.
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Summary~of the Issue
 
Two points in the,PUC Utilities Division staff statement should be
 
emphasized. First, the regulation of firms that sell all of the cogen­
erated electricity to a utility is not addressed. Second, it is the
 
view of only the PUC Utilities Division's staff. The PUC legal depart­
ment, as noted, has indicated the need for a case-by-case analysis of
 
whether or not the cogeneration facility is dedicated to the public use
 
and is, therefore, subject to regulation by the PUC.
 
As a result, both the industrial firms and the electric utility
 
companies expressed the need for legislation exempting cogeneration from
 
being classified as a public utility. Mr. Gerald Decker of the Dow
 
Chemical Company stated in his congressional testimony on cogeneration
 
that:
 
"The existing regulations which tend to prohibit
 
electricity sales by private industrials are so complex
 
that-positive and specific exemptions from utility
 
regulations are necessary to entice an industrial firm
 
to even attempt an electric power sale." (Reference 20,
 
pg. 334.)
 
The testimony was given with respect to those parts of the National
 
Energy Act and related legislation on cogeneration. In the early legis­
lation the Federal Power Act was to be amended to state that "progisions
 
.. shall not apply to a cogeneration facility."* This was amended
 
so that the existing legislation states that "power procedures of over
 
thirty megawatts may not'be exempt from the Federal Power Act."
 
Thus, the issue of regulation is still unresolved and until it
 
is, many firms will forego investments in cogeneration. Unfortunately,
 
discussions of the regulation issues never seem to address a more funda2
 
mental question - regardless of all the legal precedents, are there
 
justifiable reasons for regulating an ihdustrial cogenerator? The
 
answer is related to the special role assigned to the generation of
 
electricity in the U.S. economy as a regulated industry. Is cogenerated
 
electricitydifferent? These questions which require an examination
 
of the reasons for regulating electrical generation, are beyond the
 
scope of this study.
 
c. Long Term Agreements. In addition to the price paid by the
 
utility for firm cogenerated electricity, the utility and the cogenerator
 
must also come to some understanding on the operating interface and on
 
the length of the commitment by the two parties. Electric utilities are
 
accustommed to a 5 to 10 year planning horizon and are reluctant to make
 
investments that will not help them over this time period. Manufacturers
 
are usually more accustommed to a shorter planning horizon in relation
 
to decisions at individual plants.. The required contractual arrangements
 
must reflect these twb concerns. The problems of negotiating such an
 
arrangement are discussed in Section V-A-i-a.
 
*Reference 9, Section 107(c).
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2. Secondary Issues 
0 
a. Rate Design. Changes in rate design can have two different 
effects. They can: 
(1) . Increase the rates for electricity and thus heighten the
 
firm's willingn&ss to consider cogeneration.

1 
(2) 	 Change the differential between the price paid by the firm
 
for electricity and the price paid by the utility for
 
cogenerated electricity. An increase in the diffbrence will
 
discourage th4 implementation of industrial cogenbration
 
as discussed in this chapter.
 
The issues and views related to changes in rate design were examined in
 
Section III-A-2-b.
 
b. Wheeling. Wheelin is the use of the transmission facili­
ties of one system to transmit power of and for another system. Wheeling
 
is also one of the most controversial subjects in the study of the elec­
tric utility industry. Although major electric utility companies will
 
normally wheel power for one another, their relationship with the smaller
 
municipal utilities has been less than cooperative in many cases (see
 
Appendix F). The utilities' wheeling relationship with industry is
 
almost nonexistent.
 
When does wheeling arise as a major issue? Wheeling is closely
 
related to the issue of the selling price of excess electricity. If
 
the selling price is sufficiently high, the issue of wheeling never
 
arises.
 
If the price 6ffered by the local utility is not considered high
 
enough, the option to wheel that power from the industrial firm-to a
 
nonlocal utilit or to. another firm could help to keep the proper incen­
tives for cogeneration without having the local utility pay what might
 
be to them an excessive price.
 
The operational aspects of wheeling for.a cogenerator could
 
become difficult to manage for an electric utility. For example, what
 
procedure should be followed by the utility transporting electricity if
 
the cogenerator must shut down its generators for a short time period?
 
Should power delivery at the other end of the transmission be stopped
 
for the same period? Should payment be made for keeping the electric
 
supply continuous? If so, what is a proper price for such a service?
 
The Industrial Firm Viewpoint
 
Three of the 12 firms surveyed considered the ability to wheel
 
power as an essential part of their cogeneration scheme. For California
 
Portland Cement, the ability to wheel power at a favorable cost over SCE
 
lines from its Mojave plant to its Colton plant was a necessary factor
 
for one system under consideration. The wheeling capability was
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considered by California Portland Cement to be required in addition to
 
receiving a favorable price from the utility for power sold to the grid.
 
Kaiser Steel expressed a similar concern for having the capability to
 
have electricity wheeled to an interested municipal utility. It is not
 
clear how the situation might change if the municipal utility owned the
 
cogeneration plant at the Kaiser Steel facility. In this case the
 
wheeling would be done between utilities, a common and accepted practice
 
in California.
 
Simpson Timber has requested that PG&E allow them to wheel power
 
to other plants. Industrial wheeling, according to Simpson Timber, is a
 
common practice in the Northwest.
 
The Electric Utility Company's Viewpoint
 
The utilities do not perceive wheeling as an issue. They feel that
 
the same result can be achieved by two distinct operations: utility
 
purchase of cogenerated power and the subsequent sale of that power. The
 
issue of wheeling is raised as a means to ensure that the firms are
 
offered a fair price. Because the utilities are confident that they will
 
offer a fair price, they feel that this issue need not be raised.
 
The Public Utilities Commission's Viewpoint
 
The PUC agrees with the utilities, noting that even raising the
 
issue could become a major deterrent to utilities' support of cogenera­
tion. The PUC feels that its actions requiring the utilities to offer a
 
fair price for cogenerated electricity will preclude the necessity for
 
wheeling.
 
At the federal level, wheeling is still viewed as an important
 
issue. In Section 241(b), Title II of the proposed H.R. 4018 - Public
 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act - the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis­
sion (FERC) can, by order, direct an electric utility to:
 
"(A) establish physical connection of its transmission facilities
 
with the facilities of any other electric utility or qualify­
ing cogenerator, or
 
(B) (i) sell or deliver energy to or exchange energy with, 
(ii) provide pooling for, 
(iii) provide wheeling or otherwise transmit energy for, or 
(iv) otherwise coordinate with, such utility or cogenerator." 
The FERC cannot make such an order unless it determines that the
 
consumer of an electric utility will receive benefits and that "no-utility
 
subject to such order or its customers will suffer-economic hardship."
 
(Section 241(a).) The section goes on to exclude from the paragraph, the
 
transmission of electric energy to an "ultimate customer." This would
 
apply to plant A wheeling to plant B over a utility's transmission or
 
distribution system.
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Even if this proposed legislation is passed, it could be a long
 
time before the FERC determines how and when it will apply the law.
 
Summary of the Issue
 
Wheeling is a complex issue because of its close relationship to
 
many other issues concerning electric utility regulation. Both industry
 
and the U.S. Congress have indicated the possible need for wheeling. The
 
PUC and the utilities in California do not perceive it as an issue.
 
Wheeling, they believe, can be avoided by negotiating a fair price for
 
cogenerated electricity. If the local utility does not need the cogen­
erated electricity or does not value it as highly as another utility,
 
arrangements should be made between the utilities. For example, if
 
San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) wanted to purchase electricity from
 
a firm in the Southern California Edison (SCE) service area, SDG&E would
 
arrange to purchase electricity from SCE. SCE would then be able to
 
offer a different, presumably higher, price to the firm and then in a
 
separate agreement sell power to SDG&E.
 
d. 	 Natural Gas Priorities and the National Energy Act. The
 
issues related to the change in natural gas priorities and the National
 
Energy Act are discussed in Sections III-A-2-a and Ill-A-l-b, respectively.
 
3. 	 Inappropriate Issues
 
a. Standby Power Charge. A firm buying all its electricity
 
from the utility does not require standby power. The standby power
 
charge will, however, affect a firm's decision to supply firm power.
 
Standby power issues are discussed in Section II-A-l-a.
 
b. 	 Steam Sales. Category B does not involve steam transactions.
 
B. 	 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
 
1. 	 Introduction and Description of the Air Quality Impact Analysis
 
(AQIA)
 
The Best Available Control Technology (BACT) provision, discussed
 
in Section III-B, is intended to prevent stationary sources from increas­
ing their emissions by requiring the use of technologies that will at
 
least maintain the status quo in emissions.* For sources with larger
 
emissions, the New Source Review (NSR) rules require an Air Quality
 
*All of the sources subject to AQIA are necessarily subject to the
 
BACT provision.
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Impact Analysis (AQIA). The intent of the AQIA with respect to
 
modifications to existing stationary sources* is to deny a permit to
 
construct if the modification will result in a net increase in emissions
 
that will interfere with the attainment or maintenance of ambient air
 
quality standards. In other words, she AQIA focuses on net emission
 
increases due to the modificationp while the BACT provisions consider
 
total emissions from the entire source. The net emission increase must
 
be:
 
"... greater than 25 pounds per hour or 250 pounds per day of 
nitrogen oxides, organic gases, or any air contaminant for 
which there is a state or national ambient air quality 
standard (except carbon monoxide, for which the limits are 
250 pounds per hour and 2500 pounds per day)." 
How, then, is the local Air Pollution Control Officer to determine
 
that the emissions will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance
 
of specific ambient air quality standards? The rule mentions only what
 
should be considered in the analysis of the effect on air quality:
 
"Such analysis shall consider the air contaminant emissions
 
and air quality in the vicinity of the new source or modified
 
source, within the air basin and within adjoining air basins..."
 
One of the key aspects of the ARB's model New Source Review rule
 
is the concept of trade-offs or offsets to achieve emissions reduction.
 
The basic idea is for the Air Pollution Control Officer to allow the
 
net increase in emissions from the applicant's source to be offset,
 
traded-off, with a reduction in emissions from another source. Thus,
 
if Plant A will be increasing its emission by 100 pounds per hour
 
because of cogeneration, a permit to construct would be granted if the
 
plant could modify or eliminate another source such that the net emis­
sion of both sources did not interfere with the attainment of an ambient
 
air quality standard.
 
A few 	clarifying remarks are necessary:
 
(1) 	 The trade-off is by air contaminant. Thus, the net increase
 
in nitrogen oxides cannot today be traded-off with a net
 
reduction in sulfur oxide at another plant.
 
(2) 	 The stationary source where the emission reduction occurs
 
must be located in the same air basin as the increased
 
emitter.
 
*Because the sites visited are considering cogeneration as a modifica­
tion, only the corresponding provisions of the NSR rules are considered
 
here.
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(3) 	 The trade-off must be real and the applicant must be able to
 
demonstrate that the air basin will in fact experience a net
 
decrease in emissions.*
 
(4) 	 The rules have thus far been construed that the source where
 
the reduction in emissions occurs must be under the same
 
ownership as the increased emitter.
 
(5) 	 Emissions reduction cannot be used in the trade-off if they
 
are already required by law. Thus, the applicant cannot use
 
the reduction in emissions due to the use of BACT at other
 
units at the source because this would be required by law
 
under the provisions of the NSR rules as discussed
 
previously.
 
The latest version of the NSR rules adopted by the ARB (for the
 
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District) includes the one additional
 
constraint that to obtain a trade-off the "applicant must demonstrate
 
that there will be a net decrease in the emissions of all air contam­
inants emitted..." (emphasis added). Thus, even if nitrogen oxides were
 
the only pollutant for which there was a net increase in emissions over
 
25 pounds, the firm would still be required to find other sources,
 
including its own, that could be modified to result in a net decrease
 
in pollutants other than nitrogen oxides before it could apply for the
 
trade-off consideration. This change from the original model NSR rules
 
will presumably be incorporated in the South Coast Air Quality Manage­
ment District and all other future NSR rules adopted by the California
 
APCDs.
 
The NSR rule contains several criteria for granting exemptions
 
from the AQIA. Three of the exemptions are pertinent to industrial
 
cogeneration:
 
(1) 	 The proposed stationary source modification will cause
 
"demonstrable air quality benefits." ARB and EPA written
 
concurrence is required prior to granting this exemption.
 
(2) 	 The modification will utilize "unique and innovative control
 
technology" resulting in a "significantly lower emission
 
rate" than the "previously known best available cbntrol
 
technology." EPA and ARB concurrence is required.
 
(3) The modification of the stationary source "represents a
 
significant advance in the development of a technology that
 
appears to offer extraordinary environmental or public
 
health benefits or other benefits of overriding importance
 
to the public health or welfare." (emphasis added) Here
 
again, EPA and ARB concurrence is required.
 
*For 	example, if Plant B is presently emitting 75 pounds per hour of
 
organic gases but it is authorized to emit 100 pounds per hour, the
 
difference of 25 pounds per hour could not be traded off Plant A; only
 
actual emissions can be traded off.
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2. Concerns About Implementing the AQIA Provision
 
Discussions with the ARB and the local APCDs indicate that the
 
AQIA provisions are intended to give the local Air Pollution Control
 
Officer (APCO) a considerable degree-of latitude in making determinations
 
on permits to construct. The rule provides no algorithm for permit
 
review. Specific factors to be considered are not indicated nor does
 
the rule indicate the importance to be attached to various factors.
 
Obviously, this allows-the APCO to use his own discretion in arriving
 
at a decision.* Thus, the application of the AQIA will be capable of
 
change as conditions necessitate. The ARB felt that this dynamic
 
characteristic was important for the APCO to judiciously apply the NSR
 
rule. For the firm, however, this dynamic characteristic is fraught
 
with'arbitrariness and uncertainty.
 
The determination of the trade-off ratio** is probably the most
 
political of all aspects of performing an AQIA. The ratio is used as a
 
surrogate for modeling. If an accurate air quality model were available,
 
the demonstrable air quality benefit could be shown analytically.***
 
Without such reliable models, the ratio is used, with certain caveats,
 
to insure that more pollutants are removed than are added by the new
 
units. The factors used in computing the ratio have not yet been
 
established but, according to the ARB, include the type of pollutant,
 
other nearby facilities, aid the demography of the air basin. Note
 
that site-specific pollutants, such as particulates, require trade-offs
 
with sources near the new source in order to prevent one location in
 
the air basin from benefitting at the expense of another. Because all
 
of these divergent aspects must be incorporated into one ratio, it is
 
unlikely that a single ratio can serve a whole air basin let alone an
 
entire state. Thus, for example, resolution of the so-called Sohio
 
case might not establish a precedent for administering trade-offs.
 
*A firm can appeal an unfavorable decision. The ARB can intervene
 
only if it finds that the rules are not being implemented correctly.
 
In the case of the Bay Area APCD, discussed in the next chapter, the
 
ARB never overruled the local APCD but instead found that the exist­
ing rules were inadequate and therefore adopted new rules for the
 
District.
 
**A ratio of 1.2 to 1 means that for every pound of net emission
 
increase of a pollutant, 1.2 pounds of that pollutant must be
 
eliminated. There are in fact two ratios: a "safety factor" ratio
 
which must be met daily and a "project benefit" ratio that is calcu­
lated on an annual basis.
 
***Discussions with the ARB and several APCDs indicated that even with a
 
modeling capability, the equity problems involved in determining air
 
quality benefits for an entire air basin could be very difficult to
 
resolve.
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The Sohio case refers to the first significant application of the
 
trade-off concept in California. The project itself involves the con­
struction of a marine terminal, 10 storage tanks, and pipeline segments
 
that connect to existing lines to Midland, Texas. Alaskan crude oil
 
would thus be delivered to the mid-West at a cost savings in comparison
 
to going through the Panama Canal. To acquire its authority to construct,
 
the Standard Oil Company of Ohio (Sohio) entered into negotiations with
 
the Southern California Edison Company (SCE) that would have Sohio buy
 
$78 million worth of pollution control equipment for SCE to offset the
 
net increase in emissions that would result from the terminal operations.
 
Negotiations were described as "not easy." For example, some of the
 
issues that needed resolution were: (1) Who is responsible for continu­
ing operations and maintenance? (2) What if the control equipment fails,
 
who is responsible for its repair? and (3) Who pays for cost overruns?
 
Although the Sohio case is referred to as an application of the NSR
 
rules, the case falls under the third exemption discussed above. One
 
problem area is the estimates of the reliability and efficiency of the
 
BACT - scrubbers - which is to be applied at the SCE plant. Such data
 
are necessary to compute the trade-offs; thus, the use of the ARB defini­
tion of BACT (see Section ITT-B) presents a "Catch 22" -- to obtain the
 
operating data one needs to demonstrate the technology, but in order to
 
demonstrate the technology one needs the operating data to obtain the
 
required permits.
 
3. Application to Industrial Cogeneration
 
The concept of a pollution trade-off appears to be designed for
 
industrial cogeneration -- the industrial firm offsets the utility's
 
electric capacity (and emissions) by generating electricity on-site.
 
Thus, while the industrial firm burns more fuel, the utility benefits
 
since it, theoretically, can reduce its own fuel consumption.
 
The key word above is "theoretically." Since the local APCDs
 
consider only actual trade-offs, the firm needs to prove that the
 
utility would be permanently reducing its own electric generation
 
capacity. For site-specific pollutants, the utility's powerplant must
 
therefore be nearby. However, the utility may prefer cutting back on
 
its purchased power agreements rather than reducing generation at a
 
baseload powerplant in the local area.
 
The question which remains is whether the NSR rules are constructed
 
so that they do not recognize the benefits of industrial cogeneration.*
 
The industrial firms point to the net decrease in emissions after the
 
implementation of industrial cogeneration, while the air pollution
 
regulators note that emissions are not easily aggregated -- reductions
 
in one air basin may not necessarily help another air basin. Even
 
*The California Paperboard Corporation's joint project with the City of
 
Santa Clara is discussed in Section V as an example of a case where the
 
exemption clauses of the NSR rules relating to "innovative technology"
 
were tested. For the present section, only the rule's nonexclusionary
 
clauses are discussed.
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within an air basin as diverse as the Bay Area, some zones have carbon
 
monoxide problems and others have sulfur oxides problems. Thus, within
 
this basin, a cogeneration plant that increases carbon monoxide in one
 
community and reduces carbon monoxide in another harms the former and is
 
ineffective in alleviating the (sulfur oxides) problems of the latter.
 
Regulators do not regard this as helpful in meeting ambient air standards.
 
As far as its legal mandate goes, industrial cogeneration is not very
 
special.
 
C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
 
The net present cost is defined as the reduction to the cogenera­
tion system life-cycle cost due to receipts from the sale of by-product
 
power. A comparison of the net present costs for the case of industry
 
ownership of the cogeneration system with firm power sales, results in
 
many alternatives that are more attractive than the corresponding base
 
system. The analysis considers the cases where (a) only excess by-product
 
power is sold, and (b) all cogenerated power is sold.
 
1. Sale of Excess By-Product Power
 
Five cogeneration system alternatives are available to four of the
 
surveyed industrial sites where the sale of excess by-product power is
 
feasible based on annual consumption requirements and calculated cogen­
eration system output. When the price of this excess power is assumed­
to be equal to the purchase price of electricity the industrial firm
 
currently pays the utility, the upper bound on the benefit to the firm
 
from the sale of excess power is assumed to be established. Not surpris­
ingly, the net present cost is lower than the base system life-cycle cost
 
in each instance (Table 4-1).
 
When the price of excess power is assumed to be 14 mills/kW-h,
 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company's standard offer to industrial firms with
 
electric power for sale, a possible lower bound on the benefit to the
 
firm is established. Surprisingly, for four of the five cogeneration
 
systems with excess electricity, this price also yields a-lower net
 
present cost than the base system life-cycle cost. The only exception
 
is the Hunt-Wesson canning season alternative. In view of the fact that
 
the other Hunt-Wesson alternative did have a lower net present cost than
 
the base system, it is surprising that all four industrial firms can
 
have an economic cogeneration system even when the price for excess
 
by-product power is set at what could be considered a lower bound. It
 
should be noted, however, that the difference between the base system
 
life-cycle cost and the net present cost for California Paperboard is
 
almost negligible and the difference for Hunt-Wesson and Kelco is not
 
significant, implying that hidden factors could favor the base system
 
over the cogeneration system. The primary reason for such a large
 
difference for Simpson Paper is a change in fuel type between the base
 
system and the cogeneration system - the former uses natural gas while
 
the latter uses considerably cheaper hog fuel.
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Table 4-1. Net Present Cost Comparison: Industrial Ownership With Firm Sales of Excess Power
 
Industrial Firm 

California Paperboard Corp. 

Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. ­
canning season(6) 

Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. ­
all year, Alt. 2(7) 

Kelco Co. 

Simpson Paper Co. 

Net Present Cost, Break-Even 
Excess Power Base System 106 dollars Price(5) for 
Generated, Life-Cycle Cost, Excess Power, 
106 kW-h/yr 106 dollars (3) (4) Q/kW-h 
38.3 27.6 23.4(1) 27.5(2) 1.4 
150.2 40.5(2) 23.5(i) 46.9 1.7 
362.3 48.6 (13.7 (1 ) 42.7(2) 1.3 
135.2 57.0 23.2(1) 54.8(2) 1.2 
46.6 121.9 (2.7(1)) 14.3(2) <0 
(1) 	Most attractive system when power sold at base system rate.
 
(2) 	Most attractive system when power sold at 14 mills/kW-h.
 
(3) 	Excess power sold at base system rate.
 
(4) 	Excess power sold at 14 mills/kW-h.
 
(5) 	Required price for excess power which will equate cogeneration system cost with base system cost.
 
(6) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam requirement and operates only during
 
canning season.
 
(7) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam requirement and operates all year, dumping
 
steam during off-season.
 
Finally, a break-even price for the sale of excess by-product
 
electricity was calculated for each applicable system (Table 4-1). The
 
break-even price is that price which yields a net present cost for the
 
cogeneration system that is equal to the life-cycle cost for the base
 
system it would replace. In general, the break-even price for excess
 
by-product electricity reflects the surprising results just noted.
 
Since the issue of a favorable price for excess by-product elec­
tricity was considered an important factor by half the firms surveyed,
 
these results are even more surprising. On the surface, it would appear
 
that this issue is not as important as the firms perceive it to be.
 
Only four had excess by-product electricity available, of the 12 indus­
trial firms studied, and one of those four firms, Simpson Paper, has a
 
cogeneration system alternative that is more economical on a cost basis
 
alone, independent of whether or not excess by-product electricity is
 
sold.
 
Underlying factors may contribute to this unexpected result,
 
although in some of the more attractive situations they cannot explain
 
it entirely. Presumably, a cogeneration system is preferred when its
 
life-cycle cost is less than the base system life-cycle cost. However,
 
when the life-cycle cost of the base system is greater than the net
 
present cost of the cogeneration system but less than the life-cycle
 
cost of the cogeneration system, there may be additional hidden costs
 
associated with, say, contract negotiations or interfacing with the
 
utility, that more than offset the benefit to the firm. Such a situa­
tion is similar to a firm's adding a new product line (in this case
 
electricity), and many of the industrial firms interviewed were not
 
interested in product diversification.
 
2. Sale of All Cogenerated Power
 
A second option available under Category B is for all cogenerated
 
power to be sold to the utility while the industrial firm continues to
 
purchase its required power from the utility at the base system rate.
 
Table 4-2 presents the life-cycle cost and net present cost comparisons
 
when cogenerated electricity is sold to the utility at 19.5 mills/kW-h,
 
a price based on the SCE "Alternate B" plan (see Appendix D) in which
 
the utility requires certain minimum guarantees for the power supply
 
and agrees to pay an amount that allows for a capacity credit, an energy
 
credit and a small operations and maintenance credit. For this case,
 
two cogeneration systems, Hunt-Wesson, sized to match the off-season
 
steam requirements, and Simpson Paper, have life-cycle costs that are
 
lower than the base system life-cycle cost. All the cogeneration
 
systems, with the exception of Kaiser Steel's, have net present costs
 
that are lower than the base system life-cycle cost. Thus, while this
 
option results in generally higher life-cycle costs than those in which
 
the industrial firm offsets some or all of its electrical requirements
 
with cogenerated power, it nevertheless is economically viable. It is
 
not the most attractive alternative for cogeneration from the industrial
 
firm's point of view, but it is competitive. The major factors that may
 
detract from this alternative are the additional costs associated with
 
contract negotiations and interfacing with the utility.
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Table 4-2. Life-Cycle Cost Comparisons: 

Industrial Firm 

California Paperboard Corp. 

California Portland Cement Co. 

Exxon Co., U.S.A. 

(3 )
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. - canning season
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. - all year Alt. 1 (4 )  

- all year Alt. 2(6)
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 

Kaiser Steel Corp. 

Kelco Co. 

Owens-Illinois, Inc. 

Simpson Paper Co. 

Simpson Timber Co. 

Industrial Ownership With Firm Sales of All Power
 
Net Present 
Life-Cycle Cost, Cost (1 ) 
Excess 106 dollars 106 dollars 
Power 
Generated Base Cogeneration Cogeneration 
166 kW-h/yr System System System 
38.3 27.6 43.1 25.8 
(2 ) 
--- 46.7 61.5 35.6(2) 
---
156.4 177.5 123.4(2) 
150.2 40.5 84.1 34.9(2)
 
--- 48.6 48.0(5) 46.2(2)
 
.	 
13.8(2)362.3 48.6 129.4 

--- 199.1 290.5 235.0
 
94.3 	 54.7(2)
135.2 	 57.0 

---
40.5 46.4 37.5(2)
 
46.6 121.9 102.7 (5 )  52.5(2)
 
---
29.2 29.5 28.7(2)
 
Table 4-2. Life-Cycle Cost Comparisons: Industrial Ownership With Firm Sales of All Power
 
(Continuation 1)
 
Net Present 
Excess 
Life-Cycle Cost 
106 dollars 
Cost(l) 
106 dollars 
Power 
Industrial Firm 
Generated 
106 kW-h/yr 
Base 
System 
Cogeneration 
System 
Cogeneration 
System 
Spreckels Sugar Co. --- 63.4 68.1 58.9 
(2 ) 
Union Oil Co. 186.7 221.2 125.5(2) 
(1) 	Cogenerated power sold at 19.5 mills/kW-h. Required power purchased at base system rate.
 
(2) 	More attractive than base system when costs are reduced by the receipts.

/ 
(3) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam requirement and operates only during
 
canning season.
 
(4) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet off-season steam requirement and operates all year.
 
(5) 	Life-cycle cost less than base system life-cycle cost.
 
(6) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam requirement and operates all year,
 
dumping steam during off-season.
 
The calculated incremental internal rate of return for &ogeneration
 
systemsjin Category B.is shown in Table 4-3. Columns 1 and 2 represent
 
the calculated internal rate of return for selling power at the estimated
 
upper and lower bound, respectively, of prices for the sale of cogenerated
 
power. It is noteworthy that only the Hunt-Wesson canning season alter­
native has an unacceptable internal rate of return for the lower bound
 
price (column 2). These results are consistent with those from the net
 
present cost comparison. The most significant result, however, is that
 
selling all cogenerated power at a price that is lower than whatfthe
 
industrial firm pays the utility can result in an acceptable rate of
 
return. With the'exception of Kaiser Steel, all thealternatives have
 
an incremental internal rate of return that is acceptable when compared
 
to the required rate of return.t
 
The life-cycle costs for the base system and the cogeneration
 
system for the two tax incentives are shown in Table 4-4. While both
 
incentives reduce the life-cycle cost for the cogeneration system,
 
neither one alters the economic viability of the cogeneration system
 
when evaluated on a life-cycle cost basis. The base system life-cycle
 
costs for California Paperboard, Hlunt-Wesson (two alternatives), and
 
Kelco are still lower than the corresponding cogeneration system lifeZ
 
cycle costs under each incentive. Thus, based on this analysis, the
 
effect that either financial incentive will have toward encouraging
 
the installation of cogeneration by industrial firms is inconclusive.
 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
1. Institutional
 
Policies to remove the institutional barriers and develop incen­
tives for Category B are the most difficult to implement inasmuch as
 
both the utilities and the industrial firms want to see certainty in a
 
changing world. In such a world, agreements on a definitive policy
 
determination on regulatory, economic, and contractual positions are
 
.difficult to reach.
 
As a positive first step, the state legislature would need to
 
pass legislation explicitly defining the status of a cogenerator. The
 
National Energy Act legislation could reduce the importance of such a
 
statement if the Federal Power Act provisions are found to apply to
 
cogenerators.
 
Given a resolved regulatory environment, it will then be up to the
 
industrial firm and the utility to produce contractual agreements. One
 
can expect that after a few "tett" cases are completed, the number of
 
firms seriously considering cogeneration will increase dramatically.
 
At this time, the PUC can only encourage the necessary interaction
 
between the utilities and potential cogenerators, an activity already
 
being pursued by the PUC as discussed in Appendix B.
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Table 4-3. 	 Calculated Incremental Internal Rate of Return:
 
Industrial Ownership With Firm Sales of Power
 
Incremental Internal Required
 
Rate of Return, % Rate of
 
Return
 
Industrial Firm (1) (2) (3) (After Tax), %
 
California Paperboard Corp. 21 12.5 16.3 12.5
 
.California Portland Cement .- 19.2
.. 10.0
 
Co.
 
Exxon Co., U.S.A. 	
-- -- 36.2 12.5
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. - 19 1.3 13.3 10
 
canning season
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. - .. .. 40 10
 
all year, alt. 1
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. - 34.9 13.2 25.3 10
 
all year, alt. 2
 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 
--
 <0 15
 
Kelco Co. 30.5 17.7 17.6 15
 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. 
--	 12-- 18.8 

Simpson Paper Co. >40 >40 >40 12
 
Simpson Timber Co. 

--
-- 36.1 12
 
Spreckels Sugar Co. 

-- -- >40 10
 
Union Oil Co. 

-- -- 33.8 10 
(1) Excess 	by-product power sold at base system rate.
 
(2) Excess 	by-product power sold at 14 mills/kW-h.
 
(3) All cogenerated power sold at 19.5 mills/kW-h.
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Table 4-4. 	 Effects of Two Financial Incentives: Industrial Ownership
 
With Firm Sales of Excess By-Product Power
 
Life-Cycle Cost, 106 dollars
 
Financial Incentive
 
Capital Current
 
Investment, Base 10% Investment 20% Investment 6%
 
Industrial Firm 106 dollars System Tax Credit Tax Credit Interest Loan
 
California Paperboard Corp. 3.7 27.6 34.5 	 33.8 32.2
 
Hunt-Wesson 	Foods, Inc. - 13.7 40.5 79.6 76.9 73.7
 
(1)
canning season
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. - 13.7 48.6 121.6 118.9 115.7
 
all year, Alt. 2(2)
 
Kelco Co. 8.2 57.0 75.5 73.9 69.0
 
Simpson Paper Co. 8.1 121.9 23.1 21.5 18.3
 
(1) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam load and operates only during canning
 
season.
 
(2) 	Cogeneration system sized to meet canning season steam load and Operates all Year, dumpihg
 
steam during the off-season.
 
2. 	 Environmental
 
As with the BACT provision discussed in Section III, there appears
 
to be a large difference between the viewpoints of industry and the
 
environmental regulators. Based on discussions with the regulators, the
 
following recommendations are made:
 
(1) 	 A joint ARB/APCD committee should be established to specify
 
implementation guidelines for conducting an Air Quality
 
Impact Analysis. The committee should have industry and
 
environmental interest group representation. Included in
 
the guidelines should be a clearer delineation of (a) the
 
method by which trade-off ratios are determined, and (b)
 
what constitutes a legally enforceable inter-firm contract.
 
(2) 	 Based on these guidelines, individual APCDs should produce
 
specific procedures for evaluating trade-off applications.
 
This could help the firms understand the basis for the
 
process.
 
(3) 	 The ARB should give consideration to the possibility of
 
cross-pollutant trade-offs for air basins with zones having
 
different air pollution problems. In addition, considera­
tion should be given to implementing inter-basin trade-offs.
 
The problems in administering cross-pollutant and inter­
basin trade-offs should not be underestimated - they involve
 
legal, public health, and equity questions that have not
 
yet been analyzed.
 
These recommendations offer opportunities for supporting industrial
 
cogeneration ventures without undermining air pollution mandates.
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SECTION
 
ANALYSIS OF CATEGORY C: UTILITY OR THIRD PARTY OWNERSHIP 
Under utility or third party ownership of the cogeneration facility,
 
the electric utility invests its capital in the cogeneration equipment
 
located at the industrial firm. The utility operates the cogeneration
 
facility to meet the steam requirements of the'industrial plant. Given
 
this constraint, the utility then runs the facility as part of its total
 
generation capacity.
 
A. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
 
The advantage for the firm in this arrangement includes the abil­
ity to look at the steam supply as an annual expense as opposed to a
 
capital expenditure. "Corporate income tax rates (encourage) the sub­
stitution of expenses for capital investment" (Reference 1, page 22).
 
When buying steam, the firm reduces its need for staff to oversee steam­
supply system maintenance. The disadvantage is that the firm is subject
 
to the utility's determination of the proper price for the delivered
 
steam. The negotiated contract for steam must take into account the
 
firm's need for a fixed supply at a reasonably determined price, i.e.,
 
less expensive than the firm's other alternatives, but with the capabil­
ity to terminate the contract if it decides the plant is no longer
 
economic to run. The contract must also take into account the utility's
 
need for assurance that the firm will not close and result in a cogen­
eration plant without a steam customer. Without the steam customer,
 
the plant would become very expensive for the utility to run.
 
Other advantages for the firm are the lack of any concerns over
 
regulation of their firm by federal or state authorities and the avoid­
ance of many of the issues raised, e.g.:
 
- Selling price for electricity 
- Determination of standby rates 
Changes in natural gas priorities as a result of entering
 
into a cogeneration agreement. In fact, many of the firms
 
fueL supply concerns are alleviated under this arrangement
 
and are placed on the utility.
 
Advantages of utility ownership for the utility are (1) continuing
 
control over electrical generation and (2) retaining the existing (and
 
preferred) industrial customers. Disadvantages include (1) the concern
 
over the continuity of its steam customer, (2) the need to acquire the
 
necessary capital, and (3) the lengthy siting procedures.
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Capital requirements for future utility capacity expansion are
 
a problem for many utilities whether for cogeneration plants or central
 
station plants.' However, for the three California utilities, capital
 
commitments have already been made for near-term expansion. To raise
 
capital for cogeneration projects, the utility must either acquire new
 
capital or back off on planned projects.
 
The other restraint is on plant siting. Utility-owned plants are
 
subject to the complete Notice of Intent/Application for Construction
 
permit procedure administered by the California Energy Resources Con­
servation and Development Commission (CERCDC). This procedure can
 
legally take up to 36-months, but in practice can last much longer. If
 
the plant is between 50 and 100 MW, the'procedure can be expedited under
 
the "Small Power Plant Exemption."* State legislation has been proposed
 
to expedite the siting of power plants which utilize cogeneration tech­
nology. Under AB2046, three alternative sites will not be required and
 
the decision of the CERCDC must be issued Within nine months from the
 
date of filing of the proposed construction and within nine months of
 
the subsequent filing of the application for certification. Although
 
this will help the utilities, it is still an involved procedure. These
 
procedures hold for both investor-owned and municipal utilities.
 
The cogeneration provision in the pending National Energy Act legis­
lation applies only to "persons not primarily engaged in the generation
 
or sale of electric energy." As a result, utility-owned cogeneration
 
plants-'might be placed at a disadvantage when and if the incentives in
 
the National Energy Act are passed.
 
1. Primary Issues
 
a. Long-Term Agreements. There is a striking difference
 
between the planning horizon of an industrial firm and that of a regu­
lated electric utility company. This difference could result in con­
tractual problems when agreements are'required between the two parties.
 
The utility is concerned with investments that will produce returns over
 
a 10 to 30 year period. The firm is more interested in the immediate
 
return and its effect on its short-run profitability. The utility is
 
insured by the PUC that it will be viable in the long run. The firm has
 
no such guarantee.
 
The Industrial Firm's Viewpoint
 
The problem for the California Paperboard Corporation was the
 
requirement, imposed by the City of Santa Clara Electric Department, of
 
a guarantee that California Paperboard would stay in business for a
 
specific period of time. California Paperboard would have no capital
 
invested in the project. However, there would be a contingent liability
 
if the firm closed the facility. Because of this liability, the require­
ment for a long-term guarantee presented a problem from the industry
 
viewpoint.
 
,:Memorandum from the CERCDC to the Department of Finance, January 28,
 
1978. A power plant under 50 MW is not under the jurisdiction of the
 
CERCDC. The CERCDC would not have jurisdiction in the siting of plants
 
under Category A.
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A similar situation faces the Husky Oil Company in its negotiations
 
with PG&E to supply oil to the utility in return for steam. PG&E wants
 
a long-term guarantee for a continuous supply of oil for the cogenera­
tion power plant. If Husky Oil is unable to meet PG&E fuel demands,
 
then $15/bbl oil might have to be purchased and supplied to PG&E at
 
$7/bbl.
 
These two examples demonstrate the need for the industrial firm to
 
accept the long-term risk associated with cogeneration; however, some
 
firms are not in a position to accept this risk.
 
The Electric Utility Company's Viewpoint
 
All of the utilities recognize the significance of the different
 
planning horizons used by utilities and industrial firms. This is one
 
reason why they are reluctant to invest in cogeneration schemes. The
 
fact that the annual revenue per dollar invested in utilities is typi­
cally small forces the utility to consider only those investments that
 
can be relied on for over 15 years.
 
Summary of the Issue
 
Not all industrial firms have short-term planning horizons.
 
According to PG&E, some of its industrial customers have 15-20 year
 
plans, comparable to those of the utilities. However, for those firms
 
without a long-term planning horizon and who are therefore reluctant to
 
make long-term investments, the contrast in planning horizons can give
 
rise to a significant impasse. If the utilities continue to place the
 
risk on the firm, the number of potential cogenerators will probably
 
decrease. Until a larger number of contracts have been negotiated,
 
further analysis would be speculative.
 
b. Steam Sales. The sale of by-product steam to the firm has
 
many of the characteristics of the problems of joint supply (Reference
 
21, pp. 53-66). The classic example is that of the production of wool
 
and mutton from sheep raising. How much of the cost of raising the sheep
 
should be attributed to the production of wool? How much should be
 
attributed to the production of mutton?
 
As an example, let us assume that a firm and an electric utility,
 
each using 1 barrel of oil, could produce X pounds of steam and Y
 
kilowatt-hours of electricity. However, if they cogenerate, 1-1/2 bar­
rels of oil could produce X pounds of steam and Y kilowatt-hours of
 
electricity. Should the reduction of 1/2 barrel of oil be attributed to
 
steam production or electricity production? If the utility determines
 
that the reduction is to be shown in the cost of steam produced, then
 
steam users will have reduced costs and will capture the productivity
 
gain. Alternatively, if the utility determines that the reduc'tion is
 
to be shown in the cost of electricity produced, then electricity cus­
tomers will capture the productivity gain. Although one can argue that
 
the-truth lies somewhere in between, it is not possible to say precisely
 
where. Therefore, both customers will always have a potential complaint.
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In an unregulated market, the differences in demand and available
 
alternative production opportunities would help to determine the optimal
 
prices. However, the nature of a public utility with its fixed, or at
 
least slowly changing, tariff for electricity will prevent this from
 
happening. Because steam tariffs are more flexible, the utility might
 
allocate'the current cost of electricity production (1 barrel) to elec­
tricity production and negotiate for the best possible price for steam.
 
The net result would be that the reduction in the cost of electricity
 
-productioi by cogeneration is not passed on to the electricity customer.
 
If, on the other hand, the utility does try to pass on the savings to
 
its electricity customers, the sale price for steam might need to be
 
higher than industrial firms are willing to pay. The firm would probably
 
be unwilling to enter into such an agreement.
 
The Industrial Firm's Viewpoint
 
From the industrial firm viewpoint, a cogeneration system where
 
steam is purchased from the utility will be acceptable only if the pur­
chase price is less than the firm's present steam production cost.
 
California Paperboard Corporation saw the need for a 5 to 10% reduction.
 
Kelco was not specific but did note the need for a reduction in the price
 
in order to enter into a cogeneration agreement with SDG&E.
 
The Electric Utility Company's Viewpoint
 
San Diego Gas and Electric Company has taken the view that the
 
cost of electricity from cogeneration is equivalent to other generating
 
plants and that the savings from cogeneration are passed on to the steam
 
customer. For example, the investment at Rohr Industries is estimated
 
to save the industrial firm $90,000 per year as a result of purchasing
 
steam from the utility (Reference 22). The two other major California
 
public utilities have not made any final d~termination on how steam
 
prices will be set.
 
Summary of the Issue
 
A consumer will accept a range of prices for steam and electricity;
 
the determination of the actual sale price within that range is normally
 
set by the market. In this case, however, since thePUC oversees the
 
determination of the socially optimal prices, all of the cost savings
 
are not automatically passed on to the consumer.
 
2. Secondary Issues
 
a. National Energy Act. The original draft of legislation for
 
a comprehensive national energy policy defined a qualifying cogenerator
 
as one who meets certain requirements and, in cases where the cogenera­
tion facility is to be directly connected to an electric utility, has
 
offered the utility the opportunity to construct and operate the equip­
ment. Such a definition would have helped encourage utility recognition
 
of potential cogeneration. However, subsequent drafts of the legislation
 
have altered the definition as noted in Section III-A-b. The result is
 
that the proposed legislation does not encourage electric utilities to
 
consider cogeneration.
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3. Inappropriate Issues
 
Many of the identified issues do not affect the implementation of
 
utility-owned cogeneration systems. One reason for this is that only
 
three of the surveyed firms are considering this arrangement. In addi­
tion, the firm and the utility retain their existaing roles - the utility
 
supplying intermediate ,godds to industry and the firm converting them
 
into a final product. iecause of this, the concern about (1) the selling
 
price of electricity, (2) regulation, (3) standby rates, (4) natural gas
 
priorities, (5) wheeling, and (6) the changes in the electric utilities
 
rate design are not influential in the implementation of utility-owned
 
cogeneration systems.
 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
 
A major advantdge to an industrial firm in Category C is that the
 
burden of obtaining environmental permits is placed on the electric
 
utility. The significance of the New Source Review (NSR) rules is
 
unchanged, but now the electric utility must take the.lead in applying
 
for permits.* In other words, all the problems discussed previously on
 
Best Available Control Technology (BACT) and Air Quality Impact Analysis
 
(AQIA)must now be addressed by the electric utility.
 
Under the model NSR rule, a source is defined as an aggregation of
 
units which, among other conditions, must be "under the same ownership
 
or entitlement to use and operate." Under Category C, the electric
 
utility owns the cogeneration system; thus the cogeneration boiler is
 
considered to be a separate source from the industrial firm's plant.
 
This makes it easier (and less expensive) to comply with the BACT pro­
vision at the source (which is now just the electric utility's cogenera­
tion plant) and also easier to comply with AQIA since improvements in
 
the industrial firm's coterminous plant could be used as trade-off (see
 
Figure 3 in Appendix H). This is precisely what occurred in the San
 
Diego Air Pollution Control District when Applied Energy, Inc., a wholly­
owned subsidiary of San Diego Gas and Electric-Company, began to acquire
 
permits to operate a cogeneration system at a facility of Rohr Indus­
tries. In this case, trade-offs with two of Rohr's boilers were used
 
in conjunction with a requirement to burn low sulfur fuel.
 
The California Air Resources Board (ARB) recognizes this loophole
 
created by the legal formalism of the definition of a source. However,
 
the ARB has indicated that the law would be changed if it was overused
 
or was influential in keeping the air basin from meeting its ambient
 
standards.
 
As an example of a Category C arrangement, consider the case of
 
the California Paper Board Corporation (CPC). After the initial engi­
neering analysis, CPC and the local electric utility, a municipal utility
 
*The analysis in this study concentrated on those issues affecting the
 
industrial firm's decision; the electric utility's position on the NSR
 
rules was not examined.
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owned by the City of Santa Clara, agreed to proceed with a Category C
 
arrangement. In September 1977, the City applied for a permit to con­
struct under the existing NSR rules ih the Bay Area Air Pollution Control
 
District. In November, the City was advised that its cogeneration pro­
ject did not meet the existing standards but that the use of a taller
 
stack to disperse the pollutant would allow the project to receive a
 
permit to construct.* In December, the ARB adopted a new NSR rule for
 
the Bay Area in line with the model rule discussed in this report. Now
 
the project must be evaluatdd on the basis .of emissions. The City modi­
fied the plant to reduce emissions from 67 pounds per hour to 35 pounds
 
per hour. Thus, an Air QualitIm~pact Analysis was still required. The
 
lack of industry in the area made it almost impossiblelfor the plant to
 
find trade-offs. In Mardh, the City was formally denied their first
 
application. The City requested an exemption under the premise that
 
cogeneration was an innovative control technology, one of the several
 
exemptions available under the Air Quality Impact Analysis section of
 
the NSR rules. The ARB denied the required concurrence and the City
 
appealed to the Bay Area APCD Hearing Board. The case has not yet been
 
heard, although preliminary hearings were held in July 1978. Thus,
 
despite utility ownership of the cogeneration facility, the industrial
 
firm can still be subjected to the frustrations of delayed plans.
 
C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
 
Three of the industrial firms, California Paperboard, Husky Oil,
 
and Kelco, have the alternative of purchasing steam and electricity.
 
The life-cycle cost for the cogeneration system under this ownership
 
alternative is highly dependent on the price of steam to the industrial
 
firm. The steam price assumed for California Paperboard is based on
 
detailed information obtained from the firm and should be a good esti­
mate; however, the prices for steam to Husky Oil and Kelco were esti­
mated under more arbitrary conditions and may not accurately reflect the
 
actual price. In addition to computing the life-cycle cost based on the
 
assumed steam price for each site, the break-even steam price was also
 
calculated for each site. The results are presented in Table 5-1.
 
Based on the assumed steam price for each site, only California
 
Paperboard has a life-cycle cost that is lower than the base system life­
cycle cost. However, the calculated break-even steam prices for Husky
 
Oil and Kelco are very close to that for California Paperboard, with a
 
variance of less than 7% from one another despite the uniqueness of each
 
cogeneration system. It is also significant to note that for Husky Oil,
 
a 9¢ reduction in the steam price results in an economically viable
 
system.
 
Thus, the price of steam to the industrial firm is extremely
 
important. In addition, a firm may be more likely to consider this
 
cogeneration option than some of the other options discussed because it
 
relieves the firm of the problems associated with producing steam and
 
does not alter the normal procedure of purchasing electricity from the
 
utility.
 
*The NSR rule operating in the Bay Area APCD at that time was based on
 
the effect on ground level concentrations rather than on emissions.
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Table 5-1. Life-Cycle Cost Comparison: Utility or Third Party Ownership
 
Life-Cycle Cost, 106 dollars 	 Steam Price, $/103 lb
 
Industrial Firm Base System ( 1) Cogeneration System Assumed Price Break-Even Price
(2 )
 
California Paperboard Corp. 27.6 26.6 3.25 3.39
 
Husky Oil Co. 236.4 326.5 3.35 3.26
 
Kelco Co. 57.0 75.4 4.50 3.18
 
(1) 	Base system refers to the current method of steam production in the plant. Husky Oil currently
 
does not have a steam production system and a hypothetical system, based on an actual system at
 
another oil field, was used.
 
(2) Required price for steam that will equate cogeneration system cost with base system cost.
 
The internal rates of return, assuming utility or third-party
 
ownership of the cogeneration facilities (see Table 5-2), reflect the
 
results of the life-cycle cost comparisons. The conclusion that this
 
option is not viable for Kelco and Husky cannot be made, however,
 
because of the uncertainty in the estimate of the steam price.
 
Table 5-2. 	Calculated Incremental Internal Rate of Return:
 
Utility or Third Party Ownership
 
Calculated Incremental
 
Industrial Firm Internal Rate of Return, %
 
California Paperboard Corp. 540 
Husky Oil Co. <0 
Kelco Co. <0 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Almost all of the technical, economic, and legal analysis has
 
emphasized cogeneration by an industrial firm. In addition, policy
 
developments at the federal and state level have emphasized industry­
owned cogeneration. Based on the advantages of Category C, it appears
 
that such emphasis deserves reconsideration. Section 115 of the pro­
posed Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1977 addresses the
 
need for such a study.
 
The inclination of industrial firms and utilities to enter into
 
Category C agreements would be affected if the PUC could minimize the
 
risk to the two entities. Typically, firms appear to be reluctant to
 
accept liability for the consequences should circumstances force them
 
to cease operations at the plant. Utilities, however, do not want to
 
enter into agreements where they would assume the liability of operating
 
cogeneration equipment for just the production of electricity. If the
 
PUC could assure the utility that adequate rate relief would be made
 
quickly available if such cogeneration arrangements were prematurely
 
terminated, the firms' and the utilities' concern over the sharing of
 
the associated financial risk would be reduced. The risk would be
 
borne by the ratepayers. The decision before the PUC is how to allocate
 
the risk associated with industrial cogeneration, while at the same time
 
encouraging cogeneration to help reduce the price of electricity. In
 
the past, the efforts of the PUC appear to have been towards placing the
 
risk on the utility's stockholders and passing on the benefits to the
 
ratepayers. Whether this can continue successfully with cogeneration is
 
still being debated. In the meantime, some utilities want the firms to
 
accept the risk. The differences among the three major public utilities
 
are examined in Appendix C.
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APPENDIX A
 
GLOSSARY
 
This glossary contains a list of terms frequently used in discus­
sions of cogeneration. The selection of terms was based on experience
 
with the relevant literature. Sources for the terms are contained in
 
the Bibliography.
 
APCD
 
Air Pollution Control District
 
AQMA
 
Air Quality Maintenance Area
 
ARB
 
Air Resources Board
 
Base Load
 
The minimum load of electric power which is generated or supplied
 
continuously over a period of time.
 
Bottoming cycle
 
Waste heat from an industrial process is utilized for the genera­
tion of electricity.
 
Bottoming cycle, combined/organic
 
Waste heat from a gas/steam turbine is utilized for the'genera­
tion of electricity in an organic bottoming cycle.
 
Bottoming cycle, organic
 
ATHEAT HEAT TURBINGENERATOR ]ELECTRICITY 
HEAT EXCHANGER 
LOW TEMPERATURE
 
WASTE HEAT
 
The utilization of low temperature waste heat from an industrial
 
process for the generation of electricity in a system using an
 
organic working fluid.
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Bottoming cycle, steam
 
INDUSTRIAL WASTEST M 
PROCSS HATURBIE GNERAORELECTRICITY 
HEA ] - LOW TEMPERATRE WASTE HEA T 
LOW TEMPERATURE 
WASTE HEAT 
The utilization of waste heat from an industrial process for the
 
generation of electricity using a'steam turbine.
 
Brayton cycle
 
A reversible thermodynamic cycle which describes the heat to work­
conversion process in a gas turbine power plant.
 
By-product power
 
Power which is generated in conjunction with an industrial
 
process which optimizes or matches the generation of electricity
 
to the steam and/or heat requirements.
 
Capacity
 
The load for which a generating unit, generating station, or
 
other electrical apparatus is rated either by the user or by
 
the manufacturer.
 
Capacity factor
 
The ratio of the average load on a machine or equipment for the
 
period of time considered to the capacity rating of the machine
 
or equipment.
 
Capital cost
 
Cost of construction of new plant (additions, betterments, and
 
replacements) and expenditures for the purchase or acquisition of
 
existing facilities.
 
A-2
 
Central power generation, steam
 
HIGH TEMPERATURE 
WASTE HEAT 
TRANSMISSION 
GENERATOR '(POWER LINES) 
LOW TEMPERATURE
 
WASTE HEAT
 
Electricity generated by a utility at a large power generating
 
plant, the primary purpose of which is the generation of
 
electricity.
 
CERCDC
 
California Energy Resources Conservation and Development
 
Commission
 
Cogeneration
 
The generation of process steam, process heat or space condition­
ing dombined with the generation of electrical power which leads
 
to an efficiency of fuel utilization greater than that resulting
 
from the independent generation of equivalent units of process
 
steam, process heat, space conditioning,',and electrical power.
 
Combined cycle
 
SGENERATOR ELECTRICITY 
LOW TEMPERATUR 
WASTE HEAT 
Waste heat from a gas turbine topping cycle is utilized for the
 
generation of electricity in a steam turbine/generator system.
 
A- 3
 
Condensing power
 
Power generated through a final steam turbine stage where the
 
steam is exhausted into a condenser and cooled to a liquid to be
 
recycled back into a boiler.
 
CPUC
 
California Public Utilities Commission
 
Dual-purpose power plant 
See cogeneration.
 
Engine topping
 
See topping cycle.
 
Feedstock
 
With respect to cogeneration, it is the type of fuel supply to a
 
combustion process for the production of heat used for energy
 
conversion to steam or electricity.
 
Field assembled boiler
 
A high pressure boiler which usually has a large capacity.
 
Generally oil and gas fired, it can also burn solid fuels and
 
costs about $40-45/ib of steam per.hour.
 
Fuel allocation
 
Natural gas is allocated by the priority basis consistent with
 
defined end-uses. Priorities, from a high of P1 to a low of P5,
 
are effective May 31, 1976.
 
Grid
 
A utility's power generation, transmission and distribution
 
system, including transmission lines, transformer stations, etc.
 
Heat rate
 
A measure of generating station thermal efficiency, generally
 
expressed in Btu per net kilowatt-hour. It is computed by
 
dividing the total Btu content of fuel burned for electric gen­
eration by the resulting net kilowatt-hour generation.
 
Heat recuperators
 
Equipment used to recycle heat back into the process creating a
 
higher thermal efficiency of the overall process.
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High grade waste heat
 
Waste heat in the high temperature range of 1000°F or above which
 
can be used for power generation in a steam turbine.
 
Hog fuel
 
A waste product of the lumber industry consisting of coarse
 
residue and sawdust which can be used as by-product fuel.
 
Industrial cogeneration
 
Power generation at an industrial site using either a topping
 
cycle or a bottoming cycle.
 
Industrial dual-purpose power plant
 
See industrial cogeneration.
 
Industrial steam
 
Steam that is produced as part of the industrial process.
 
In-plant generation
 
See industrial cogeneration.
 
Internal rate'of return
 
The discount rate which equates the present value of expected
 
future receipts to the cost of the investment outlay.
 
Interruptible power
 
Power made available under agreements which permit curtailment or
 
cessation of delivery by the supplier. Advance notice is usually
 
given from I to 1-1/2 hours prior to the interrupt.
 
Investment tax credit
 
A specified percentage of the dollar amount of new investment in
 
each of certain categories of assets that a firm can deduct as a
 
credit against their income tax bill.
 
Load
 
The amount of electric power delivered or required at any
 
specified point or points on a system. Load originates primarily
 
at the power-consuming equipment of the customers.
 
Load factor
 
The ratio of the average load in kilowatts supplied during a
 
designated period to the peak or maximum load occurring in that
 
period.
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Low grade waste heat 
Waste heat in the-temperature range of less than 10000 F. 
Megawatt .(MWe) 
One thousand kilowatts of electric power. 
Net present value 
A capital budgeting method which takes into account the time 
value of money through discounted cash flow analysis. The method 
determines the present value of the expected net revenue from an 
investment minus the cost outlay, discounted at the cost of 
capital. 
New Source Review Rules 
Adopted by the California Air Resources Board-, these rules con­
stitute a set of guidelines to be used by state and pollution 
control officers when ruling on permits to construct new sta­
tionary sources or modifications to existing stationary sources. 
Operating cost 
A group of expenses applicable to operations. 
Package boilers 
A low pressure boiler, usually small enough to be shop assembled. 
It generally burns gas or liquid fuels and costs about $10/lb 
of steam per hour. 
Parallel generation 
Industrial power generation facilities whose AC frequencies are 
exactly equal to and-operate in synchronism with the utility 
service grid. 
Payback period 
The number of years required for a firm to recover the original 
investment from net returns before depreciation but after taxes. 
Peak load 
The maximum of all demands of the load which has occurred 
during a specified period of time. 
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Peak load management
 
An attempt to reduce the system peak load by leveling the daily
 
power curve.
 
CURRENT DAILY POWER CURVE POWER 
PRODAEMAND - -PEAK LOAD MANAGEMENT POWER CURVE 
PR E AD D I I I 
12M 6AM 12N 6PM 12M 
TIME OF DAY 
Power factor
 
The ratio of real power to apparent power for any given load and
 
time. Generally, it is expressed as a ratio.
 
Preheaters
 
Equipment used to pre-heat the intake air prior to entering a
 
combustion process creating a higher thermal efficiency for the
 
overall process.
 
Present value
 
The present value of a cash flow is its real value adjusted for
 
the interest that could be earned, or must be paid, between the
 
time of the actual flow and the specified "present" time.
 
Process heat
 
Heat used for the industrial process of a plant and not the
 
housekeeping chores such as space heating.
 
Process Steam
 
See industrial steam.
 
Process steam load
 
Number of pounds of steam per hour reqiired for a specified
 
industrial process.
 
Rankine cycle
 
A reversible thermodynamic cycle which describes the heat to
 
work conversion process in a -steam power plant.
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Rate base
 
The value of assets, established by a regulatory authority, upon
 
which a utility is permitted to earn a specified rate of return.
 
Generally, this represents the amount of property used and useful
 
in public service.
 
Sinking fund
 
Cash or other assets, and the interest or other income earned
 
thereon, set apart for the retirement of a debt, the redemption
 
of a stock, or the protection of an investment in depreciable
 
property.
 
Spinning Reserve
 
Generating capacity which is on-line And ready to take load, but
 
in excess of the-current load on the system.
 
Standby power
 
See standby service.
 
Standby reserve
 
See standby service.
 
Standby service
 
Service that is not normally used but which is available through
 
a permanent connection in lieu of, or as a supplement to, the
 
usual source of supply.
 
Sunk costs
 
Costs which have already been committed and thus are irrelevant
 
to future investment decisions.
 
Surplus electricity
 
Energy generated that is beyond the immediate needs of the pro­
ducing system. This'energy is frequently obtained from spinning
 
reserve and sold on an interruptible basis.
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Thermally integrated energy system .(TIES)
 
The electric power output of the local power generation plant
 
goes into the utility company distribution grid, rather than
 
directly to the user, The user is served power from the grid
 
but also receives heating and cooling media produced from power
 
generation by-product heat from the TIES plant.
 
Topping cycle
 
Energy is first used to generate electricity then used in an
 
industrial process.
 
Topping cycle, back-pressure steam turbine
 
PROCESS 
STEAM 
STEAM 
TURB[N EllJRB - GENERATOR] 
ELECTRIC 
POWER 
STEAM 
FUEL- BOILER 
Steam is generated in a boiler then sent through a turbine­
generator, producing electricity. The steam is discharged
 
from the last stage of the turbine at pressures needed for
 
industrial process use.
 
Topping cycle, extraction steam turbine
 
PROCESS CONDENSATE COOLING 
STEAM STEAM SYSTEM 
TURM.A 
-GENERATOR 
STEAMI 
ELECTRICPOWER 
FUEL - - BOILER 
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This system operates in a similar manner to the back-pressure
 
steam turbine, except that steam is extracted at different
 
pressures from intermediate stages of the turbine and used
 
in industrial processes, while the steam exhausting from the
 
final stage is condensed and returned to the boiler for reuse.
 
Topping cycle, gas turbine/waste heat boilers
 
PROCESS
 
STEAM
 
WASTE HEAT 
BOILER 
EXHAUST 
-
GASES 
FUEL 
---- GENEJATOR 
GAS ELECTRIC 
TRBINE POWER 
Compressed air and a gaseous fuel or light petroleum product are
 
fired in a gas turbine. The hot combustion gases pass through a
 
turbine-generator, producing electricity. The hot exhaust gases
 
from the turbine are passed over water-filled tubes in a waste­
heat ,boiler, producing steam at pressures needed for industrial
 
process use.
 
Total energy system
 
On-site generation of electricity with beneficial use of waste
 
heat.
 
Turbine
 
An enclosed rotary type of prime mover in which beat energy in
 
steam or gas is converted into mechanical energy by the force.
 
of a high velocity flow of steam or gases directed against suc­
cessive rows of radial blades fastened to a central shaft.
 
Utility cogeneration
 
Utilization of waste beat from a central power generating plant
 
to produce either thermal energy to sell for space or process
 
heat, or additional electrical energy.
 
Utility dual-purpose power plant
 
See utility cogeneration.
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Waste heat
 
Unused thermal energywhich is exhausted to the environment from
 
an electric generation system or an industrial process.
 
Wheeling
 
The use of the transmission facilities of one system to transmit
 
power of and for another system.
 
Wheeling charges
 
Cost of wheeling power.
 
Working capital
 
The amount of cash or other liquid assets that a company must
 
have on hand to meet the current costs of operations until such
 
a time as it is reimbursed by its customers.
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APPENDIX 3
 
THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
 
I. RESPONSIBILITIES
 
The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is responsible
 
for regulating certain privately owned facilities and transportation
 
companies and to secure for the public adequate services at rates that
 
are just and reasonable. As one of the boards, commissions, and inde­
pendent units in the California State government, this administrative
 
agency has both legislative and judicial powers:
 
"It (the PUC) may take testimony in the same manner
 
as a court; issue decisions and orders, it may site
 
for contempt and may bubpoena records."
 
(Reference 23, page 7.)
 
Although its powers have been described as unusually broad, its deci­
sions may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
 
Specific responsibilities of the California Public Utilities
 
Commission include:
 
(1) 	 Establishing retail rates for the services from regulated
 
utilities (establishing wholesale interstate and wholesale
 
intrastate rates is now the responsibility of the Federal
 
Energy Regulatory Commission).
 
(2) 	 Regulating service and facilities from public utilities to
 
insure safety, reliability, and adequacy.
 
(3) 	 Authorizing sale of securities by the public utilities.
 
(4) 	 Establishing accounting procedures for public utilities.
 
(5) 	 Reviewing of all special contracts for the reasonableness
 
of expenses.
 
In February 1975, PUC jurisdiction over the adequacy of electric
 
generation facilities was curtailed by a revision of General Order 131
 
(June 1970). Originally, G.O. 131 made the PUC responsible for annual
 
10-year forecasts and biennial 20-year forecasts of load demand and
 
supply capability for each utility.- The California Energy Resources
 
Conservation and Development Commission (CERCDC) now has the responsi­
bility to-review and assess these plans. The only forecasts reviewed
 
by the PUC, as revised by General Order 131A (February 1976), are
 
10-year forecasts of planned and/or needed transmission lines (Refer­
ences 24 and 25, Section 2). Thus the CERCDC, rather than the PUC, is
 
more influential in determining the applicability of a cogeneration
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system's capacity to the forecasted supply capability of each utility.
 
The PUC is still responsible for determining that plants over 50 MWe
 
planned by the public utilities under its jurisdiction
 
are necessary to promote the safety, health,
 
comfort and convenience of the public, and that they
 
are required by the public convenience and necessity."
 
(Reference 24, Section 1.)
 
In the determination of the public's energy needs, the PUC could allow
 
available cogeneration facilities to be taken into consideration. How­
ever, because of the length of the utility resource planning cycle,
 
usually about five years, the importance of cogeneration delaying the
 
need for new capacity will be heavily determined by the CERCDC.
 
II. ACTIVITIES RELATED TO COGENERATION
 
Regulation of electric utilities is only one of many activities
 
under the jurisdiction of the PUC. Although the PUG regulates over
 
500 utilities (Reference 24, page 62), only 13 are electric utilities.
 
However, of the $10 billion per year of operating revenue under PUC
 
regulation, $3.5 billion is attributable to these 13 electric utilities
 
(Reference 16). Two of these utilities, PG&E and SDG&E, are also steam
 
utilities with annual revenues from steam sales of approximately $3
 
million (Reference 23, page 66).
 
The PUC's Decision No. 85559 (March 1976) on Case No. 9804,
 
ordered the utilities in California "to cooperate and evaluate waste
 
heat proposals to be submitted by" large industrial firms. "Electric
 
utility rate structure and conservation" was the subject of the case.
 
In addition, the utilities were also ordered to provide the PUC with a
 
"status report on existing waste heat electric'generating plants and
 
utilization of waste heat from" the utilities' "generating facilities
 
for industrial and commercial purposes." (Reference 26, page 7.)
 
Until January 1978, the PUC did not exhibit active involvement in
 
encouraging industrial cogeneration, other than requesting the reports
 
required by Decision No. 85559. In January 1978, the PUC took what they
 
described as a "significant first step" by adopting Resolution No.
 
E-1738 (January 10, 1978) and approving the Staff Report on California
 
Cogeneration Activities (January 17, 1977). These are discussed below.
 
Resolution No. E-1738 - Order Directing Electric Utilities to Augment
 
Cogeneration Projects
 
The resolution finds that there has been "insignificant progress"
 
since Decision No. 85559 by the three major electric utilities (PG&E,
 
SCE, and SDG&E) in installing, negotiating for, and developing cogenera­
tion. Cogeneration is defined by the PUC in the resolution as a "more
 
efficient method of optimizing electrical and heating requirements and
 
will result in both a reduction in the use of imported fossil fuels to
 
generate electricity and the cost of electric generation."
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The resolution also points to the need to evaluate the
 
appropriateness of existing "rates for standby service and prices paid
 
for energy purchased from cogenerators." The availability of inter­
ruptible service is also mentioned, but it is not directly tied to its
 
influence on promoting cogeneration.
 
The resolution ordered the three major electric utilities to:
 
(1) 	 Propose a rate schedule for expanding interruptible electric
 
service.
 
(2) 	 Propose other "rate proposals to enhance cogeneration,
 
including revisions to standby rates."
 
(3) 	 Submit "guidelines covering the price and conditions for
 
the purchase of energy and capacity from cogeneration
 
facilities owned by other."
 
(4) 	 Submit "a report on guidelines for development of utility.
 
owned cogeneration facilities."
 
At the time the present report was being written, these items were
 
being pursued. The utilities' initial responses were not received in
 
time to describe and analyze them in this report.
 
Staff 	Report on California Cogeneration Activities
 
The Staff Report on California Cogeneration Activities serves as
 
necessary background and support of the PUC's resolution. In addition
 
to providing useful definitions, descriptions, and analyses of the
 
implications of rate changes for standby power and interruptible service,
 
the staff has listed what the state's three major utilities consider to
 
be sites that have cogeneration potential. Because the firms are not
 
identified, it is not known if all 12 sites referred to in this report
 
are included.
 
The Staff Report also addresses the concern of some firms that
 
cogeneration will place them under the jurisdiction of the PUC.
 
"The staff does not regard the customer who generates
 
all or a portion of electricity for his own use and
 
sells 	surplus energy to a utility as a public utility
 
and subject to Commission regulation..." (Reference 5,
 
page 8.)
 
However, this is only a finding by the Staff and not a Commission ruling.
 
III. 	 JURISDICTION OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
 
AS IT RELATES TO INDUSTRIAL COGENERATION
 
The Public Utility Code consolidates all the "laws relating to
 
and regulating public utilities and other regulated business." What
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then is a public utility? The determination that a particular
 
cogeneration system makes the owner a public utility, and therefore
 
subject to regulation, is a crucial issue that is presently the subject
 
of federal legislation (see, for example, H.R. 4018).
 
In the Public Utility Code, Paragraph 216 defines a public utility
 
such that it:
 
(a) 	 "... includes every common carrier, toll bridge corpora­
tion, gas corporation, electric corporation, ... where the
 
the service is performed for or the commodity delivered to
 
the public or any portion thereof.
 
(b) 	 "Whenever any (of the above) ... performs a service or
 
delivers a commodity to the public or any portion thereof
 
for which any compensation or payment whatsoever is
 
received, ... such (a corporation is) a public utility
 
(and) is subject to the jurisdiction, control, and
 
regulation of the commission and the provisions of
 
this part."
 
This definition appears to be quite broad, but it goes even fur­
ther in subsection (c): ­
(c) 	 "When any person or corporation performs any service or
 
delivers any commodity to any person, private corporatibn,
 
municipality, or other political subdivision of the State
 
which 	in turn either directly or indirectly, mediately or
 
immediately, performs such services or delivers such
 
commodity to or from the public or some portion thereof,
 
such person or corporation is a public utility subject to
 
the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the commission
 
and the provisions of this part."
 
Subsection (c) appears to incorporate just about anybody and
 
anything, including a firm that sells a minor amount of electricity to
 
an electric utility for resale to the customers of the electricity
 
utility. The definition is much broader than that used in the discus­
sion of the State Regulatory pattern in the Dow Chemical Company's
 
Report on industrial cogeneration.
 
"...companies owning or operating facilities devoted or
 
dedicated to 'public use'." (Reference 1, page 371.)
 
The concept of "devoted or dedicated to public use" also holds in
 
California as a result of the interpretation by the California court.
 
The key decision appears to be that of the courts in 1960 in the case
 
of Richfield Corporation vs. Public Utilities Commission. Here the
 
Supreme Court ruled that the PUC was without jurisdiction in its
 
attempt to regulate an oil and gas producer who was offering to deliver
 
oil and gas to a public utility. The reason given was that the oil and
 
gas producer had not dedicated its facilities to public use.
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The major question, then, is how is the concept of "dedicated or
 
devoted to public use" determined? Even this question raises some ques­
tions as to which "life" of the boiler should be used -- economic, tech­
nical or tax life. The PUC's present position is that
 
"Whether a cogenerator can be said to have dedicated
 
its cogeneration facilities to public use is a question
 
the answer to which will depend on the facts of each
 
case.*
 
Before leaving the question of what determines whether or -not a
 
corporation is a public utility, the case of the River Bend G&W Company
 
should be considered. The River Bend G&W Company is a public utility
 
that sold its water distribution system to another company, but agreed
 
to continue to sell water from its well at a fixed rate per month to
 
the new owner of the distribution system. The PUC (at that time the
 
California Railroad Commission) held in 1917 that the River Bend Com­
pany did not lose its public utility status nor was it relieved of
 
public utility regulations. The holding in this case appears to apply
 
to any cogenerator. The only difference is that a cogenerating firm
 
was not a public utility prior to cogenerating. In other words, the
 
end state of the River Bend Company Case and a cogenerator selling
 
excess electricity are identical; they differ only in their history
 
of getting to that end state. To review what has been described above,
 
when looking at any cogeneration scheme where electricity is being sold
 
to the grid:
 
(1) 	 The California Code states that the owners of such a system
 
are under PUC jurisdiction.
 
(2) 	 The case of Richfield Corporation states that such a
 
facility is not under PUC jurisdiction (pending clarifi­
cation of the definition of "dedicated to public use").
 
(3) 	 The "old" case of River Bend G&W Company held that the
 
owner is under PUC regulation.
 
*Personal communication, M. J. Borak, California Public Utilities
 
Commission, March 3, 1978.
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APPENDIX C
 
THE THREE MAJOR PUBLIC UTILITIES
 
The Public Utilities Commission staff noted in its report that
 
"the implementation of cogeneration projects require (sic) both a willing
 
buyer and willing seller." (Reference 5, page 8.) With that in mind,
 
this appendix describes the three major electric utility companies in
 
the state: (1) Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), (2) Southern
 
California Edison Company (SCE), and (3) San Diego Gas and Electric
 
Company (SDG&E). During the course of this study, interview teams met
 
with representatives of each of these utilities to discuss their views
 
on cogeneration. Table 1'presents a comparison of some of the key
 
characteristics of these three electric utilities.
 
I. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
 
Although PG&E services an area twice the size of that served by
 
SCE, their electric system and sales are similar. Electric operations
 
account for 59% of the total revenues and 70% of the operating income.
 
Both of these percentages have been increased in recent years because
 
of the decrease in gas sales. The most recent dramatic change for PG&E
 
occurred during 1976-77 when, as a result of the drought, hydroelectric
 
power contributed only 38% of the total system output. In the years
 
preceding the drought, PG&E was able to use hydroelectric generation
 
(which is less expensive than fossil fuel generation) for more than half
 
of its output (Reference 27, .page 6). The effect on the cost of electric
 
energy produced in 1977 was quite dramatic, as shown below:
 
Cost of Electric Energy (Thousands of Dollars)
 
% Increase from 
1977* 1976* Previous Quarter 
First Quarter 215,432 198,139 9 
Second Quarter 257,479 113,824 126 
Third Quarter 364,864 159,281 129 
Fourth Quarter 337,365 152,871 121 
Totals 1,175,140 624,114 
*Current dollars 
The 40% increase from the second to the third quarter of 1977 represents
 
an annual increase of almost 300%. The increase from the annual total
 
for 1976 to 1977 was about 90%. During the same period revenues
 
increased only-50% and sales in kilowatt-hours decreased by 2%.
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Table 1. Comparison of the Three Major California Public Utilities, 1976 and 1977
 
PG&E 	 SCE SDG&E
 
1977 1976 Change 1977 1976 Change 1977 1976 Change
 
Service Area, sq. mi. 94,006 94,000 	 50,000 50,000 4,400 4,400
 
Total-Assets, 106$ 	 7,998 7,419 7.8 5,646 4,947 14.1 1,415 1,187 19.2
 
Equity as a Z of Total
 
Capitalization and Liabilities 48 45 6.7 45 47 (4.3) 41 41
 
Investment in Electric Plant
 
Facilities at original costs,
 
106$ 	 5,636 5,345 5.4 4,965 4,699 5.7 861 796 8.2
 
Electric Customers (x 10 ) 3,179 3,087 3.0 2,901 2,814 3.1 683 645 5.8
 
Sale of Electricity, NW-h 58,071 56,560 2.7 57,726 53,685 7.5 8,931 8,646 3.3
 
Capacity, MW 	 13,948 14,424 (3.3)* 14,337 
 14,066 1.9 2,273' 2,278 (0.2)**
 
Peak Demand, M 12,191 12,246 (0.4) 11,247 11,081 1.5 1,746 1,716 1.7
 
(I )
 Average Price per W-h
 
cents 2.58 
 3.52 	 3.64
 
% of Generation Oil and Gas 72(2) 62(2) 16.1 78 77 1.3 87.6 79.3 10.5
 
Fuel and Purchased Power as a
 
/ of Operating Expenses(3 ) 68 63 7.9 68 59 15.3 63 61 3.3
 
Z of kW-h to Industry 23 23 	 28.4 29.1 (2.4)" __(4) __(4) __(4)
 
*Due to adverse hydroelectric conditions Notes: 
**Due to a reduction in firm contracts 1'. Reference 28, page 64. 
Source: 1976 and 1977 Annual Reports for each 2. The figures for PG&E are for all thermal plants. 
company unless otherwise noted. 3. 	For PG&E and SDG&E, the Fuel and Purchased Power for both electric and
 
gas sales are added and divided by the total operating expenses.
 
4. 	Data supplied by SDG&E does not separate industrial customers from the
 
total for industrial and commercial. The California Energy Commission
 
estimates that it is about 24%, but a look at SDG&E's industrial gas
 
customers indicates that it might be about 20%.
 
The result of this change in generation mix (an additional 16
 
million barrels of low sulfur oil was burned in 1976 in comparison to
 
1975) has been a change in attitude toward alternative methods of
 
generation. As stated in their 1978 annual report:
 
"No single source of energy is the answer to our needs.
 
All feasible sources must be developed and conservation
 
must be vigorously pursued." (Reference 27, page 7.)
 
Such a change in attitude can only help industrial cogeneration.
 
However, the rains experienced during the first quarter of 1978 could
 
modify PG&E's new attitude as once again very inexpensive hydropower
 
is purchased from outside the PG&E system or is generated at PG&E
 
plants. By the end of the first quarter'of 1978, 48.5% of PG&E's
 
electric energy came from hydroelectric plants.*
 
Concerns About Cogeneration
 
PG&E is concerned about the influence of regulatory bodies on its
 
activities. Of specific concern was the recent request by the PUC for
 
guidelines and prices on the purchase of industrially cogenerated power.
 
The utility felt that the publication of that information could hurt
 
their negotiating position. PG&E wants to be able to negotiate with
 
firms on an individual basis in order to keep the purchase price as
 
low as possible. They fear that windfall profits for some cogenerators
 
is a real possibility. Related to the problem of purchase price deter­
mination is PG&E's general concern about the type of projects that fall
 
under PUC's classification of cogeneration. For instance, does the
 
power that PG&E buys from the Dow Chemical Company - which is not cogen­
erating at this time - come under this classification? PG&E, as pre­
viously stated, is concerned only with the quality of the electricity,
 
not in the fuel efficiency used by a second party to produce it.
 
As a result of the oil embargo and the drought, PG&E has become
 
interested in all sources of power. However, PG&E and industrial firms
 
do not always have identical interests. PG&E wants the flexibility to
 
buy the least expensive power, which is hydro, when it is available. In
 
addition to flexible prices, PG&E also prefers long-term contracts.
 
Fifteen years is appropriate for its planning horizon. While some firms
 
they are negotiating with have compatible planning horizons, other firms
 
would like five year contracts. The firms prefer predetermined prices
 
and demand requirements and arrangements that reflect fuel escalation
 
rates. PG&E would prefer contracts that call for periodic price
 
renegotiations. This arrangement would leave room for negotiation and
 
it is PG&E's negotiating position that is their present concern. At
 
this time, the entire pricing arrangement is subject to negotiation.
 
PG&E also questioned why a utility should pay for "waste" material,
 
as in the case of wood waste (hog fuel) used in cogeneration. The
 
proper determination of price of a fuel for which the owner must normally
 
*Personal communication, PG&E public information office, March 27, 1978.
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pay to dispose, is a question that PG&E feels has not been adequately
 
addressed. The question is, who gets the profit? PG&E would prefer
 
that the reduced fuel price be passed on to them and their customers.
 
They can see no rationale for tying the price of a waste material to
 
the world price of oil as some firms have suggested.
 
II. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
 
Of the three major California public utilities, SCE has the
 
highest percentage of industrial customers. Their future fuel supplies
 
appear to be assured and their financial status appears to be strong.
 
Its biggest problem appears to be the continuing capital requirements
 
of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
 
Although its energy costs are not increasing as rapidly as PG&E,
 
SCE has incurred a 15% growth in energy costs from 1976 ($916,131,000)
 
to 1977 ($1,040,091,000) with a comparable 13% increase in sales
 
revenue. SCE generated 7.5% more electricity in 1977 through 1976.
 
Thus its increased fuel costs were passed on to its ratepayers. Over
 
the last decade, energy costs increased at an average annual rate of
 
26% while generation in kilowatt-hours increased at an annual rate of
 
4%. Due to air quality regulations, SCE must operate its plants in
 
the South Coast Air Basin to minimize the NOx emissions as opposed to
 
minimizing the cost.
 
Concerns About Cogeneration
 
Mr. Edward Myers, a Vide-President of SCE, presented the company's
 
optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints on cogeneration. On the optimistic
 
side he stated that:
 
"As energy costs continue to increase, industrial customers
 
are becoming increasingly aware of the need to improve the
 
energy efficiency of lifeline and time-of-use rates. The
 
revenue deficiency caused by providing lifeline service is
 
to be made up from primarily commercial and industrial
 
classes of service. These subsidies, together with time­
of-use rates, charging more for service used during a
 
utility's peak period, will, on the surface, tend to make
 
on-site generation look more promising. Thus, Edison
 
expects an increase in the number of proposals for cogen­
eration ventures." (Reference 29, page 1591.)
 
On the pessimistic side, Mr. Myers expressed the utility's skepticism
 
about cogeneration. The utilities insist that
 
(1) 	 "...frequency control remain the province of the utility
 
system, and
 
(2) 	 "...that the system be adequately protected from undue
 
outside influence."
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They are concerned with the increasing complexity of system dispatch.
 
In general, they realize the cogeneration potential is real,
 
"...but that both the magnitude and impact of that
 
potential have perhaps been overstated by on-site
 
proponents in their explanation of cogeneration
 
benefits." (Reference 29, page 1594.)
 
SCE is also concerned that industry will not be interested in
 
industrial cogeneration because of the many institutional issues. The
 
major issue is regulation: namely, the lack of a legal determination
 
on how industrial cogenerators will be viewed by regulatory agencies.
 
Will such generating facilities be viewed as part of the utility's
 
generating system? If so, could they be forced to continue generating
 
even if they find it to be uneconomic for the firm? These two questions
 
remain to be adequately resolved. Until they are, cogeneration growth,
 
as far as SCE is concerned,--will not be significant.
 
III. SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC
 
SDG&E is the smallest of the three public utilities examined in
 
this study. Its service area is about 1/10 that of SCE and 1/20 that
 
of PG&E, but its electrical sales are only about 1/6 that of SCE and
 
slightly less than 1/6 of PG&E. About 80% of SDG&E's operating
 
revenues are from electric service. Less than 0.2% of operating
 
revenues are from steam sales.
 
The price of electricity from SDG&E is higher than that set by
 
the other two utilities. Presently, it is about 3.5% higher than SCE
 
and 4.1% higher than PG&E. Forecasts completed by the utilities show
 
the difference in 1995 to be 25% higher than SCE and 60% higher than
 
PG&E.* (Reference 28, page 641.)
 
Like other utilities, SDG&E has faced tremendous increases in
 
fuel and purchased energy costs for electric generation. These costs
 
have increased at an average annual rate of 29% over the past 10 years.
 
Fuel and purchased energy costs for the generation of electricity as a
 
percentage of total electric operating revenues has increased by almost
 
a factor of three over the last 10 years, as is shown in Figure 1.
 
SDG&E does not believe that this trend will continue as "the cost of
 
power plant fuel oil rose more slowly (in 1976) than in either of the
 
two previous years." (Reference 30, page 3.) However, in an effort
 
to control these increases in fuel costs, SDG&E has consolidated all
 
the "fuel procurement and development activities into a fuel resources
 
department." (Reference 30, page 9.) Such an organizational change
 
would help the company properly evaluate industrial cogenerated
 
electricity. At this time, most of the efforts of this department
 
have concentrated on the management of existing fuel and development
 
of firm contracts for the future fuel supply.
 
*If the California Energy Commission's estimates are used, SDG&E electricity
 
will be 16% less expensive than SCE and only 20% higher than PG&E's price.
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SDG&E established Applied Energy, Inc. (AEI), a wholly owned
 
subsidiary, to handle all of its industrial cogeneration activities.
 
AEI is not organized to handle the purchase of industrially generated
 
power. Such arrangements must be coordinated with the parent company,
 
SDG&E, if the industrial firm wants to own the generation equipment.
 
Concerns About Industrial Cogeneration
 
In general, AEI believes that private firms do not want to get
 
involved in generating electricity. It does not perceive the cause for
 
the lack of interest to be the fear of regulation, but rather that
 
industrial cogeneration is viewed as another unwanted operations head­
ache. In fact, it feels that many firms would like to get out of the
 
steam generating business and concentrate on their own business. One
 
reason for this observation could be the lack of large-energy industrial
 
users in the SDG&E service area. As stated in the 1977 Annual Report:
 
"While cogeneration is efficient, its contribution to
 
system electrical requirements is expected to remain
 
small because the number of industries that can use
 
large amounts of steam is somewhat limited."
 
(Reference 30, page 5.)
 
C-6
 
IV. COMPARISON OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES
 
The preceding sections indicated the diversity of the three
 
electric corporations regulated by the California Public Utilities
 
Commission. Some of the important differences and similarities will
 
be compared in this section.
 
Similarities
 
Some of the obvious similarities described in the previous section
 
are:
 
(1) 	 Energy costs and the ratio of energy costs to operating
 
expenses have been increasing over the last decade.
 
(2) 	 Substantial capacity expansion is planned.
 
(3) 	 A feeling that each cogeneration project must be considered
 
separately and that almost all necessary contractual matters
 
are open to negotiation.
 
All of the utilities agreed that in the near term the amount of
 
cogeneration that would be implemented would be too small to cause any
 
changes in the reliability of their systems or in the reduction of their
 
tariffs. However, they also agreed that there probably was a rate for
 
introducing industrial cogeneration above which the utility could find
 
itself having to charge higher prices for retail electricity. As one
 
overview on cogeneration noted:
 
"...it must be pointed out that with the increase of
 
this type of system (industry operated cogeneration plant
 
offsetting its electric demand) in any given utility area,
 
a point may be reached in which the total utility load is
 
predominantly of a residential and commercial type. Since
 
these customers are relatively more expensive to service,
 
the effect could be to increase the cost of electrical
 
service." (Reference 1, page 38.)
 
Another similarity is the forecasted changes in reserve margin.
 
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, in its review of the
 
President's National Energy Plan, noted there were areas of concern
 
that:
 
"...could keep the Nation from realizing (industrial)
 
cogeneration's full potential. Principally, utility
 
interest in cogeneration will probably be very limited
 
for the next several years because planned expansion
 
of generating capacity will meet or exceed demand."
 
(Reference 31, page 127.)
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In California, electric utilities are required by Section 25300 of
 
the Public Resource Code to include tabulations of reserve margins indi­
cated by the 5, 10, and 20 year forecast of each utility's supply plan.*
 
The table below summarizes the submissions by PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E.
 
Planned Reserve Margins
 
Year PG&E SCE SDG&E 
1976 23.9% 21.1% 23.1% 
1977 25.3 24.3 17.8 
1978 20.2 21.6 12.6 
1979 16.5 18.9 22.1 
1980 14.4 15.4 11.3 
1985 15.4 15.7 11.8 
1995 14.5 11.5 10.9 
Note: 	 Reserve margin is the percent net generating capacity
 
in excess of annual peak demand. The national average
 
in 1976 was 50% (Reference 13, page 15).
 
Source: 	 California Energy Trends and Choices, (Reference 28,
 
page 131).
 
Although the determination of the proper reserve margin is depen­
dent on many factors, it can be seen that the three utilities are all
 
planning to decrease the percentage. The accuracy of these forecasts
 
is dependent on each utility's ability to bring planned capacity on-line
 
and its ability to predict future demand. Nuclear power is a significant
 
part of the planned capacity. Over the next 10 years, 38% of PG&E's
 
capacity expansion and 47% of SCE's expansion will be from nuclear gen­
erating stations. SDG&E's capacity expansion was also heavily dependent
 
on nuclear power. However, given the questions raised by the Public
 
Utilities Commission and the California Energy Resources Conservation
 
and Development Commission on nuclear power, it appears that the nuclear
 
plants will not come on-line. The potentially shorter lead time for
 
installing cogeneration could therefore become an important source of
 
new capacity for SDG&E.
 
All three utilities have been involved in cogeneration-projects in
 
the past. However, only SDG&E has established a separate entity to look
 
after cogeneration projects. Ironically, Applied Energy, Inc. was
 
formed by the San Diego Gas and Electric Company to handle only one
 
type of cogenerationarrangement--the sale of steam to industrial firms.
 
At this point, they are awaiting the completion of their first civilian
 
project with Rohr Industries, Inc., before other cogeneration projects
 
are evaluated.
 
*Appendix E contains more detail on each utility's forecasting and plannin
 
C-8
 
Differences
 
Although the utilities realize that their planning environment is
 
changing and that alternatives such as industrial cogeneration must be
 
considered seriously, they differ in how they evaluate new cogeneration
 
ventures. PG&E appears to be the most cautious. They have been reluc­
tant to encourage cogeneration projects that cannot be considered as
 
firm capacity. As a result, they are less inclined to want to incor­
porate cogeneration capacity'into their resource planning. SCE appears
 
to be less reluctant to incorporate cogeneration into their capacity
 
supply planning. They have indicated that even cogeneration plants with
 
random sales of excess electricity to the grid will be considered as
 
part of the generating capacity, though not at its full capacity. For
 
example, the Dow Chemical Co. contract with PG&E has a required capacity
 
factor of 95%. In SCE's Alternate B, a 70% annual capacity factor is
 
required. Because of the type of cogeneration projects entered into by
 
SDG&E, the cogeneration capacity is considered as part of the utilities
 
generating system.
 
As far as existing capacity goes, the availability of hydro­
electric resources to PG&E is the most striking difference. This
 
resource has obviously fluctuated in recent years, but its potential
 
availability appears to make PG&E reluctant to consider contracts that
 
might force them to buy relatively expensive cogenerated electricity
 
when less expensive hydropower might be available.
 
All of the utilities are concerned about system control. However,
 
here again there is variation. SCE, in its interruptible rate experi­
ment, indicates that a premium is paid if the utility maintains control
 
over the generating station's interface with the system. PG&E appears
 
to want to consider only arrangements where it maintains control over
 
the system interface. SCE, on the other hand, is considering the pos­
sibilities of some external control.
 
Each utility appears to have its own feelings on how the price of
 
cogenerated energy should be evaluated and re-evaluated over time. SCE
 
is willing to tie the price to either its average system cost (Alter­
nate A) or its South Coast Basin oil and gas fired generation plant
 
costs (Alternate B). SDG&E's price of waste heat sold to AEI for resale
 
is directly tied to the cost of base load power. PG&E, however, pre­
fers to negotiate each price separately and not tie it to other fuels.
 
They feel it is their responsibility to get the best price for the elec­
tricity for their customers. For example, they question paying for
 
wood waste as though it were equal to the dollar value of Btu equiva­
lent oil, when in the past the seller has had to pay for disposing or
 
treating the waste.
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the opinions of the utilities
 
as to why some firms might not be willing to consider cogeneration. All
 
agreed that state and federal legislation clearly exempting industrial
 
cogeneration from regulation was essential. Even a decision by the PUC
 
was not considered sufficient. SDG&E felt that firms in its service area
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would prefer not to have to worry about the production of steam ret
 
alone begin to consider operational responsibility for electric genera­
tion. SCE saw cost and availability of capital as the biggest obstacle
 
to the firms as well as a fear that once they begin to cogenerate they
 
might be forced to continue generation even if it is no longer profitable.
 
PG&E felt that industrial concerns about future sources of fuel for
 
cogeneration plants using a topping cycle was the dominant concern.
 
As a result of PUC resolution E-1738, it is probable that as each
 
utility's guidelines on cogeneration are made public and as cogeneration
 
arrangements come on-line and their performance is evaluated, the differ­
ences will decrease.
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APPENDIX D
 
COGENERATION ACTIVITIES OF THE THREE MAJOR PUBLIC UTILITIES
 
I. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY*
 
A. EXISTING COGENERATION PROJECTS
 
PG&E has three existing cogeneration** facilities that have been
 
operating since the early 1940s. All three facilities involve refinery
 
plants that trade fuel oil for steam from the PG&E owned and operated
 
cogenerating plant. The arrangement was initially conducted under
 
separate contractual agreements with each of the three refiners--Shell,
 
Union, and Lion. Schedule No. P-8, Oil Refinery Electric and Steam
 
Service, addresses the dollar value of the steam supplied. Special con­
ditions under the schedule include a minimum 10 year contract. While
 
the plants meet air quality standards, they are considered to be econ­
omically marginal by PG&E and are usually operated to meet the steam
 
demands of the refineries. The agreement calls for 0.265 bbls of fuel
 
oil and $2 for each 1,000 pounds of steam (160 psig) plus a demand
 
charge of $6,000 per month.
 
PG&E has been buying electric power from other non-utility firms.
 
One such arrangement is with the Dow Chemical Company in Pittsburg,
 
California. The arrangement originally for six months, but recently
 
renewed for another six months, calls for 15 MW of power at a 95%
 
capacity factor. There is a severe penalty for any month in which the
 
delivered power falls below this amount. Although the penalty should
 
not pose a problem for Dow with its 300% reserve, it does reflect PG&E's
 
concern about purchasing high quality (available and reliable) base load
 
power.
 
Other arrangements where excess power is purchased by the utility
 
exist with the Georgia-Pacific Corporation (1.2 MW), Louisiana Pacific
 
Corporation (8 MW), and Stauffer Chemical Company (2 MW). All of these
 
agreements are short term, although long term negotiations are underway
 
for the first two firms.
 
PG&E will buy power at a price of 14 mills/kW-h because they have
 
less expensive power available, depending on water conditions. For
 
example, PG&E pays 3 mills/kW-h for dumped power from the Northwest and
 
its variable cost for its own hydropower is nil. Any price above
 
*This section is based on a meeting with PG&E on January 17, 1978.
 
**In the past, PG&E defined cogeneration in its Commercial Guide as
 
"joint electric generation projects where PG&E would own, operate
 
and/or maintain some component of the power sources." Cogeneration
 
arrangements without PG&E direct involvement were referred to as
 
industrially produced power. Recently, this has been changed to
 
include all facilities where there is "simultaneous production of
 
useful heat in some form and electric energy in the same system."
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14 mills per kW-h is subject to negotiation. PG&E is not concerned with
 
how the electric power is generated. All of the power purchased from
 
industry, whether or not it is cogenerated, is termed industrially
 
generated power. PG&E has a standard contract form to purchase surplus
 
energy up to 3 MW from industrial plants. Above 3 MW a case-by-case
 
approach is followed where such issues as ownership, equipment purchase,
 
land acquisition, and operating and maintenance responsibilities are
 
negotiated.
 
PG&E contends that any capital investment they make should go into
 
their bate base. For this reason, PG&E needs assurance that a coopera­
tive venture will exist for a given period of time (six years at a
 
minimum) so that they can continue to use it in their rate base
 
calculations.
 
B. 	 PRESENT ACTIVITIES
 
In late 1976, the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
 
raised the matter of cogeneration potential in the state (Decision
 
No. 85559). B. W. Shackelford, at that time a PG&E Senior Vice
 
President for Planning and Research, presented in testimony to the PUC
 
a list of 46 large gas consumers in the PG&E service area. These were
 
considered to be energy users that should be considered for possible
 
cogeneration projects. In early 1978, a team of eight people was formed
 
to deal with cogeneration projects. In addition, several people in
 
other departments are involved in evaluating and implementing cogenera­
tion projects. Presently, PG&E is involved in 10 such projects, having
 
a total estimated capacity of about 900 MW. These projects consist of:
 
(1) 	 Enhanced oil recovery projects. Two projects--Getty and
 
Texaco--have had feasibility studies conducted by an
 
outside engineering firm. A definite decision on PG&E's
 
involvement is expected by the end of 1978. A third
 
project is with the Husky Oil refinery.
 
(2) 	 Two waste heat recovery projects.
 
(3) 	 Four wood by-product projects.
 
One of the wood by-product projects is with the Louisiana Pacific
 
Corporation. Louisiana Pacific would use 2,100 tons of wood waste per
 
day from a lumber mill in Oroville to fuel a turbine generator with a
 
capacity of about 45 MW. (PG&E has estimated that as much as 635,000
 
barrels of oil equivalent per year could be saved with this project.)
 
Louisiana Pacific asked PG&E to review the possibility of generating
 
electricity from wood waste and residue. Following an initial evalua­
tion, the two organizations hired a consultant for technical assistance
 
in the area of wood gathering, storage, and combustion, as well as in
 
planning the general layout of the plant.
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The preliminary sizing considerations were based on the fuel
 
availability. The wood wastes are categorized as sawdust, bark, and
 
wood shavings. Wood chips were not considered in the original evalua­
tion because they are already a marketable commodity. Although wood
 
chips are not selling well at the present time, PG&E did not want to
 
be forced to compete with others in the market for the wood chips.
 
Like the Dow Chemical project, this example shows that PG&E is quite
 
risk-averse in its purchase of industrially-generated electricity.
 
Although fuel availability was important in determining the size
 
of the facility, the availability of a used turbine generator and two
 
boilers determined the 45 MW capacity.. The result is the production of
 
450,000 pounds/hour of steam, of which only 50,000 pounds/hour is
 
required by Louisiana Pacific. Hopefully, the remaining steam can be
 
utilized by other plants that might locate in the vicinity in the near
 
future.
 
At this point the prices and other contractual arrangements have
 
not been worked out. Points that remain to be resolved include:
 
(1) Ownership. 
(2) Operation responsibility. 
(3) Price for waste wood. 
(4) Cost of steam to industry. 
II. .SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY 
A. EXISTING COGENERATION PROJECTS
 
SCE has two existing cogeneration agreements, one with the Garden
 
State Paper Company (15 MW) and another with the Stauffer Chemical
 
Company (4 MW). The Garden State Generating Station, in Pomona, is
 
owned and operated by SCE. Steam is sold under a negotiated contract
 
to the Garden State Paper Company. Electricity is still purchased from
 
the SCE system. Operations began in 1966.
 
The Garden State cogeneration facility developed as a result of
 
the competition between electric and gas utilities in the mid-1960s.
 
SCE examined about 40 industrial customers where.cogeneration arrange­
ments could be established in order to keep SCE customers from switching
 
to natural gas. Only one facility--the Garden State Paper Company-­
was considered to be a beneficial investment for the utility.
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B. PRESENT COGENERATION ACTIVITIES*
 
As a result of California Public Utilities Commission Decision
 
No. 85559, SCE began to search for potential cogeneration projects.
 
In late 1977, SCE expanded its cogeneration team in order to increase
 
its efforts in attracting industrial cogenerators. The SCE effort to
 
implement industrial cogeneration involves three engineers, one market­
ing representative, and several field representatives. As of February
 
1978, no contracts had been signed.
 
As a first step toward implementing cogeneration, SCE established
 
three alternatives utilizing on-site cogeneration. Experimental tariffs
 
for interruptible service and parallel generation were also established.
 
The three schemes are:
 
Alternate A - Partial Requirements
 
Alternate B - Resource Type
 
Alternate C - Utility Ownership
 
Alternate A is much further along in terms of contractual review and
 
development. Position papers on Alternates B and C have not been
 
completely reviewed by SCE or any potential customers. The three
 
alternates are discussed below.
 
Alternate A
 
Most of the industrial interest in cogeneration in the SCE service
 
area has been directed toward Alternate A, in which the customer plans
 
to replace all or a portion of his present energy source--SCE--while
 
keeping SCE as back-up. SCE has established a policy paper in the form
 
of a contract to facilitate beginning negotiations. Counteroffers,
 
including changes to the present price structure for the sale of
 
electricity to the utility, will be considered, especially if the
 
customer presents its specific objections and recommendations. The
 
proposed price for excess electricity would be based on the total system
 
average cost. As with time-of-use (TOU) rates, the price would depend
 
on when it is made available to the grid.
 
An important feature of Alternate A is the way that back-up power
 
or standby charges are handled. Prior to this pricing scheme, if a
 
firm required standby power, its charge was $2/kW for the first 20 kW
 
and $1.50 for all excess kW on standby. In addition there was the
 
regular demand charge plus a 50% carry over of the demand charges based
 
on the highest maximum demand established in the previous 11 months.
 
Under Alternate A, these charges would be eliminated and only the actual
 
demand charge and an 85% ratchet would be employed. The 85% ratchet
 
refers to the setting of a monthly minimum demand charge based on the
 
highest demand over the past 11 months. The example in Table 1 shows
 
a savings of $412 over a five-month period. An actual example cited by
 
*This section is based on a meeting with SCE on March 7, 1978.
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Table 1. Comparison of SCE's Alternate A to SCE's Regular
 
Standby Tariff
 
Regular Standby Tariff
 
kW Demanded (1 )  Demand Standby Ratchet 
Month (Peak) Alternate A Charge Charge (50%) Total 
1 50 $105.00(2) $105(2) $85( 4) $52 $242 
2 10 89.25 (3 )  21 85 52 158 
3 10 89.25 21 85 52 158
 
4 10 89.25 21 85 52 158
 
5 10 89.25 21 85 52 158
 
Totals: $462.00 $874
 
(1)This is the assumed kW actually demanded in each month.
 
50 kW is assumed to be the maximum over the previous
 
11 months. Only peak demand is analyzed here.
 
(2)kW x $2.10/kW on peak demand.* This rate is from TOU-8
 
schedule.
 
(3)85% ratchet 
- ($105 x 
0.85 = $89.25) 
- applied to maximum
 
demand over the past 11 months if higher than present
 
month.
 
(4)50 kW is assumed to be on standby. The charge is-based on
 
$2.00 for the first 20 kW and $1.50 for each additional kW
 
on standby.
 
SCE would result in a monthly savings of $62,000 or 86% under Alternate
 
A. Basically what happens is that the responsibility for insuring
 
adequate back-up is accepted by SCE.
 
More important from the standpoint of future capital expenditures
 
is whether or not SCE would count the on-site generating equipment in
 
its resource planning. If SCE does not, and the total potentialdemand
 
of the customer remains on the demand side of the resource plans, the
 
result would be an increase in the capital expenditure per kilowatt.
 
This follows because both the utility and the firm are investing in
 
capacity. SCE stated that their system planning department has indi­
cated that cogeneration will be counted in SCE's capacity planning.
 
Each site, depending on its characteristics, will be assigned a factor
 
by which its capacity will be multiplied to determine an effective
 
planning capacity. Because none of the contracts for Alternate A have
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been signed, no factors have been defined. All special contracts, such
 
as Alternate A, must be reviewed by the PUC. In the past, SCE has had
 
no difficulty in having special contracts approved. The PUC appears
 
to have the attitude that the contract must be satisfactory if the
 
customer and utility both feel that it is beneficial. However, PUC
 
review of existing contracts can occur at any time and could result in
 
contractual changes in the price or other aspects of the agreement.
 
Alternate B
 
Under Alternate B, the generating facility is owned by the customer,
 
but all or a portion of it is considered as part of SCE's firm power.
 
The draft contract that SCE is developing requires a 70% annual capacity
 
factor and an 85% annual on-peak capacity factor for the contracted
 
capacity to ensure that it is dependable power. In addition, the con­
tract would be in force for 10 years and renewable in five year incre­
ments. (SCE's planning cycle is five years.)
 
There 	are three parts to the payment by SCE for this firm power:
 
(1) 	 Energy Credit - SCE will pay up to 85% of the South Basin
 
oil- and gas-fired generation costs. Presently this cost
 
is about 19.3 mills/kW-h, but it can fluctuate every quarter.
 
Because the power is considered as part of the utility's
 
firm power, there is no differentiation between power
 
delivered on or off-peak.
 
(2) 	 Capacity Credit - If a firm that is already a customer
 
installs a cogeneration capability, the capacity is not of
 
value 	to SCE for five years. The value of the capacity is
 
discounted to reflect this fact. If a new customer comes
 
on line with a cogeneration capability, the capacity is
 
immediately of full value. The capacity value has not yet
 
been completely worked out by SCE.
 
(3) 	 Operation and Maintenance Credit.
 
Although one customer is interested in Alternate B, no customers
 
have reviewed the proposed contract to date. One reason might be that
 
there are few firms that have the required steam loads or that can meet
 
the continuous operating cycle requirements.
 
Alternate C
 
Under Alternate C, the utility owns the generating facility. This
 
arrangement is similar to that for the Garden State Paper Company facilit:
 
described previously. This type of arrangement is more appealing to SCE
 
because of the control they maintain over the generating equipment. The
 
major obstacle for the utility is the lack of capital. However, the
 
availability of capital for cogeneration is an obstacle for either the
 
utility or the firm under all three alternatives.
 
D-6
 
III. SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION*
 
A. EXISTING COGENERATION PROJECTS
 
SDG&E's view of cogeneration as described in a recent article,
 
appears to be quite different than PG&E or SCE:
 
"San Diego Gas and Electric favors the concept of
 
utility-owned and operated cogeneration plants
 
located on or next to customer premises - where it
 
can sell the waste heat and keep the electricity ­
rather than become involved with customer-owned
 
facilities.
 
"In keeping with this philosophy, the utility has
 
set up a subsidiary company, Applied Energy, Inc.,
 
to concentrate exclusively on working out cogeneration
 
arrangements with industrial customers and to help
 
them evaluate their needs and options."
 
(Reference 22, page 241.)
 
Applied Energy,..Inc. (AEI) was incorporated in 1968 to handle the
 
supplying of steam to the U. S. Naval Training Center and the Marine
 
Corps Recruiting Depot. Three steam-producing facilities employing
 
cogeneration technology owned by SDG&E are not operated by AEI. It is
 
important to remember that ABI is involved only in the "manufacturing"
 
of steam and its sale. All of the equipment used to generate electricity
 
is owned and operated by SDG&E. The exhaust heat from the SDG&E turbines
 
is "purchased" by AEI which in turn uses it to manufacture the required
 
steam. The steam is used by the customer for processing and space heat­
ing. Because of the steam supply orientation, each of the three facili­
ties is overdesigned to ensure that the customer's steam demand is met.
 
Whether the steam is supplied by the waste heat boilers connected to the
 
turbines or by a separate package boiler is an economic decision based
 
on the quantity of steam required and the type of fuel available. If
 
necessary, the electricity is produced at a very low efficiency or not
 
at all.
 
The first Naval facility, with a capacity of 15 MW, was contracted
 
for in 1968 and came on line in 1971. The second (20 MW) and the third
 
(20 MW) came on line in 1976 and 1979, respectively.
 
SDG&E established AEI to streamline the legal involvements and to
 
keep all the attendant contractual and administrative problems in a
 
separate profit center. This arrangement is similar to the establish­
ment of separate R&D and operating subsidiaties by some utilities. The
 
PUC is interested in what AEI does, but it does not have the same direct
 
operating jurisdiction over AEI activities as it does over SDG&E.
 
*This section is mostly based on a meeting with SDG&E/AEI representatives
 
on January 23, 1978.
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AEI has kept a very low profile while servicing a limited market.
 
Considering that it has been in existence for 10 years, there is very
 
little public information concerning its activities. In 1973, there
 
was a brief article on its chilled water supply systems (Reference 6,
 
page 8) and in 1977 an article appeared on a planned cogeneration
 
facility (Reference 22, page 24). AEI is also investigating installing
 
a turbine from which waste heat would be derived for use in absorption
 
chillers at its chilled-water facility.
 
B. PRESENT ACTIVITIES
 
AEI is a small company with four full-time personnel and two
 
temporary personnel; two allocated positions have not yet been filled.
 
During periods of construction and operation, AEI hires personnel from
 
SDG&E on a contract basis. Billing and expenses for 1977 amounted to
 
$6 million, with those for 1978 projected at $10 million. About 90%'
 
of their revenue is derived from the three steam contracts noted above.
 
The fuel costs for 1978 are projected to total $16 million. However,
 
they will obtain an electricity credit of about $9 million from SDG&E.
 
Nineteen seventy-seven was not a good year because of turbine operating
 
problems: the turbine breakdown at one facility fesulted'in the produc­
tion of costly steam by a package boiler. The use of a package boiler
 
is not economic, but, as mentioned previously, is legally required by
 
the existing contracts for steam.
 
AEI can be described as a steam contractor. The steam billing to
 
a customer is determined by the amount of steam used. It is the respon­
sibility of AEI to supply the steam continuously. The cost of steam
 
from a cogeneration system is determined by first establishing the cost
 
of the exhaust heat. To calculate that cost, the amount of gas and oil
 
used per month is calculated than multiplied by current-prices to obtain
 
a total equivalent fuel cost for the operation of the turbines. Next,
 
the electricity meter is read to determine the electricity produced.
 
(AEI has little control over how much electricity is used by SDG&E. The
 
load management control belongs to SDG&E.) A credit for this electricit)
 
is then calculated. The $/kW-h was not given, but it is based on the
 
cost of base load power. This credit is subtracted from the fuel cost
 
to derive a dollar value for the exhaust heat as shown below:
 
Cost of Fuel Credit for
Value for 

E to Operate Electricity
Turbines Generated
 
This amount is divided by the pounds of steam sold to get a fuel cost
 
for steam to AEI. The fuel cost comprises 70% to 80% of the steam cost.
 
The rate structure (based on a declining block schedule) is predeterminec
 
in contracts with the company that buys the steam.
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In summary, AEI is organized to maximize their return on sale qf
 
steam and not to produce electricity at minimum cost. Thus, the parent
 
company pays a price for its electricity equivalent to other sources.
 
This is the opposite-of the concept used in many studies that look at
 
the marginal cost for producing on-site electricity and selling the
 
steam at slightly below existing costs.
 
Recently, AEI has been looking into establishing more steam con­
tracts with private customers. The company has established a contractual
 
agreement with Rohr Industries to place an 800 kW on-site cogeneration
 
plant for the supply of 7,000 lb/hr, 15 psig, 250 F saturated steam.
 
Although other industries have expressed interest, AEI wants to complete
 
the Rohr agreement before it examines other potential sites. AEI has
 
identified about 26 other potential customers, some of whom could be
 
combined into joint projects.
 
Presently the Rohr arrangements are progressing smoothly and will
 
be an excellent test case. In March 1977, the original contact was made
 
by Rohr with AEI and by September the contract agreement was signed. In
 
February 1978, the.last permit was acquired by AEI. AEI has a 20-year
 
contract consisting of two 10-year terms with Rohr. There will probably
 
be an escalation clause in all contracts that will be tied to the
 
Engineering News Record Construction Index.
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APPENDIX 	E
 
ELECTRICITY FORECASTING AND PLANNING BY THE THREE
 
MAJOR PUBLIC UTILITIES
 
I. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
 
In its February 1977 submission to the California Energy Commission,
 
PG&E forecasted a 4.6% annual growth rate for the sale of electricity as
 
shown in Table 1. The peak capacity was forecasted to grow at 4.2%.
 
The percentage of industrial sales remains constant at about 25% of the
 
total kW 	hrs sold.
 
Table 1. 	Electricity Forecasts by Pacific Gas and
 
Electric Company
 
Sales, 106 kW-h 
Year 
Total Industrial Peak Capacity, MW 
1975 60,262 15,428 12,983 
1980 80,941 20,994 16,601 
1985 100,866 25,961 20,430 
1990 122,364 31,416 24,503 
1995 148,983 37,851 29,799 
Percent Growth Rate 
1975-85 5.3 5.3 4.6 
1975-95 4.6 4.6 4.2 
Note: 	 Data supplied by PG&E to the California Energy
 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission
 
in Feburary 1977.
 
Source: 	 Reference 28, pages 37, 38, 30.
 
The California Energy Commission has reduced these forecasts by
 
about 20% for sales and about 15% for capacity. The reasons given for
 
the modification are:
 
(1) 	 Different assumptions about future energy prices.
 
(2) 	 Non-price conservation adjustments in the commercial and
 
industrial sectors.
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(3) Different residential sales forecasting methodology and
 
different assumptions. (Reference 28, page 34.)
 
II. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
 
In the January 1977 submission to the California Energy Commission
 
SCE forecasted a 4.3% annual growth rate for the sale of electricity as
 
shown in Table 2. Peak capacity was forecasted to grow at 3.2%. In
 
comparison to PG&E and SDG&E, SCE is forecasting the lowest growth rate.
 
In addition, SCE is the only utility forecasting a decrease in the per­
centage of sales to industrial customers.
 
Table 2. 	Electricity Forecasts by Southern California
 
Edison Company
 
Sales, 106 kW-h

Year 	 Peak
 
Total Industrial Capacity, MW
 
1975 50,108 17,336 (35%)(l) 10,193
 
1980 59,676 18,676 (31%) 12,510
 
1985 75,171 21,705 (29%) 15,470
 
1990 94,345 26,702 (28%) 19,400
 
1995 116,402 32,609 (28%) 23,740
 
Percentage Growth Rate
 
2.3% 	 4.3(2)
4.1
1975-85 

1975-95 4.3 3.2% 	 4.3(2)
 
Note: 	 Data supplied by SCE to the California Energy
 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission
 
in August 1976 and January 1977.
 
Source: 	 Reference 28, pages 61, 62, 63.
 
(1)Industrial sales as a percentage of total sales. Note
 
that this is higher than shown in Table I in Appendix C
 
for 1976 and 1977.
 
(2)Corrected from 4.5% listed in source.
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SCE's forecasts were modified by the California Energy Resources
 
Conservation and Development Commission (CERCDC) to reduce total sales
 
by about 10% and to increase the percentage of sales to industrial cus­
tomers over the SCE forecasts. The percentage of industrial sales still
 
declines over the next 20 years under CERCDC's adopted forecast, but only
 
by two percentage points. Reasons for the changes made in the SCE fore­
cast include adjustments for the following factors:
 
(1) Reduction of SCE's upward adjustment in sales due to the
 
implementation of lifeline rates. SCE had assumed that
 
lifeline rates would cause an increase'in demand.
 
(2) 	 Non-price conservation in the residential sector.
 
(3) 	 SCE's high projections for non-residential forecasts based
 
on lower projections of electricity prices (Reference 28,
 
page 56).
 
III. SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
 
In the January 1977 submission to the CERCDC, SDG&E forecasted a
 
5.8% annual growth rate for the sale of electricity as shown in
 
Table 3. No changes were made by the CERCDC. The peak capacity was
 
forecasted to grow at 5.8%. These estimates show SDG&E is the fastest
 
growing major electric utility in the state. Such growth at a time when
 
the cost of construction of power plants is so high has been cited at
 
the major reason for the company's financial problems. Its stock
 
(common and preferred) are both rated below PG&E and SCE, and its bonds
 
are now rated at BBB, the lowest rating given "investment grade"
 
securities (References.32'and 33).
 
E-3
 
Table 3. Electricity Forecast by San Diego Gas and Electric Company
 
Sales, 106 kW-h
 
Year Peak 
Total Industrial Capacity, MW 
1975 8,141 1,980 (24%)( 1) 1,619 
1980 10,785 2,790 (26%) 2,234 
1985 14,500 3,977 (27%) 3,006 
1990 19,571 5,597 (29%) 3,971 
1995 25,091 7,276 (29%) 4,985 
Percent Growth Rate 
1975-85 5.9 7.2 6.4 
1975-95 5.8 6.7 '5.8 
Note: Data supplied by SDG&E to the California Energy
 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission
 
in January 1977.
 
Source: Reference 28, pages 54, 55.
 
(1)Industrial as a percentage of total sales.
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APPENDIX F
 
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES
 
I. WHAT IS A MUNICIPAL UTILITY?
 
The joint undertaking by the City of Santa Clara and the California
 
Paperboard Corporation was viewed as one of the most promising of the
 
cogeneration projects examined in this study. A major reason for this
 
favorable assessment was related to the characteristics of a municipal
 
utility. One study concluded that:
 
"...municipal utilities are more likely to be the.
 
first to adopt innovative, large-scale cogeneration
 
than are large, investor-owned electric utilities.
 
Municipals are more closely tied to local community
 
needs and are better able to respond to their needs
 
because they are less regulated than investor-owned
 
utilities; many already sell steam or are empowered
 
by their charters to do so; and they are generally
 
permitted to site plants closer to load areas than
 
large, investor-owned plants." (Reference 34,
 
page 19.)
 
Before looking at some of the characteristics of a municipal
 
utility, it is important to examine the legal status of a municipal
 
utility as described in the Public Utilities Code. In Paragraph 10002,
 
the code states that
 
"Any municipal corporation may acquire, construct,
 
own, operate or lease any public utility."
 
In addition, under'Paragraph 10004, the municipal government
 
"...may sell, lease or distribute the excess (water,
 
light, heat or power) outside of its corporate limits."
 
These powers appear to be quite broad, but there are some notable
 
exceptions that need further examination. For instance, there is no
 
mention of the PUC aiding or supporting the municipal government in
 
carrying out those powers. More important are the implications of
 
Paragraph 10107, the effect of Article 3 on powers of the PUC and the
 
Department of Public Works:
 
"Nothing in. this article limits in any respect the
 
jurisdiction powers, and duties vested by law in
 
the PUC... shall prevail."
 
Though Article 3 deals with Rights of Way, the broad language of the
 
paragraph suggests wider implications.
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While it is commonly held that utilities owned by municipal
 
governments are not regulated by the PUC, there is no statement in the
 
code that limits the PUC's jurisdiction. However, under the Municipal
 
Utility District Act (Division 6 of the Public Utilities Code) the
 
Directors of the District have the power and duty to supervise and
 
regulate the fixing of rates, contracts, practices, schedules, and
 
other aspects of the utility district. In fact, the powers of this type
 
of a municipal utility are left unconstrainted by Paragraph 11884 on
 
Administrative Powers:
 
"All matters and things necessary for the proper
 
administration of the affairs of the district which
 
are not provided for in this division (6) shall be
 
provided by the board (of directors)."
 
As early as 1956 these powers were interpreted by the courts as giving
 
one utility district the ability to increase its revenues to meet any
 
increase in costs by increasing its rates or by levy of taxes (Sacra­
mento Municipal Utility District vs. Spriles, 1956, 303 P2d 40, 145 C.A.
 
2d 561). Only recently has the PUC provided the public utilities with
 
an abbreviated hearing process (Energy Cost Adjustment Clause) to cover
 
the increasing cost of fuel without a rate hearing. (Decision No.
 
87531, April 27, 1976.)
 
Division 7 is almost a mirror image to Division 6, except that it
 
is designed to establish and empower public utility districts, i.e.,
 
"municipal" utility districts in an unincorporated area. This provision
 
allows the people of that area to obtain the advantages of having certain
 
utilities.
 
In summary, we see that there are at least four ways a local
 
government can be involved in supplying a public service:
 
(1) 	 Granting a franchise to a utility.
 
(2) 	 Owning a utility.
 
(3) 	 Having a municipal utility district in its jurisdiction.
 
(4) 	 Having a public utility district in its jurisdiction.
 
II. 	 CHARACTERISTICS OF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES WITH
 
RESPECT TO COGENERATION
 
Municipal utilities are considered to be prime institutions to
 
implement cogeneration because:
 
(1) 	 Municipals are not directly regulated by state or federal
 
public utility agencies.* In addition, they have access to
 
low cost municipal loans and taxes on the generation facility
 
are less.
 
*The California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission
 
does have power plant siting authority over municipal utilities.
 
F-2
 
(2) 	 Municipal utilities face an uncertain future about the
 
source of their electricity and its cost.
 
Most of the municipal utilities* are only distribution systems
 
that buy electricity from larger generation and transmission systems.
 
,These larger systems are often owned by investor-owned public utilities
 
such as PG&E and SCE. The municipals charge that they:
 
"...are having to bear a heavier share of rate increases
 
than large companies served by investor-owned utilities
 
under retail contracts. As a result of this discrimina­
tion, the cities say, they are losing their ability to
 
compete for industry. And some are even coming under
 
pressure to sell city-owned utilities that have helped
 
support sagging municipal budgets." (Reference 35.)
 
The investor-owned utilities
 
"...deny the price gap is their fault or that they are
 
trying to squeeze the cities' utilities out of business.
 
Rather, they say the differences are due to the fact
 
that wholesale power rates are set by federal regulators,
 
while retail rates are fixed by state commissioners."
 
(Reference 35.)
 
One investor-owned utility in Florida was charged by the Federal
 
Power Commission with "anticompetitive" conduct by refusing to sell bulk
 
power to cities, and by denying them use of its transmission lines to
 
buy cheaper power elsewhere. The utilities say the accusations are
 
"without foundation." However, as a result of the higher bill they
 
have paid, the municipal's customers have voted to have the investor­
owned utility take over the municipal system. (Reference 35.)
 
Given the above characteristics, it would appear that the municipal
 
utilities would be inclined to install their own generating facilities.
 
The first characteristic implies that municipally-owned generating plants
 
can produce less expensive energy for their customers. In addition,
 
municipals do not usually make a profit on their operation, thus creat­
ing more of a gap between the cost of investor-owned generation and
 
municipally-owned generation. The second characteristic implies that
 
the municipal electric utilities face an uncertainty over price and
 
availability of the traditional sources of electricity. Ownership of
 
generation facilities is onemethod for reducing this uncertainty and
 
at the same time reducing the price of electricity for the municipal's
 
customer. Cogeneration plants with their reduced capital expenditures,
 
generating costs, and-emissions in comparison to traditional fossil-fuel
 
generating plants should prove to be appealing.
 
*Los Angeles Department of Water and Power is a notable exception,
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III. MUNICIPAL UTILITIES' OUTLOOK ON COGENERATION*
 
Based on the discussion above, one would expect to see increased 
activity in cogeneration by the municipal utilities. At this time, 
however, the opposite-appears to-hold true in California. The Northern 
California Power Association (NCPA) was established by 11 municipal ­
utilities to develop generation projects. Most of their efforts have
 
been devoted to two geothermal projects in Northern California. How­
ever, none of the municipal utilities, with the exception of the City
 
of Santa Clara, were actively developing cogeneration projects. Many
 
municipal utilities view cogeneration as a roblem and not as an oppor­
tunity; instead of the economics and operating benefits noted above,
 
they see:
 
(1) 	 Legal negotiations.
 
(2) 	 The need to acquire new operating personnel.
 
(3) 	 Difficulties in obtaining permits.
 
(4) 	 Concerns about whether the industrial firm will stay in
 
business.
 
As noted, the City of Santa Clara is the exception. Their work to
 
date has concentrated on acquiring all the permits and in negotiating
 
contracts in order to establish a cogeneration facility at the Calif­
ornia Paperboard Corporation plant. The facility would be owned'by
 
the City. Other firms have already come to the City to request similar
 
arrangements. The City is now having talks with the California Energy
 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission regarding their
 
assistance in establishing an effective energy audit that will identify
 
the best cogeneration candidates. The City appears to be ready and
 
willing to proceed with more utility-owned cogeneration systems. How­
ever, they plan to wait until the California Paperboard project is
 
operating before they will consider other sites.
 
IV. COMPARISON TO THE PUBLIC UTILITY OUTLOOK
 
At this time it appears that the municipals are not moving as fast
 
as the public utilities which are motivated by the Public Utilities Com­
mission. This situation could soon reverse itself as more municipals
 
and their industrial customers see the results, if successful, of the
 
pioneering cogeneration projects.
 
*This section is based on a meeting with the City of Santa Clara Electric
 
Department on January 18, 1978.
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APPENDIX G
 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT
 
NEW SOURCE REVIEW RULES
 
RULE 213 Standards for Permit to Construct: Air Quality Impact 
RULE 213.1 Standaids for Permit to Operate: Air Quality Impact 
RULE 213.2 Definitions for Rules 213 and 213.1 
'Adopted October 8, 1976 by the Air Resources Board
 
to be effective immediately and to apply to any subject
 
application filed with the District, but not finally
 
acted upon prior to October 8, 1976
 
RULE 213. Standards for Permits to Construct: Air Quality Impact
 
(a) General
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall deny a permit to construct
 
for any unit or units of a stationary source that fail to meet the
 
applicable requirements of subsection (b) or (c) of this Rule.
 
(b) Best Available Control Technology
 
New Stationary Sources:
 
The Air Pollution Control Office shall deny a permit to
 
construct for any unit or units constituting a new station­
ary source if such source will emit more than 15 pounds per
 
hour or 150 pounds per day of nitrogen oxides, organic
 
gases, or any contaminant for which there is a state or
 
natural ambient air quality standard (except carbon monoxide,
 
for which the limits are 150 pounds per hour and 1500 pounds
 
per day) unless the applicant shows that the new source is
 
constructed using best available control technology.
 
2. Modification to Existing Stationary Sources:
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall deny a permit to
 
construct for any modification of any existing stationary
 
source if such source after modification will emit more than
 
15 pounds per hour or more than 150 pounds per day of nitro­
gen oxides, organic gases, or any air contaminant for which,
 
there is a state or national ambient air quality standard
 
(except carbon monoxide, for which the limits are 150 pounds
 
per hour and 1500 pounds per day), unless the applicant
 
demonstrates that the modification of the existing stationary
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source will be cbnstructed using best available control
 
technology, and:
 
A. 	 That the modification would not result in a net
 
increase in emissions of any pollutant affected by
 
this Rule;-or
 
B. 	 That best available control technology is being, or is
 
to be, applied to all existing units of the stationary
 
source; or
 
C. 	 That emissions from all of the existing units of the
 
stationary source are controlled by use of technology
 
that is at least as effective as that generally in use
 
on similar stationary sources, and that the cost of
 
installing best available control technology on exist­
ing units is economically prohibitive and substantially
 
exceeds the cost per unit mass of controlling emissions
 
of each pollutant through all other control measures;
 
or
 
D. 	 That the stationary source is a small business, as
 
defined in subsection (1) of Section 1896 of Title 2
 
of the California Administrative Code; that emissions
 
from all existing units of the stationary source are
 
controlled through application of the best technology
 
that is economically reasonable to apply to that
 
stationary source; and that the cost of employing best
 
available control technology is economically prohibitive.
 
(c) Air Quality Impact Analysis
 
1. 	 New Stationary Sources:
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall deny a permit to
 
construct for any unit or units constituting a new station­
ary source if such source will emit more than 25 pounds per
 
hour or 250 pounds per day of nitrogen oxides, organic gases,
 
or any air contaminant for which there is a state or national
 
ambient air quality standard (extept carbon monoxide, for
 
which 	the limits are 250 pounds per hour and 2500 pounds
 
per day), or which is a precursor of any such air contami­
nant, unless he determines that the emissions from the new
 
source will not cause a violation of, or will not interfere
 
with the attainment or maintenance of, the state or national
 
ambient air quality standard for that same contaminant (or,
 
in the case of a precursor, for the contaminant to which the
 
precursor contributes).
 
2. 	 Modifications to Existing Stationary Sources:
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall deny a permit to
 
construct for any modification of any existing stationary
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source if the modification will result in a net increase in
 
emissions from the existing source of more than 25 pounds
 
per hour or 250 pounds per day of nitrogen oxides, organic
 
gases, or any air contaminant for which there is a state or
 
national ambient'air quality standard (except carbon monoxide,
 
for which the limits are 250 pounds per hour and 2500 pounds
 
per day), or which is a precursor of any such air contaminant,
 
unless he determines that the emissions from the modified
 
source will not cause a violation of, or will not interfere
 
with the attainment or maintenance of, the state or national
 
ambient air quality standard for that same contaminant (or,
 
in the case of a precursor, for that contaminant to which
 
the precursor contributes).
 
(d) 	 Determination of Emission Increases
 
In determining under subsection (b) 2. A. and subsection (c) 2.
 
whether there has been a net increase in emissions and, if so, the
 
amount of any such increase, the Air Pollution Control Officer
 
shall 	consider all increases and decreases of emissions caused by
 
modifications to that stationary source pursuant to permits to
 
construct issued during the preceding five years, or since the
 
adoption of this Rule, whichever period is shorter. Emission
 
reductions required to comply with federal, state, or district
 
laws, emission limitations, or rules or regulations shall not
 
be considered to be decreases in emissions for the purposes of
 
this subsection.
 
.(e) 	 Consideration of Future Emission Reductions
 
In making the analysis required in subsection (h) 2., the Air
 
Pollution Control Officer shall take into consideration the air
 
quality impact of any reduction in the emissions of the same air
 
contaminant which results from the elimination or modification of
 
other existing stationary sources under the same ownership and
 
operating within the same air basin. If reductions are to be
 
based on planned elimination or modification of any stationary
 
sources, the Air Pollution Control Officer shall condition the
 
permit to operate to require such elimination or modification
 
within not more than 90 days after the start-up of the new or
 
modified source. Emission reductions required to comply with
 
federal, state, or district laws, emission limitations, or rules
 
or regulations shall not be considered to be decreases in emissions
 
for the purposes of this subsection.
 
Ct) 	 Exemptions 
1. 	 The Air Pollution Control Officer shall exempt from the
 
provisions of subsection (c) of this Rule, any new stationary
 
source or modification of any existing stationary source
 
which:
 
A. 	 Will be in whole or in part a replacement for an
 
existing stationary source at the same location if
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the resulting emissions of any air contaminant will
 
not be increased. The Air Pollution Control Officer
 
may allow a maximum of 90 days as a start-up period
 
for simultaneous operation of the existing stationary
 
source or replaced portions thereof, and the new
 
stationary source or replacement; or
 
B. 	 Will cause demonstrable air quality benefits within
 
the air basin, provided however, that the written
 
concurrence of the California Air Resources Board and
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency shall
 
be obtained prior to the granting of an exemption
 
hereunder; or
 
C. 	 Will be used exclusively for providing essential public
 
services such as schools, hospitals, or police and
 
fire fighting facilities, but specifically excluding
 
sources of electrical power generation other than for
 
emergency standby use at essential public service
 
facilities; or
 
D. 	 Is exclusively a modification to convert from use of
 
gaseous fuels, provided that all units constituting
 
the modification will utilize best available control
 
technology. Modifications for the purpose of this
 
paragraph shall include the addition or modification
 
of facilities for storing, transferring and/or trans­
porting such fuel oil at the stationary sources. A
 
condition shall be placed on the operating permit
 
requiring conversion to gaseous or other equivalent
 
low polluting fuels when they are, or become,
 
available; or
 
E. 	 Is air pollution control equipment which, when in
 
operation, will reduce emissions from an existing
 
source; or
 
F. 	 Is portable sandblasting equipment used on a temporary
 
basis within the air basin.
 
2. 	 The Air Pollution Control Officer may exempt from the pro­
visions of subsection (c) of this Rule, any new stationary
 
source, or modification of an existing stationary source,
 
which has been determined to be:
 
A. 	 A new stationary source or modification of an existing
 
stationary source utilizing unique and innovative
 
control technology which will result in a significantly
 
lower emission rate from the stationary source than
 
would have occurred with the use of previously known
 
best available control technology, and which will
 
likely serve as a model for technology, to be applied
 
to similar stationary sources within the State. In
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order 	for a stationary source to be exempted under
 
this paragraph, the applicant must obtain the written
 
concurrence of the California Air Resources Board
 
and the United States Environmental Protection Agency
 
with the Air Pollution Control Officer's determination;
 
or
 
B. 	 A new stationary source or modification of an existing
 
stationary source that represents a significant advance
 
in the development of a technology that appears to
 
offer extraordinary environmental or public health
 
benefits or other benefits of overriding importance to
 
the public health or welfare. In order for a station­
ary source to be exempted under this paragraph, the
 
applicant must obtain the written concurrence of the
 
California Air Resources Board and the United States
 
Environmental Protection Agency with the Air Pollution
 
Control Officer's determination.
 
(g) 	 Notice Requirements for Proposed Exemptions
 
Before granting an exemption under subsection (f) 1. B., (f) 2. A.
 
or (f) 2. B. of this Rule, the Air Pollution Control Officer shall
 
publish a notice by prominent advertisement in at least one news­
paper 	of general circulation in the District and shall notify in
 
writing of his intention: the applicant, the United States
 
Environmental Protection Agency, the California Air Resources
 
Board 	and adjoining air pollution control districts. Calculations
 
and technical data used by the Air Pollution Control Officer as
 
the bases for granting exemptions pursuant to subsection (f) 1. B.,
 
(f) 2. A. or (f) 2. B. shall be made available to the California
 
Air Resources Board and United States Environmental Protection
 
Agency. Before granting an exemption under subsection (f) 1. B.,
 
(f) 2. A. or (f) 2. B. of this Rule, the Air Pollution Control
 
Officer shall consider any comments received within 30 days after
 
the date of publication or date of notification of the above
 
agencies, whichever occurs later, and shall have obtained the
 
concurrence of the California Air Resources Board and the United
 
States Environmental Protection Agency.
 
In addition, the Air Pollution Control Officer shall notify in
 
writing the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the
 
California Air Resources Board of the granting of an exemption
 
under 	subsection (f) 1. A., (f) 1. C. or (f) 1. D.
 
(h) 	 Procedures for Evaluation of Applications for Permits to Construct:
 
Before granting a permit to construct for any unit of a new
 
stationary source or modification subject to the requirements of
 
subsection (c) of this Rule, the Air Pollution Control Officer
 
shall:
 
1. 	 Require the applicant to submit information sufficient to
 
describe the nature and amounts of emissions, location,
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design, construction, and operation of the source, and to
 
submit any additional information required by the Air
 
Pollution Control Officer to make the analysis required
 
by this Rule.
 
2. 	 Analyze the effect of the operation of the new or modified
 
stationary source on air quality in the vicinity of the new
 
source or modified stationary source, within the air basin
 
and within adjoining air basins. Such analysis shall con­
sider the air contaminant emissions and air quality in the
 
vicinity of the new source or modified source, within the
 
air basin and within adjoining air basins at the time the
 
new source or modification is proposed to commence normal
 
operation. Such analysis shall be based on the application
 
of existing state and local rules and regulations.
 
3. 	 Upon completion of the evaluation, but before granting a
 
permit to construct:
 
A. Publish a notice by prominent advertisement in at
 
least one newspaper of general circulation in the
 
District, stating the preliminary decision to grant
 
the permit to construct and where the public may
 
inspect the information required by this subsection.
 
A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the
 
applicant, the United States Environmental Protection
 
Agency, the California Air Resources Board and
 
adjoining air pollution control districts. The
 
notice shall provide a period of 30 days, beginning
 
on the date of publication, or on the date of notifi­
cation of the above agencies, whichever occurs later
 
for the public to submit comments on the application.
 
B. 	 Make available for public inspection at the Air
 
Pollution Control District office, except as other­
wise limited by law: the information submitted by
 
the applicant, the Air Pollution Control Officer's
 
analysis of the effect of the source on air quality,
 
and the preliminary decision to grant the permit to
 
construct. Such information shall also be forwarded
 
to the California Air Resources Board for review.
 
C. 	 Consider all comments submitted. If within the 30-day
 
notice period the Air Pollution Control Officer
 
receives a written request from either the United
 
States Environmental Protection Agency or California
 
Air Resources Board to defer the Air Pollution Control
 
Officer's decision pending the requesting agency's
 
review of the application, the Air Pollution Control
 
Officer shall honor such request for a period of 60
 
days from the date of such request.
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(i) 	 Additional Applicant Requirements
 
Receipt of a permit to construct shall not relieve the stationary
 
source owner or operator of the responsibility to comply with
 
other applicable portions of the District's Rules and Regulations.
 
(j) 	 Severability
 
If any portion of this Rule shall be found to be unenforceable,
 
such finding shall have no effect on the enforceability of the
 
remaining portions of the Rule, which shall continue to be in full
 
force 	and effect.
 
RULE 213.1. Standards for Permits to Operate: Air Quality Impact
 
(a) 	 Requirement for Permit to Construct as Condition for Permit to
 
Operate
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall deny a permit to operate
 
for any stationary source subject to the requirements of Rule 213
 
unless the applicant has obtained a permit to construct.
 
(b) 	 Air Quality Impact Analysis for Sources Emitting Larger Quantities
 
of Air Contaminants Than Assumed in the Analysis Performed Pursuant
 
to Rule 213
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall not grant a permit to
 
operate to any stationary source that he determines emits quan­
tities of air contaminants larger than were assumed in the analysis
 
performed for the permit to construct for the source, unless the
 
Air Pollution Control Officer performs the air quality impact
 
analysis required by Rule 213 and determines that the actual
 
emissions from the source will not cause a violation of, or will
 
not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of, any state
 
or national ambient air quality standard.
 
(c) 	 Permit Conditions
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall condition the issuance of
 
a permit to operate, on such terms as are deemed necessary to
 
ensure that the stationary source will be operated in the manner
 
assumed in making the analysis required by Rule 213 or subsection
 
(b) of this Rule, whichever is applic~ble. Where appropriate,
 
such conditions shall prohibit a new stationary source which is
 
a replacement for an existing stationary source from operating,
 
unless the operation of the existing source is terminated The
 
Air Pollution Control Officer may allow a maximum of 90 days as
 
a start-up period for simultaneous operation of the existing
 
stationary source or replaced portion thereof, and the new
 
stationary source or replacement portions thereof.
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(d) 	 Exemptions
 
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall exempt from the provisions
 
of this Rule, any stationary source which:
 
1. 	 Has received a permit to construct prior to the adoption of
 
Rule 213.
 
2. 	 Is a continuing operation, without modification, of a station­
ary source that was previously exempt frbm the permit provi­
sions of these Rules and Regulations and a permit to operate
 
is required solely because of a change in permit exemptions
 
stated in Rule 219.
 
(d) 	 Severability
 
If any portion of this Rule shall be found to be unenforceable,
 
such finding shall have no effect on the enforceability of the
 
remaining portions of the Rule, which shall continue to be in full
 
force and effect.
 
RULE 213.2. Definitions for Rules 213 and 213.1
 
(a) STATIONARY SOURCE means a unit or an aggregation of units of
 
non-vehicular air-contaminant-emitting equipment which is located
 
on one property or on contiguous properties; which is under the
 
same ownership or entitlement to use and operate; and, in the case
 
of an aggregation of units, those units which are related to one
 
another. Units shall be deemed related to one another if the
 
operation of one is dependent upon, or affects the operation of,
 
the other; if their operation involves a common or similar raw
 
material, product, or function; or if they have the same first
 
three digits in their standard industrial classification codes
 
as determined from the Standard Industrial Classification Manual
 
published in 1972 by the Executive Office of the President, Office
 
of Management and Budget.
 
In addition, in cases where all oir part of a stationary source is
 
a facility used to load cargo onto or unload cargo from cargo
 
carriers, other than motor vehicles, the Air Pollution C6nitrol
 
Officer shall consider such carriers to be parts of the stationary
 
source. Accordingly, all emissions from such carriers (excluding
 
motor 	vehicles) which will result in an adverse impact on air
 
quality in the State of California shall be considered as emission
 
from such stationary source. Emissions from such carriers shall
 
include those that result from the operation of the carriers'
 
engines; the purging or other method of venting of vapors; and
 
from the loading, unloading, storage, processing, and transfer of
 
cargo.
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(b) 	 MODIFICATION means any physical change in, or any change in the
 
method of operation of, a stationary source.
 
For the purposes of this definition:
 
1. 	 Routine maintenance or repair shall not be considered to be
 
a change in the method of operation, provided that these
 
increases are not contrary to any existing permit to operate
 
conditions.
 
(c) 	 BEST AVAILABLE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY means the maximum degree of
 
emission control for any air contaminant emitting equipment;,
 
taking into account technology which is known but not necessarily
 
in use, provided that the Air Pollution Control Officer shall not
 
interpret best available control technology to include a require­
ment which will result in the closing and elimination of or
 
inability to construct a lawful business which could be operated
 
with the application of the best control technology currently in
 
use.
 
(d) 	 Severability
 
If any portion of this Rule shall be found to be unenforceable,
 
such finding shall have no effect on the enforceability of the
 
remaining portions of the Rule, which shall continue to be in
 
full force and effect.
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APPENDIX H
 
AIR QUALITY REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS FOR
 
COGENERATION IN CALIFORNIA
 
Regulatory constraints on air quality may take the form of specific
 
emission standards or criteria by which identified environmental impacts
 
are to be mitigated. Attaining certain levels of air quality in some
 
localities may add more general constraints and also may include specific
 
prohibitions. The following sections explore air quality regulatory
 
constraints on implementation of cogeneration faciliites in California.
 
I. CLEAN AIR ACT
 
The Air Quality Act of 1967 (Reference 36) attempted to establish
 
a balance between state and federal air pollution control responsibilities.
 
The federal government was directed to establish air quality control
 
regions (air shed basins) and to publish appropriate air quality criteria
 
for each region. The states'were directed to adopt ambient air quality
 
.standards-set by federal or state governments and to adopt implementa­
tion plans to achieve the standards. The 1967 Act approach was not
 
entirely successful and was modified in 1970.
 
The passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1970
 
(Reference 37) was a significant step forward in federal air pollution
 
control; these amendments are the foundation for current air pollution
 
control programs.
 
Even though state and local agencies retained the responsibility
 
for'controlling air pollution in their regions, the CAA of 1970 gave
 
.the federal government much stronger legal tools to deal with air pollu­
tion. These included the responsibility and authority to enforce state
 
and local air pollution control programs, to enforce pollution controls,,
 
and even to assume the duties of the state or local agencies should they
 
fail in their mandated responsibilities.
 
Some of the more important provisions of the CAA of 1970 are
 
included in sections 108 through 112 of that legislation. Section 108
 
requires that air quality criteria be developed for the major air pollu­
tants which may have a potentially adverse impact on public health and
 
welfare. Section 109 requires National Ambient Air Quality Standards
 
(NAAQS) to be established based upon the air quality criteria developed
 
according to the requirements of section 108. Implementation plans for
 
achieving and maintaining the NAAQS are required of each state according
 
to section 110. Finally, section 111 requires that "Standards of
 
Performance" be developed for new and modified stationary sources of
 
pollution. These standards constitute direct emission limitations for
 
,pollutants from a number of specified types of sources, including fossil­
fuel-fired steam generators and stationary gas turbines. Section 112
 
of the CAA of 1970 requires establishment of national emission .standards
 
for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPS).
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On August 7, 1977, President Carter signed P.L. 95-95, the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Reference 38). These Amendments impose a 
wide range of new responsibilities upon the operators of stationary 
source facilities and substantially change the conditions for obtaining 
permits for new and expanded plants. Compliance with the Amendments 
will require development, interpretation, and submission of several kinds 
of technical data and will generally increase the lead time required for 
- obtaining permits to construct. 
Some of the more important provisions of the CAA of 1977 are
 
included in sections 160 through 178 of that legislation. Sections 160.
 
through 169, "Prevention of Significant Deteribration (PSD) of Air
 
Quality," was added to establish three land classifications for allow­
able increases of total suspended particulates (TSP) and SO2 (sulfur
 
dioxide) in areas where air quality is now cleaner than required by
 
ambient air quality standards. Sections 171 through 178 deal with plan
 
requirements for non-attainment areas, areas which now exceed NAAQS.
 
II. JURISDICTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES,
 
As the principal federal agency for environmental matters, the-

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has primary responsibility for:
 
the implementation of the Clean Air Act and its Amendments. The EPA
 
has set criteria in accordance with section 108, has established national
 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) in accordance with section 109,
 
and retains ultimate authority -to implement them. States are allowed to
 
set stricter, but not weaker, standards than the federal requirements.
 
States must have a state implementation plan (SIP) detailing how it will
 
attain clean air standards.
 
In California, each of the forty-seven air pollution control
 
districts is required to submit to the California Air Resources Board
 
plans for meeting state and federal air standards within their juris­
diction. The collection of air district programs forms the basis for
 
the state plan, which also includes a statewide plan for controlling
 
mobile pollution sources.
 
The state can specify regulations for an air district, or revise
 
the district's plan if it is considered inadequate. The EPA has final
 
review and approval authority over the state plan. California's imple­
mentation plan is currently under revision because the EPA judged
 
inadequate that part of the~procedures for meeting air quality standards.
 
It should be noted that there are practical limitations to the EPA's
 
authority. The EPA cannot force a state to implement a specific program
 
if the latter chooses not to do so. The EPA may itself implement such a
 
program, but would probably find the administrative requirements pro­
hibitive in terms of costs and personnel.
 
In accordance with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, the EPA
 
required each state to submit a state implementation plan (SIP) within
 
nine months after the NAAQS were issued. The first deadline was 1975,
 
and has since been delayed twice. First, the EPA granted California and
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other states an extension until June 30, 1977. California, like many
 
other states, did not meet clean air standards in 1977, so in the 1977
 
amendments to the Clean Air Act Congress granted another extension until
 
1982; for areas with severe oxidant or carbon monoxide problems the
 
extension may be delayed until 1987. The recent federal amendments also
 
require states to submit new implementation plans by 1978 detailing how
 
air quality standards will be met.
 
The New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), Prevention of Signifi­
cant Deterioration (PSD), and.New Source Review (NSR) regulations are
 
three important programs currently administered by the EPA which are
 
relevant to implementation of cogeneration facilities. The standards of
 
performance for new stationary sources are enforced by the local Air
 
Pollution Control Districts (APCD) in California according to guidelines
 
set forth by the EPA. The Air Conservation Program (ACP), currently
 
under development by the California Air Resources Board (ARB), is in
 
response to the federal PSD program. Model rules for New Source Review
 
have been established by the ARB and are intended for adoption by the
 
local APCDs. To date less than half of the APCDs have adopted the sug­
gested NSR rules. These programs are described in the following sections.
 
III. NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 authorizes the
 
EPA to impose emission standards on those stationary sources that are
 
determined to be significant contributors to air pollution and that con­
sequently endanger the public health or welfare. Section 112 of the Act
 
authorizes the EPA to promulgate national emission standards for
 
hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPS). The EPA's use of Section 111 and
 
112 authority provides a quick-response emission control program com­
pared to the relatively slow process of establishing additional ambient
 
air quality standards and having the states adopt implementation plans
 
(section 109). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 have further broad­
ened and strengthened the EPA's direct regulatory authority. Section
 
ill (q) (1) defines standard of performance to mean "a standard for
 
emission of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limita­
tion achievable through the application of the best system emission
 
reduction 'BACT' which, taking into account the cost of achieving such
 
reduction, the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated."
 
In determining the degree of emission limitation achievable, which has
 
been adequately demonstrated for purposes of promulgation of clean air
 
standards, the Administrator of EPA is entitled to make a projection
 
based on existing technology. That projection is subject to the restraint
 
of reasonableness and cannot be based on "crystal ball" inquiry. An
 
"adequately demonstrated" system is one that has been shown to be
 
reasonably reliable, reasonably efficient, and that can be expected to
 
serve the interests of-pollution control without becoming exorbitantly
 
costly. An achievable standard is one that is within the realm of an
 
adequately demonstrated system's efficiency, and one that, while not
 
at a level that is purely theoretical or experimental, need not neces­
sarily be routinely achieved within industry prior to its adoption
 
(Reference 39).
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A. 	 NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR EQUIPMENT USED IN
 
COGENERATION SYSTEMS
 
Pursuant to section ii of the Federal Clean Air Act, the Adminis­
trator of the EPA had promulgated standards of performance for a number
 
of new or modified stationary sources, including fossil-fuel-fired steam
 
generators (Reference 40). The standards are applicable to fossil-fuel­
fired boilers of more than 250 million Btu per hour of heat input which
 
are, or have been, constructed or modified after August 17, 1971.
 
Included under the NSPS are emission standards for S02 (sulfur dioxide),
 
NOx (oxides of nitrogen), and particulate and visible emissions (Table
 
1). Pursuant to the same section of the Clean Air Act, EPA has recently
 
(October 3, 1977) proposed standards of performance for stationary gas
 
turbines (Reference 41) of more than 10.7 gigajoules (10.13 million Btu)
 
per hour heat input. Included under these NSPS are emissions standards
 
for SO2 and NOx (Table 2). Requirements for performance by the operator
 
and installation of continuous emission monitoring equipment are also a
 
part of these standards.
 
B. 	 ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF NSPS
 
The state may seek EPA approval to enforce NSPS for applicable
 
stationary sources within their boundaries. To facilitate state partici­
pation, the EPA has established guidelines identifying the administrative
 
procedures the state should adopt for implementation and enforcement of
 
the NSPS (Reference 42). In California, the EPA has delegated enforce­
ment authority for NSPS and NESHAPS to the state Air Resources Board
 
(ARB) which has in turn delegated this authority to the local Air
 
Pollution Control Districts (APCD). A number of APCDs in California
 
have adopted the NSPS for some cogeneration equipment such as fossil­
fuel-fired steam generators and have been granted EPA approval for their'
 
enforcement. Other districts also are planning to adopt NSPS.
 
IV. PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION (PSD)
 
On May 24, 1972, the Sierra Club, the Metropolitan Washington
 
Coalition for Clean Air, and the New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and
 
Water filed suit against EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus in U.S. District
 
Court, District of Columbia, for a declaratory judgment and injunctive
 
relief against EPA regulations which permit significant deterioration of
 
air quality in pristine areas. This action led to the development of
 
EPA's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations in 1974
 
(Reference 43) and 1975 (Reference 44), and which are now in effect in
 
California.
 
The EPA's PSD regulations (40 CFR 52.21) require the states to
 
protect air quality superior to National Secondary Ambient Air Quality
 
Standards (ambient air quality standards for protecting public welfare)
 
for total suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide. The regulations
 
identify three classes of clean air areas: Class I, very little deter­
ioration; Class II, moderate deterioration; Class III, up to secondary
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Table 1. 	Summary of New Source Performance Standards for
 
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Steam Generators Over
 
250 Million Btu Per Hour (Reference 40)
 
Pollutant Standard Fuel
 
Particulates 0.10 lb/10 6 Btu heat input Gas, oil, coal
 
6
 so	 0.8 ib/10 Btu heat input Oil
 
SO2 	 1.2 lb/106 Btu heat input Coal
 
NO 	 0.2 lb/106 Btu heat input Gas
 
NO 0.3 lb/106 Btu heat input Oil
 
NO 0.7 lb/106 Btu heat input Coal
 
Opacity 20 percent Gas, oil, coal
 
Table 2. 	Summary of Proposed New Source Performance Standards
 
for Stationary Gas Turbines Over 10.13 Million Btu
 
per Hour Heat Input (Reference 41)
 
Pollutant Standard 	 Fuel
 
NO * 	 75 PPMV at 15% oxygen Natural gas and
xC 	 distillate fuel
 
oil
 
so2 	 150 PPMV at 15% oxygen Natural gas and
 
corresponds to a fuel distillate fuel
 
sulfur content of oil
 
0.8 percent by weight
 
*It has been assumed that distillate fuel oil and natural gas
 
contain no "fuel-bound" or "organic" nitrogen.
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Table 3. Specific Limitations of Each Class of Clean Air Areas
 
(Reference 43)
 
Class I Class II 
Pollutant L,g/m 3 p,g/m 3 Class III 
Particulate matter 
Annual geometric mean 5 10 Deterioration up 
24-hour maximum* 10 30 to ambient air quality standards 
is permitted 
Sulfur dioxide 
Annual geometric mean 2 15 
24-hour maximum* 5 100 
3-hour maximum* 25 100 
*For the purposes of these regulations, the second highest concen­
tration measured is considered the maximum allowable.
 
standards. Each class reflects different social, economic, and environ­
mental needs. Specific limitations of each class are presented in
 
Table 3.
 
A provision in the EPA regulations allows the states to develop
 
their own plans to prevent significant deterioration of air quality with
 
the stipulation that these plans must be at least as stringent as the
 
EPA program and be approved by the EPA. The California Air Resources
 
Board developed its Air Conservation Program (ACT) to protect present
 
superior air quality in certain areas, to identify areas needing
 
restoration of superior air quality, and to permit necessary develop­
ment in other areas (Reference 45). The intent of the ACP was not only
 
to fulfill the requirements of the EPA's "no significant deterioration"
 
regulations, but also to adapt the fdderal mandate to meet California's
 
needs by including all pollutants for which state or federal standards
 
exist and by establishing clean air policies for all areas of the state.
 
Presently ACP is being revised to fulfill new requirements imposed by the
 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.
 
Under the old ACP, all areas of the state would be placed in one
 
of four classes, ranging from areas where very little deterioration of
 
air quality above existing levels would be permitted to areas where
 
quality would not be allowed to exceed State and National Ambient Air
 
Quality Standards. In Class A areas, no significant deterioration areas,
 
very little if any air quality deterioration would be allowed, while in
 
Class B areas, minimum deterioration areas, some deterioration would be
 
allowed, but air quality better than the existing standards would be
 
maintained. In Class C areas, agriculture/silviculture areas, air
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quality sufficient to protect agricultural and silvicultural productivity
 
would be the goal. In Class D areas, urban-industrial areas, achievement
 
and maintenance of the existing state and federal standards would be
 
sought.
 
The map in Figure 1, prepared by ARB staff, indicates how various
 
areas in California could eventually be classified based on current land
 
use. Final classification was expected in early 1978, but has now been
 
postponed due to ongoing revision of the ACP.
 
A. IMPLEMENTATION POLICIES: REVIEW OF NEW SOURCES
 
The policies to implement the ACP are not well defined at this
 
time. Examination of alternatives and selection of appropriate policies
 
are in progress. Under Plan Development for the old ACP (Reference 45)
 
the policies below were considered for reviewing of new sources in
 
Class A areas.
 
(1) Policy 1: Prevention of Emission Increases from Air
 
Pollution Sources Located Within Class A Areas. Under
 
this policy new sources of emissions would be permitted in
 
Class A areas only if there are emissions reductions of a
 
corresponding magnitude from existing sources.
 
(2) Policy 2: Prevention of Significant Deterioration of
 
Ambient Air Quality Levels. This policy would prohibit the
 
deterioration of ambient air quality levels beyond certain
 
very small deterioration increments. Emissions from sources
 
inside Class A areas and from sources outside the Class A
 
areas would be considered in this part of the ACT.
 
Under these two policies, new sources inside Class A areas would
 
have to meet both policy criteria: (1) no increase in area wide
 
emissions and (2) no significant deterioration of air quality greater
 
than the allowable increment. Significant sources located sufficiently
 
close to Class A areas to have an impact'would be reviewed only under
 
the second policy.
 
B. IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM
 
The mechanism to implement ACP is not well defined-at this time.
 
Under the old Plan Development for ACP (Reference 45), the following
 
mechanism was proposed: For Class A areas the permit authority of the
 
Air Pollution Control Districts would be the principal tool to imple­
ment the program. Reviews of proposed air pollution sources or source
 
expansion inside or outside of Class A areas would be made to determine
 
the impacts of source emissions on ambient air quality, and to determine
 
whet-her an aiea's emission limitation might be exceeded.
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. - CLASS A AREAS 
CLASS BAREAS 
CLASS C AREAS
 
CLASS D AREAS
 
CLASS C OR D AREAS 
NO POTENTIAL CLASSIFICATIONMADE. 
Figure 1. 	Potential Classification (Reference 45) of California
 
Under the Ait Conservation Program
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C. RECENT DEVELOPMENT ON PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION
 
The 1977 amendments essentially ratify, extend, and generally make
 
more stringent the prevention of significant deterioration provisions
 
promulgated by the EPA in December 1974. The provisions require that
 
the maximum increases in S02 and TSP concentrations throughout these
 
regions not exceed the specified increment of the related NAAQS concen­
trations for these pollutants. The three classes of clean air areas
 
and their allowable air quality increment limitations established in the
 
1977 amendments are shown in Table 4.
 
Facilities commencing construction after August 7, 1977, in the
 
PSD area or the area with impact on the PSD area, will be reviewed
 
according to the PSD requirements of the 1977 amendments. However, for
 
these facilities the EPA PSD regulations remain in effect until state
 
implementation plans (SIP) are revised to incorporate the PSD require­
ments of the 1977 amendments. States are required to complete appro­
priate SIP revisions by December 1, 1978.
 
The EPA is also required to promulgate PSD regulations governing
 
carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen, and photochemical
 
oxidants by August 1979.
 
Table 4. 	Specific Limitations of Each Class of Clean Air Areas
 
(Reference 38)
 
Class I Class II Class III NAAQS
 
Pollutant [L,g/m 3 [,g/m3 p,g/m 3 Lg/m3
 
s02
 
Annual 	 2 20 40 80
 
24-hour* 	 5 91 182 365
 
3-hour* 	 25 512 700 1300(S)
 
Particulate Matter
 
Annual 	 5 19 37 75(P) and
 
60(S)
 
24-hour* 	 10 37 75 260(P)
 
and
 
150(S)
 
*All 24-hour and 3-hour values may be exceeded once per year.
 
(S) indicates a secondary standard.
 
(P) indicates a primary standard.
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V. NON-ATTAINMENT REGIONS
 
A non-attainment (NA) region is one which exceeds National Ambient
 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for at least one of the criteria pollutants
 
(photochemicals, oxidants, CO, NO2 , S02 , particulates, and hydrocarbons).
 
Both state and federal laws require that the government agencies respon­
sible for controlling air pollution formulate programs which will permit
 
air quality standards to be achieved and maintained: A number of these
 
standards are exceeded in many parts of California, often by substantial
 
amounts (see Figure 2). Thus, any implementation plan for complying
 
with the ambient air quality standards in California must deal with the 
problem of uncontrolled growth of emission sources in such areas which 
would create serious air quality problems even if the best available ­
emission control technologies were utilized. 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 explicitly recognized that
 
emissions limitations alone are not sufficient in non-attainment areas
 
to Attain and maintain ambient air quality standards. In formulating
 
its basic guidelines for the content of state implementation plans in
 
1971, the EPA determined in 40 CFR 51.18 that "other measures necessary
 
to insure" achievement and maintenance of the ambient air quality
 
standards can be provided by a New Source Review (NSR) regulation.
 
40 CFR 51.12(b) requires state regulations to subject new air pollution
 
sources to preconstruction review, and to prohibit the construction of
 
a new or modified stationary source which would interfere with the
 
attainment or maintenance of the air quality standards.
 
When the California State Implementation Plan was submitted to
 
EPA in 1972, no APCD rules and regulations contained NSR provisions.
 
Consequently, the EPA formally disapproved the NSR portion of the SIP
 
and, in 1973, promulgated Federal NSR regulations to be implemented by
 
the EPA as required by the Clean Air Act.
 
Subsequent to EPA actions, all the APCDs in California adopted NSR
 
rules to supplement, existing permit systems. However, upon review by
 
the EPA, less than a quarter of all the APCDs were given EPA approval.
 
The EPA continued its own NSR program for those districts which failed
 
to meet federal requirements.
 
The California Air Resources Board (ARB) has determined that the
 
APCD's NSR programs not only fail to meet federal requirements, but also
 
fail to satisfy the state's Public Health and Safety Code. In an effort
 
to satisfy both federal and state requirements and to return NSR to
 
local authority, the ARB has drafted suggested NSR regulations (model
 
NSR) intended for implementation by the local districts. The EPA has
 
indicated that it will discontinue its NSR program and leave NSR to
 
the state and the local districts when APCDs adopt and implement NSR
 
regulations similar to those proposed by ARB.
 
The implications of NSR led to the concept of emission offset or
 
air quality trade-offs. The EPA said that allowing additional indus­
tries to locate in an area whose air was already dirtier than federal
 
standards (non-attainment area) would be a violation of the Clean Air
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Figure 2. Air Quality Maintenance Areas in California (Reference 45)
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Act. However, many labor and business groups opposed the policy of
 
refusing to allow further development in regions violating air standards,
 
calling it a "no growth" measure.
 
The Clean Air Act did not specify how this conflict might be
 
resolved. At the end of 1976, EPA interpreted the act to allow the
 
establishment of an air trade-off policy (Reference 46). Meanwhile
 
in California, the ARB adopted NSR regulations for the South Coast
 
Air Quality Management District (see Appendix G). These regulations
 
were interpreted to mean that air trade-offs between different com­
panies would be permitted.
 
Under provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 the
 
existing EPA emission offset policy remains in effect until July 1,
 
1979. After July 1, 1979, states must revise their SIPs to assure
 
that non-attainment areas will meet national ambient air quality stan­
dards for all pollutants by December 31, 1982, or by December 1987,
 
for photochemical oxidants or CO if the 1982 date cannot be met using
 
all reasonably available measures (Reference 36). The SIP revisions
 
must specify the amount of new source growth which will be permitted;
 
new sources must achieve the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER)
 
(Reference 36). LAER is defined as the most stringent emission limi­
tation which is contained in the SIP of any state for such source, or
 
the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in practice,
 
whichever is more stringent.
 
A. 	 MODEL FOR NEW SOURCE REVIEW
 
The New Source Review (NSR) rules adopted by the Air Resources
 
Board for the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) are
 
discussed here as a model for NSR Rules. It should be noted that NSR
 
for other APCDs are slightly different.
 
Basically, the NSR rules provide a decision tree for determining
 
whether or not to permit the construction or modification of a station­
ary source such as cogeneration facilities. This section will discuss
 
the basic steps in the decision tree shown in Figure 3. Further defini­
tions and interpretations for NSR rules are provided later. The first
 
step in this decision tree is to meet all applicable NSPS and local
 
prohibitory rules. The second step is to fulfill requirements under
 
NSR rules. The major requirements for a new or modified stationary
 
source under the NSR rules are as follows:
 
(1) 	 Using Best Available Control Technology (BACT) in all
 
equipment for controlling those pollutants whose uncon­
trolled emission rates are more than 15 pounds per hour
 
or 150 pounds per day (except carbon monoxide, for which
 
the limits are 150 pounds per hour or 1500 pounds per
 
day).
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Figure 3. 	New Source Review (NSR) Procedure Flow Chart Applicable to
 
Cogeneration Facilities in California (Based on Rule 213
 
of South Coast Air Quality Management District)
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(2) 	 Requiring air quality impact analysis for the source if,
 
after applying BACT, the emission rates for any pollutants
 
are more than 25 pounds per hour or 250 pounds per day
 
(except carbon monoxide, for which the limits are 250 pounds
 
per hour or 2500 pounds per day). In this case the permit
 
to construct will be denied unless air quality analysis
 
demonstrates that the emissions from the new source will
 
not cause a violation of or, in the case of a non-attainment
 
area, will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance
 
of any state or national ambient air quality standards.
 
Exemptions to the above requirement are as follows:
 
(a) 	 A new or modified stationary source that in whole or
 
in part is a replacement for an existing stationary
 
source on the same property if the resulting emission
 
of any pollutants will not be increased (section
 
(f) l.A of Rule 213).
 
(b) 	 A new or modified stationary source which can prove
 
demonstrable air quality benefits within the air
 
basin, provided however, that the written approval
 
of the ARB and the EPA shall be obtained prior to
 
the granting of an exemption hereunder (section (f)
 
l.B. of Rule 213).
 
B. 	 DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION OF NEW SOURCE REVIEW RULES
 
Definitions for some of the terms in New Source Review Rules are
 
as follows:
 
(1) 	 POLLUTANTS - any air contaminant for which there is a state
 
or national ambient air quality standard. In the case of
 
proposed cogeneration systems, these pollutants are as
 
follows: N02 , S02, CO, hydrocarbons, and particulates.
 
(2) 	 BEST AVAILABLE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY (BACT) - Under the New
 
Source Review rules "BACT" is defined as the best abatement
 
technology which is known for any equipment, but not
 
necessarily in use. Since this is an extremely stringent
 
view of the term BACT, the ARB has recently prepared a
 
list of "BACT" for different types of equipment,.and plans
 
to keep the list up to date as new abatement technologies
 
evolve.
 
(3) 	 AIR QUALITY ANALYSIS means evaluating impacts of new or
 
modified sources on local and regional air quality using
 
applicable models acceptable to the EPA and the ARB.
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C. EMISSION OFFSET AND TRADE-OFF POLICY
 
On December 21, 1976, the EPA issued an interpretative ruling for
 
emission offset or trade-off policy in order to allow further industrial
 
growth in non-attainment areas. In this ruling, emission reductions
 
(offsets) from existing sources in the area of a proposed new source
 
are required such that the total emissions are less, after construction
 
of the new source, than the total allowable emissions from the existing
 
sources were prior to the construction of the new source. These emis­
sions reductions must represent reasonable progress towards attainment
 
of the .applicable NAAQS. The EPA has mentioned that they will not
 
question the reviewing authority's judgment as to what constitutes
 
reasonable progress toward attainment, so long as the emission offset
 
results in an overall reduction. Under EPA guidelines the offset for
 
hydrocarbons may be obtained anywhere in the air basin, but the offsets
 
for NOx, S02, particulates, and carbon monoxide should be obtained in
 
the vicinity of the proposed new source.
 
Section (d) of the Model New Source Review, consideration of fur­
ther emission reductions, allows the weighing of any trade-off resulting
 
from reductions in the emission of the same air contaminant which are
 
due to the elimination or modification of other existing stationary
 
sources under the same ownership and operating within the same air basin.
 
Meanwhile, part of the Model NSR rules in California have been inter­
preted to mean that air trade-offs between different companies would be
 
permitted.
 
California is the first state that has attempted to set up consis­
tent statewide procedures for air trade-offs. On February 10, 1977,
 
Victor Calvo, who chairs the Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use,
 
and Energy, introduced an air trade-off bill, Assembly Bill 471 (AB 471)
 
(Reference 47). The most recent version (August 5, 1977) of the
 
California trade-off bill leaves much of the decision making on specific
 
issues to individual air pollution control districts. This, therefore,
 
continues the policy of giving local, rather than state government,
 
primary control over stationary source of pollution. Here it is helpful
 
to review specific issues involved in implementing air trade-offs and
 
major uncertainties along with provisions of the current version of
 
AB 471.
 
Calculating Air Trade-offs
 
How is the amount of pollution available for trade-offs to be
 
calculated? Is it to be based on an existing facility's actual emission,
 
or its allowable emissions? The issue arises because some facilities
 
are not currently polluting to the maximum extent allowed by law. The
 
present version of AB 471 specifies that trade-offs will be based on
 
actual or allowable pollution, whichever is less (Reference 47). In
 
.any event, defining a source's actual emission remains a problem.
 
As noted, EPA regulations state that each trade-off must have the
 
effect of improving air quality. That is, the reduction in pollution
 
must exceed the added pollution emitted by the new source - but how
 
much greater must it be, i.e., how much must air quality be improved?
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The California trade-off bill (AB 471) requires each APCD to
 
devise its own formula for setting trade-off factors, taking into account
 
the severity and frequency of violations of the particular air quality
 
standard. In the case of the Sohio project, the SCAQMD proposed a
 
trade-off factor of 2 to 1 on an annual basis and a 1.2 to 1 on a maxi­
mum daily basis for all pollutants.*
 
The Geographic Boundaries
 
How far away can the new facility reach to obtain trade-offs? The
 
state bill originally specified a five-mile radius but later.adopted a
 
proposal allowing trade-offs outside the immediate vicinity of the new
 
source. However, the local districts must make a finding that a'trade­
off will not result "in any substantially adverse impact on the ambient
 
air quality" in the immediate vicinity of the new source. In the case
 
of the Sohio project, the SCAQMD proposed a trade-off in the vicinity,
 
of the proposed project for all pollutants except hydrocarbons; for
 
which they have accepted a regional trade-off (Reference 48).
 
*Personal communication, R. MacKnight, South Coast Air Quality Management
 
District, April 7, 1978.
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APPENDIX I
 
ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY
 
I. LIFE-CYCLE COST APPROACH
 
The basic structure of the life-cycle cost model is shown in
 
Figure 1. The economic factors have been divided into two groups:
 
"General Model Factors" constitute the generic aspects of the model
 
and include variables that apply to all of the firms; "Site-Specific
 
Factors" consist of site-specific variables that reflect the individual
 
cogeneration systems and the financial aspects of each plant.
 
In addition to computing the life-cycle cost for a system, the
 
model also computes for a specified year the present value of all revenues
 
associated with the system under consideration. For a cogeneration
 
system, the revenues will consist of the receipts from electricity sales
 
when there is excess by-product electricity available for sale. Since
 
the primary benefits from a cogeneration installation arise from a
 
reduction in annual operating costs, when compared to a non-cogeneration
 
or base system, the revenues from such a system are not necessarily
 
expected to offset the life-cycle cost of the system to yield a positive
 
net present value. Thus, the term "net present cost" is introduced and
 
defined to be the life-cycle cost of the system less the net present
 
value of the receipts from the sale of electricity.
 
GENERAL MODEL FACTORS 
EASE YEAR 
YEAR OF COMMERCIAL OPERATION 
,ESCALATION RATES 
INVESTMENT CREDIT 
SITE-SPECIFIC FACTORSLIECLEOS 
COGENERATION SYSTEM 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT PRESENT 
ELECTRICITY COST COST 
O&M COST SITE-SPECIFIC FACTOR 
FUEL COST COGENERATION SYSTEM 
SYSTEM LIFE 
ACCOUNTING LIFE RECEIPTS FROM ELECTRICITY SALES 
COMPANY 
COST OF CAPITAL 
INCOME TAX RATE 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Figure 1. Basic Structure of Life-Cycle Cost Model 
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II. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
 
The cost trade-offs of cogeneration are evaluated by the life-cycle
 
cost for a base system without cogeneration with both the life-cycle cost
 
and net present cost, when applicable, of a cogeneration system. Sensi­
tivity analyses are then performed to test the sensitivity of the results
 
to fuel and electricity escalation rates. In addition, the incremental
 
internal rate of return is calculated for each cogeneration system
 
relative to the respective base systems and two financial incentive
 
schemes are evaluated. All assumptions used in the analysis are dis­
cussed in Appendix J and all data for each site are enumerated in
 
Appendix K.
 
III. COMPUTATIONS
 
The methodology used is a required revenue analysis which is based
 
on the model described in The Cost of Energy From Utility-Owned Solar
 
Electric Systems (JPL 5040-29, ERDA/JPL-1012-76/3), denoted hereafter
 
as USES. While the USES model was developed for utility ownership of
 
solar-electric systems, the model can be applied to a variety of systems
 
including cogeneration systems. The computational structure of the
 
computer model follows the generalized model described in Appendix H
 
of the USES document, which allows the inclusion of tax preference in
 
the form of accelerated depreciation and/or an investment tax credit.
 
The computations that are performed are discussed in detail below. All
 
variable names used in the following equations are defined at the end
 
of this appendix.
 
A. CAPITAL RECOVERY FACTOR
 
The capital recovery factor (CRF) represents the uniform annual
 
payment, as a fraction of the original principal, necessary to fully
 
amortize a-loan over a specified period of time. The equation is
 
CRF = R 10i- (il+R) -NR# 
and
 
1
 
CRF=- R = 0
N 
where N is the system lifetime assumed to be the amortization period and
 
R is the discount rate.
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B. ANNUALIZED FIXED CHARGE RATE
 
The annualized fixed charge rate (FCR) computed by the program is
 
generalized to allow the inclusion of a tax preference. The equation
 
used is
 
1 - (TAX * DPF) - TXCDT)FCR = CRF* TAX + BETA
 
where DPF is the depreciation factor (explained below)'and TXCDT is the
 
investient tax credit. (Note that the variable TAX is a rate.) The
 
depreciation factor is dependent on the depreciation method, the account­
ing lifetime (ALIFE) of the system, which may be different from the
 
system lifetime, and the discount rate. The first step to determining
 
the depreciation factor is to compute the accounting capital recovery
 
factor (ACRF). This is computed using the same equations that were used
 
for the CRF discussed-above except the accounting lifetime is used in
 
place of the system lifetime. The depreciation factor is then computed
 
according to the following equations.
 
For the straight line depreciation method
 
DPF =1
 (ALIFE * ACRF)
 
For the sum-of-the-years-digits depreciation method
 
2 * [ALIFE- AR]
DPF =RF R 0 
ALIFE * (1 + ALIFE) *R 
DPF = 1 R= 0
 
For the cogeneration analysis, the sum-of-the-years digits depreciation
 
method is assumed.
 
C. PRESENT VALUE AMOUNTS
 
The present value amounts of the various cash flows are computed
 
using the basic equations developed in the USES document. In addition,
 
some of the equations are presented in their intermediate stages in order
 
to provide clarification for a more logical analysis of the printed
 
output.
 
Present Value of Capital Investment
 
The capital investment is expressed in base year dollars. The
 
present value of the capital investment, in year-of-commercial-operation
 
dollars, is computed by escalating the amount using the following equation
 
(1 + GCI) (YCO-YB)
CIPV = CI * 
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After the present value of capital investment is computed, those amounts
 
which have the effect of reducing the CIPV in determining the life-cycle
 
cost of the system are computed.
 
Tax Reduction (Depreciation)
 
The effect of tax-deductible depreciation is to reduce income tax
 
liability by reducing taxable income. The present value of the deprecia­
tion claim is computed using the equation
 
Tax Reduction (Depreciation) = TAX * DPF * CIPV
 
where the variable TAX is the tax rate.
 
Tax Reduction (Investment Credit)
 
The introduction of an investment tax credit also has a reducing
 
effect on the CIPV.' The effective reduction is computed using the
 
equation
 
Tax Reduction (Investment Credit) = TXCDT * CIPV
 
Amortized Investment
 
Together, the two tax reductions, when subtracted from the capital
 
investment present value, yield the overall effective amount of the
 
original investment, in present value terms, that must be recovered
 
through fixed charges. This amount is the amortized investment.
 
2. Other Capital Related Charges (Insurance, Property Taxes, Etc.)
 
Other payments, such as property taxes and insurance premiums,
 
can be approximated as constant multiples of the present value of the
 
total capital investment. These payments are included in the determina­
tion of the life-cycle cost of the system and are computed using the
 
equation
 
Other Capital Related Charges = BETA * CIPV
 
3. Income Tax Payments
 
Income tax payments must also be included-in the determination of
 
the life-cycle cost of the system. These payments are computed based
 
on an adjustment to the amortized investment which reflects the pre-tax
 
revenue necessary to amortize a given amount with after-tax dollars.
 
The adjustment is computed using the equation
 
Adjustment * (1 - TAX * DPF - TXCDT) * CIPV 
1 - TAX 
The income tax payments are then computed
 
Income Tax Payments = ADJUSTMENT * TAX
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In both of these equations, the variable TAX is the tax rate.
 
4. Electricity, O&M, and Fuel Costs
 
These costs represent recurrent costs associated with the system
 
operation which occur throughout the system lifetime. Each cost value
 
is input in base year dollars, and must first be escalated to year-of­
commercial-operation dollars before the present value is computed. The
 
equations used are
 
Escalated Annual Cost = AMT * (I + G )(YCO-YB)
 
where
 
AMT = electricity, O&M, or fuel recurrent costs or annual receipts
 
from the same of by-product power
 
G = escalation rate for the category of recurrent costs
 
and
 
Present = Escalated N R =G
 
Value Annual Cost x
 
Present = Escalated [+Q )N R# G
1 + x G 
Valhe Annual Cost R - G1 + R 
When a stream of annual costs is input, the present value is computed
 
as follows
 
N (1 + Gx ) (j + YCO-YB)
Present 

- AMT(j) *
 Value j=l (I + R) j 
D. SYSTEM LIFE-CYCLE COST
 
The system life-cycle cost is computed as the sum of the present
 
value amounts described above. This calculation differs in form from
 
the USES document but the net result is the same. The primary difference
 
is that the various components which affect the'capital investment present
 
value are computed separately in the program so that they may be separately
 
documented; they are computed simultaneously in the USES model.
 
E. ANNUALIZED SYSTEM RESULTANT COST
 
The annualized system-resultant cost is computed by multiplying
 
the life-cycle cost by the capital recovery factor. This amount repre­
sents a uniform annual cost that has exactly the same present value as
 
the summed present values of all the separate cost distributions.
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F. RECEIPTS FROM SALE OF EXCESS POWER
 
These receipts represent the annual revenue expected from the sale
 
of by-product power throughout the system lifetime. The present value
 
is computed in the same manner as for the recurrent costs of the system.
 
G. NET PRESENT VALUE
 
The net present value of the system is the difference between the
 
present value of the system revenues and the present value of the system
 
costs.
 
IV. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
 
YB base year
 
YCO year of commercial operation
 
N system lifetime
 
R discount rate
 
TXCDT investment tax credit
 
TAX income tax rate
 
BETA insurance, other taxes, etc.
 
ALIFE accounting lifetime for system
 
CI capital investment
 
GCI capital escalation rate
 
ELC annual electricity charges
 
GELC electricity escalation rate
 
OM annual O&M charges
 
GOM O&M escalation rate
 
FL annual fuel cost
 
GFL fuel escalation rate
 
RC annual receipts from electricity sales
 
GRC receipts escalation rate
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APPENDIX J
 
STANDARD SET OF ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSES
 
I. GENERAL MODEL FACTOR ASSUMPTIONS
 
General model factors are those factors that reflect general
 
economic conditions.. Normally, the values used for these factors are
 
used for every site, except for fuel escalation rates where the rate
 
differs for different fuel types.
 
Base Year (YB). The costs and prices input to the model are in
 
terms of constant dollars which correspond to the current dollar price
 
as of January 1, 1977.
 
Year of Commercial Operation (CO). All present value amounts and
 
output values are .computed in the year of commercial operation. The
 
analysis for this study assumed that the cogeneration system is opera­
tional by December 31, 1977. In actuality, the complete.installation
 
of a cogeneration system can take from one to three years.
 
Escalation Rates (Gx). Escalation rates, or growth rates, repre­
sent the rate of increase-for a category of expenditures,' or revenues,
 
and include both the rate of inflation and the rate of real growth.
 
These rates are used in the life-cycle cost model to calculate the
 
present value for a stream of expenditures or revenues, over time, in
 
a given category.
 
Not all possible escalation rates are needed for this analysis.
 
A capital escalation rate does- not enter into the computations because
 
of the assumption that the cogeneration system is installed and opera­
tional in one year. A general inflation rate is implicitly included in
 
the escalation rates.
 
The selection of the proper escalation rates is difficult at best
 
and often results in controversy. Many assumptions are built into
 
various forecasting models and the resulting rates are only as valid as
 
the assumptions. Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), in its Energy'Review,
 
Summer 1977, presents four different forecasts based on four different
 
sets of assumptions. For this study, the assumptions used for the DRI
 
Control Case are considered to be reasonable and the forecasted escala­
tion rates have been used as a baseline. Following is a list of the
 
escalation rates used in the analysis accompanied by an explanation of
 
the source for each.
 
Electricity Escalation Rate (GELC). This rate is used in conjunc­
tion with the cost of electricity to the firm and also the price the
 
utility will be willing to pay for surplus power the firm wishes to
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sell. The "Average Industrial Electricity Prices" from the DRI Control
 
Case for the Pacific Region predicts the following annual percent change
 
over three five-year periods:
 
Period Annual % Change
 
1975-1980 12.1
 
1980-1985 10._4 
1985-1990 8.8
 
This corresponds to an average annual rate of 10.43%. For the
 
analysis, this figure is rounded to 10.5%.
 
Fuel Escalation Rate (GFL). This rate is used in conjunction with
 
the cost of fuel to the firm. Five different fuel types were reported
 
in the site reports: natural gas, fuel oil-, coal, hog fuel, and 
refinery fuel gas. The cogeneration systems utilizing either coal or 
refinery fuel gas do not require any increase in fuel consumption; 
thus, the fuel costs and the corresponding escalation rates are not
 
included in the analysis.
 
Natural Gas. The "Average Industrial Natural Gas Prices" from
 
the'DRI Control Case for the Pacific Region predicts the following
 
annual percent change over three 5-year periods:
 
Period Annual % Change
 
1975-1980 6.2
 
1980-1985 10.1
 
1985-1990 6.8
 
This corresponds to an average annual rate of 7.69%. For the analysis,
 
this figure is rounded to 7.5%.
 
Fuel Oil. The "Price of Oil to Electric Utilities" from the DRI
 
Control Case for the Pacific Region was used to determine this rate
 
because data were not available for the average industrial fuel oil
 
prices. A high correlation between the industrial and utility natural
 
gas prices exists and it was assumed that a similar correlation exists
 
for fuel oil. The predicted annual percent change over three 5-year
 
periods is:
 
Period Annual % Change
 
1975-1980 9.0
 
1980-1985 9.5
 
1985-1990 7.0
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This corresponds to an average annual rate of 8.59%. For the analysis,
 
this figure is rounded to 8.5%.
 
Hog Fuel. Hog fuel probably compares most nearly to the use of
 
coal as a fuel because of various pdllution requirements. Thus, the
 
escalation rate determined for coal was used as a surrogate for the hog
 
fuel escalation rate.
 
The "National Energy Prices" for contract delivered coal from the
 
DRI Control Case was used to determine this rate. This data included
 
transportation charges. The predicted annual percent change over three
 
5-year periods is: 
Period Annual % Change 
1975-1980 8.2 
1980-1985 5.5 
1985-1990 4.3 
This corresponds to an average annual rate of 5.99%. For the analysis,
 
this figure is rounded to 6.0%.
 
Operations and Maintenance Escalation Rate (GOM). This rate is
 
used in conjunction with the cost of operations and maintenance, exclud­
ing fuel cost. The components of the O&M costs are broken down into the
 
following categories:*
 
Water 5%
 
Chemical 26%
 
Electrical 34%
 
Labor 19%
 
Parts 16%
 
To obtain an escalation rate for this factor, a composite rate was
 
constructed based on the DRI Outlook for the United States Energy
 
Sector: Control Base Forecasts.
 
Gross National Product (GNP) deflator predictions were used to
 
estimate the water portion; the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) predictions
 
were used to estimate the chemical and parts portion; the Adjusted
 
Average Hourly Earnings.prediction was used for the labor portion; and
 
the electricity escalation rate discussed previously was used for the
 
electrical portion. The predicted annual percent change over three
 
5-year periods and the calculated results for each are shown below:
 
*Personal communication, Clayton Manufacturing Company.
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Annual
 
Annual Annual % Change Annual
 
% Change % Change Adjusted Hourly % Change
 
Period GNP Deflator WPI -Earnings Electricity
 
1975-1980 5.6 5.9 7.1 12.1
 
1980-1985 3.5 4.5 6.8 10.4
 
1985-1990 3.0 3.1 5.9 8.8,
 
Average rate 4.0 4.49 6.6 10.43
 
Rounded rate 4.0 4.5 6.5 10.5
 
The weighted average of these rates was then computed to obtain a value
 
of 6.89% which is rounded to 7%. This figure is used as a surrogate
 
for the O&M escalation rate.
 
Investment Tax Credit. An investment tax credit of 10% is
 
assumed to coincide with current tax laws.
 
II. SENSITIVITY TO PRICE ESCALATION RATES
 
The assumed price escalation rates are:
 
Electricity 10.5%
 
Natural gas 7.5%
 
Fuel oil 8.5%
 
Hog fuel 6.0%
 
How sensitive are the analyses to these escalation rates? If the
 
assumed escalation rate is in error by as much as 15% in either direc­
tion, would the outcome of the analyses be different?
 
A. SENSITIVITY TO ELECTRICITY PRICE ESCALATION RATE
 
The sensitivity of the life-cycle cost of-the cogeneration system
 
to a range of electricity escalation rates from 9% to 12% was tested.
 
Seven of the 12 firms were found to be more sensitive to the electricity
 
escalation rate than to the fuel escalation rate. The seven are:
 
California Portland Cement Co.
 
Exxon Co., U.S.A.
 
Kaiser Steel Corp.
 
Owens-Illinois, Inc.
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Simpson Paper Co.
 
Simpson Timber Co.
 
Union Oil Co.
 
All seven of these industrial firms utilize captive energy sources for
 
the cogeneration systems, significantly reducing or eliminating addi­
tional fuel costs. Simpson Paper Company and Simpson Timber Company
 
utilize a wood waste product, hog fuel, as a fuel source for their
 
cogeneration systems; the remaining firms utilize various forms of waste
 
heat. For these firms, then, because electricity prices are expected to
 
increase at a faster rate than fuel prices, the economic viability of the
 
cogeneration system will improve.
 
The sensitivity of the life-cycle cost to the electricity escala­
tion rate for the base system and the cogeneration system was tested for
 
each site. There were no sites for which a wrong choice in the elec­
tricity escalation rate would result in an incorrect choice being made
 
between the base system and the cogeneration system.
 
B. SENSITIVITY TO FUEL PRICE ESCALATION
 
The remaining five industrial firms are more sensitive to fuel
 
price escalation than to electricity price escalation. The five are:
 
California Paperboard Corp.
 
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.
 
Husky Oil Co.
 
Kelco Co.
 
Spreckels Sugar Co.
 
Of these five, only Spreckels Sugar has a life-cycle cost for the
 
cogeneration system that is lower than the base system life-cycle cost.
 
For these firms, the economic viability of the cogeneration systems is
 
not likely to improve because the cogeneration system requires more fuel
 
than the base system.
 
The sensitivity of the life-cycle to the fuel price escalation for
 
the base system and the cogeneration system was tested for each site.*
 
A wrong choice for the fuel price escalation rate does not affect the
 
choice of the cogeneration system over the base system for the four
 
remaining firms; the incremental difference between the two alternatives
 
is larger than could be overcome by a significant change in the fuel
 
escalation rate. Thus, the outcome of the analysis would not be
 
effected by an error in the fuel escalation rate.
 
*Only those cogeneration systems requiring additional fuel for cogenera­
tion were evaluated.
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III. SITE-SPECIFIC FACTOR ASSUMPTIONS
 
A. COGENERATION SYSTEM ECONOMIC-PROPERTIES
 
Capital Investment. The capitai investment for each site-specific
 
cogeneration system was estimated using Figures 3.10, 3.11 and 3.14 in
 
Reference 49. The cost figures, in kW of capacity, were reported in
 
1975 dollars using a 6% rate of escalation. The escalated cost was then
 
multiplied by the proposed capacity of the particular cogeneration
 
system.
 
The cost estimates* for gas turbine topping systems include
 
installation labor, accessory equipment and piping, foundations, build­
ing, instruments, insulation, painting, indirect costs, and distributable
 
costs. For steam turbine topping systems the cost estimates include thd
 
installed cost of the boiler, steam turbine, fuel handling and pollution
 
control equipment. Pollution control equipment and fuel handling costs
 
are excluded from estimates when the existing boiler is utilized in the
 
system. The cost estimates do not include transformers, escalation
 
interest during construction, land, or other owner's costs.
 
Annual Electricity Costs (ELC). This factor represents the total
 
cost of purchased electricity. For the base case analysis, the reported
 
yearly usage is multiplied by the reported rate. For the cogeneration
 
case analysis, the difference between the yearly usage and the computed
 
cogeneration capacity, when positive, is multiplied by the'reported rate.
 
Annual O&M Costs (OM). The annual O&M costs for -thebase case,
 
steam boiler systems, were estimated to be 13.4Q per 1000 pounds of
 
steam generated at 90% efficiency using the following breakdown:**
 
Water 0.6€/1000 lb
 
Chemical 3.5Q/1000 lb
 
Electrical 4.6c/1000 lb
 
Labor 2.5/1000
 
Maint. Parts 2.2/1000 lb
 
Total 13.4/1000 lb
 
The total O&M costs were then calculated based on the average steam
 
load and number of hours of operation for each site.
 
*Kaiser Steel had estimated a 63 million dollar capital investment
 
would be required. Using the estimating technique described, only
 
29.7 million was calculated. Evaluations were made using the 63
 
million.dollar capital investment figure.
 
**Ibid.
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The annual O&M costs for the cogeneration system were estimated
 
based on the O&M costs reported in Reference 49. These costs are
 
0.3¢/kW-h for steam turbine topping and condensing steam turbine
 
bottoming, and 0.4c/kW-h for gas turbine topping. In most cases, the
 
cogeneration system replaces the steam boiler system and the O&M costs
 
are calculated for the entire system and replace the O&M costs for
 
the steam boiler system. However, in two cases the cogeneration
 
system utilizes the existing steam boiler system so the two O&M costs
 
are added together for the cogeneration system analysis.
 
Annual Fuel Costs (FL). This factor represents the total cost of
 
fuel required for the production of steam for the base case, and for the
 
production of steam and electricity for the cogeneration case. When the
 
utility owns the cogeneration system, the price paid for steam is also
 
included.
 
For the base case, the amount of fuel is computed based on the
 
energy rate for the steam demand of the plant calculated in Reference-4.
 
The energy rate is multiplied by the equivalent operating hours and
 
divided by an assumed boiler efficiency of 80% to yield annual fuel
 
consumption is then multiplied by the reported price per MBtu to obtain
 
the annual fuel cost.
 
For the cogeneration ease, the additional fuel required that is
 
chargeable to the power generation was estimated based on Figure 3-1
 
in Reference 49. The additional fuel costs chargeable to power are
 
added to the base case fuel costs to obtain the annual fuel costs for
 
the cogeneration system. When the utility owns the cogeneration system,
 
the price paid for steam was estimated based on the steam requirements
 
and reported price for steam.
 
Annual Receipts from Electricity Sales (RC). This factor repre­
sents the total receipts from the sale of by-product power. The differ­
ence between the computed cogeneration capacity and the yearly usage of
 
electricity, when positive, is multiplied by the reported rate for
 
elebtricity purchased from the utility.
 
System Lifetime (N). While the system lifetime for the current
 
boiler system at each site and the proposed cogeneration system may
 
vary, a lifetime of 15 years is assumed in each case. All costs and
 
revenues for the system are computed for a 15-year period.
 
Accounting Lifetime. The capital expended for cogeneration
 
systems is'depreciated over a 10-year accounting life. This assumption
 
tends to make the results of the cogeneration analysis more attractive
 
than if the accounting lifetime were assumed equal to the system
 
lifetime.
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B. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF COMPANY
 
Discount Rate (R). This factor reflects the after-tax required
 
return at each site, rather than the cost of capital to the firm. A
 
firm will not invest in a project unless the return, as a minimum, is_
 
equal to the cost of capital. Those projects that qualify are then
 
ranked according to priority and/or maximum return. Thus, in evaluat­
ing a cogeneration system, the required return is used rather than the
 
actual cost of capital.
 
Income Tax Rate. A combined state and federal tax rate of 50%
 
is used for each site.
 
Miscellaneous. This factor includes insurance premiums and other
 
taxes. The amount is calculated as a percentage of the present value of
 
the total capital investment. The rate used for each site is 2.5%.
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APPENDIX K
 
SITE-SPECIFIC ECONOMIC TABLES
 
Key 
"Base" refers to the present method of steam production in the
 
plant. Power is purchased.
 
Cogeneration System
 
(1) 	 All cogenerated power is used to offset purchased power.
 
Additional required power is purchased at the base system
 
rate.
 
(2) 	 All excess by-product power is sold at the base system
 
rate.
 
(3) 	 All excess by-product power is sold at 14 mills/kW-h.
 
(4) Both power and steam are purchased. 
(5) All cogenerated power is sold at 19.5 mills/kW-h. Required 
power is purchased at the base system rate. 
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California Paperboard Corp.: Company owns the cogeneration system.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (2) (3) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. Fuel, % 	 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
 
C. 0 & M, % 	 7 7 7 7
 
d. Receipts, % 	 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	Investment tax credit, % 10 10 10
 
5. 	Capital cost, 1065 -- 3.7 3.7 3.7 
6. 	 Electricity cost, 106 $ 0.66 .... 0.66 
06 
7. 	Fuel cost, 10 $ 1.714 2.515 2.515 2.515 
8. 	0 & M cost, 10 6$ 0.071 0.284 0.284 -0.284 
9. 	Receipts from electricity 0.850 0.536 1.326.
 
sales, 10
6$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15 15
 
11. Accounting 	life, yr -- 10 10 10 
12. 	 Discount rate, % 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
 
13. Income tax 	rate, % -- 50 50 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106 $ 27.55 34.52 34.52 43.13 
Annualized system resultant 4.15 5.20 5.20 6.50 
cost, 106 $
 
Net present cost, 106 $ 27.55 23.44 27.54 25.84
 
Break-even price for excess electricity is 1.4¢/kW-h.
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California Paperboard Corp.: Utility owns the cogeneration system.
 
1. 	Base year 

2. 	Year of commercial 

operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:.
 
a. 	Electricity, % 

b. 	Fuel, % 

c. 	0 & M, % 

d. 	Receipts, % 

4. 	Investment tax credit, % 

5. 	Capital cost, 106 $....
 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 
7. 	Fuel cost, 106 $ 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 $ 
9. 	Receipts from electricity
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 

11. 	 Accounting life, yr 

12. 	 Discount rate, % 

13. 	 Income tax rate, % 

14. 	Miscellaneous rate 

(ins. & prop. tax), %
 
Life-cycle cost, 106$ 
Annualized system resultant 
cost, 106$ 
Net 	present cost, 106$ 
Cogeneration 
System 
Base (4) 
1977 1977 
1977 1977 
10.5 10.5 
7.5 7.5 
7 7 
10.5 10.5 
10 
0.66 0.66 
1.714 1.696 
0.071 
15 15 
- 10 
12.5 12.5 
- 50 
2.5 
27.55 26.63 
4.15 4.01 
27.55 26.63 
Break-even price for steam is $3.39/103 lb.
 
K-3
 
California Portland Cement Corp.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. 	 Fuel, % ......
 
c. 	0 & M, % 7 7
 
d. 	Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	 Investment tax credit, % -- 10 i0 
5. 	Capital cost, 10 6 -- 9.1 9.1 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 3.0 0.9456 3.0 
7. 	Fuel cost, 106$......
 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 -- 0.257 0.257 
9. 	Receipts from electricity .... 1.667
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yK -- 10 10 
12. 	 Discount rate, % 10 10 10
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 
14. 	Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106 $ 46.67 29.55 61.52 
Annualized system resultant 6.14 3.89 8.09 
cost, 106$ 
Net 	present cost, 106 $ 46.67 29.55 35.58 
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Exxon Co., U.S.A.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. 	Fuel, % ......
 
c. 	0 & M, % -- 7 7 
d. 	Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	Investment tax credit, % -- 10 10 
5. 	Capital cost, 10 6 -- 9.4 9.4 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 12.0 3.484 12.0 
7. 	Fuel cost, 106$......
 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 -- 0.852 0.852 
9. 	Receipts from electricity -- 4.152 
sales, 106$ 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 
12. 	 Discount rate, % 12.5 12.5 12.5
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106$ 156.41 66.55 177.54 
Annualized system resultant 23.58 10.03 26.78 
cost, 106$ 
Net 	present cost, 106 $ 156.41 66.55 123.43 
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Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.: 	 Cogeneration system matches steamload of
 
canning season and operations only during
 
canning season ("Canning Season").
 
Cogeneration System 
Base (2) (3) (5) 
1. Base year 1977 1977 1977 1977 
2. Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977 1977 
operation 
3. Escalation rates: 
a. Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
b. Fuel, % 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
c. O&M,% 7 7 7 7 
d. Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
4. Investment tax credit, % 10 10 10 
5. Capital cost, 10 6 -- 13.7 13.7 13.7 
6. Electricity cost, 106$ 0.2904 .... 0.2904 
7. Fuel cost, 106 $ 2.727 4.313 4.313 4.313 
8. 0 & M cost, 106$ 0.144 0.649 0.649 0.649 
9. Receipts from electricity 3.604 2.1028 3.165 
sales, 106$ 
10. System life, yr 15 15 15 15 
11. Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 10 
12. Discount rate, % 10 10 10 10 
13. Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 50 
14. Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106 $ 40.46 79.61 79.61 84.13 
Annualized system resultant 5.32 10.47 10.47 11.06 
cost, 106$ 
Net present cost, 106 $ 40.46 23.53 46.90 34.89 
Break-even price for excess electricity is 1.7¢/kW-h.
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Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.: Cogeneration system matches steam load of
 
off-season and operates all year
 
("Alternate l").
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. Electricity, % 	 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. Fuel, % 	 7.5 7.5 7.5
 
c. 0 & M, % 	 7 7 7
 
d. Receipts, % 	 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	 Investment tax credit, % 10 10
 
5. 	Capital cost, 10 6 0.3 0.3
 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 0.5 0.3020 0.5 
7. 	Fuel cost, 106 $ 3.094 3.153 3.153 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 $ 0.163 0.024 0.024 
9-. 	 Receipts from electricity 0.117
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 
12. 	 Discount rate, % 10 10 10
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- - 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106$ 48.56 44.92 48.00
 
Annualized system resultant 6.38 5.91 6.31
 
cost, 106$
 
Net 	present cost, 106$ 48.56 44''92 46.18 
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Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.: Cogeneration system matches steamload of
 
canning season and operates all year, dumping
 
steam during off season ("Alternate 2").
 
Cogeneration System 
Base (2) (3) (5) 
1. Base year 1977 1977 1977 1977 
2. Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977 1977 
operation 
3. Escalation rates: 
a. Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
b. Fuel, % 7.5 7,5 7.5 7.5 
c. 0 & M, % 7 7 7 7 
d. Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
4. Investment tax credit, % 10 10 10 
5. Capital cost, 106 -- 13.7 13.7 13.7 
6. Electricity cost, 106 $ 0.5 .... 0.5 
7. Fuel cost, 106$ 3.094 6.817 6.817 6.817 
8. 0 & M cost, 106 $ 0.163 1.524 1.524 1.524 
9. Receipts from electricity 8.695 5.0728 7.428 
sales, 106$ 
10. System life, yr 15 15 15 15 
11. Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 10 
12. Discount rate, % 10 10 10 10 
13. Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 50 
14. Miscellaneous rate 
(ins. & prop. tax), % -- 2.5 2.5 2.5 
6Life-cycle cost, 10 $ 48.56 121.62 121.62- 129.40 
Annualized system resultant 6.38 15.99 15.99 17.01 
cost, 106$ 
Net present cost, 106 $ 48.56 13.65 42.71 13.84 
Break-even price for excess electricity is 1.3Q/kW-h.
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Husky Oil Co.: The company purchases steam from the utility and sells
 
oil to the utility.
 
1. 	Base year 

2. 	Year of commercial 

operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 

b. 	Fuel, % 

c. 	0 & M, % 

d. 	Receipts, % 

4. 	Investment tax credit, % 

5. 	Capital cost, 106 $....
 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 

7. 	Fuel cost, 106$ 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106$ 

9. 	Receipts from electricity 

sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 

11. 	 Accounting life, yr 

12. 	 Discount rate, % 

13. 	 Income tax rate, % 

14. 	 Miscellaneous rate 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106$ 
Annualized system resultant 
cost, 106$. 
Net present cost, 106 $ 
Cogeneration 
System 
Base (4) 
1977 1977 
1977 1977 
10.5 10.5 
7.5 7.5 
7 7 
10.5 10.5 
10 
0.2 0.2 
20.438 29.5 
0.883 -­
2.3 
15 15 
-- 10 
12 12 
-- 50 
-- 2.5 
236.38 326.46 
34.71 47.93 
236.38 299.45 
Break-even price for excess steam is $3.26/103 lb.
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Kaiser Steel Corp.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. 	Fuel, %
 
c. 	 0 & M, % -- 7 7 
d. 	Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	 Investment tax credit, % -- 10 10 
5. 	Capital cost, 10 6 -- 63.0 63.0 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106 $ 18.0 10.234 18.0 
7. 	 Fuel cost, 106$......
 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 -- 0.773 0.773 
9. 	 Receipts from electricity .... 5.023
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 
12. 	Discount rate, % 15 . 15 15 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106 $ 199.12 204.62 290.53 
Annualized system resultant 34.05 34.99 49.69 
cost, 106$ 
Net 	present cost, 10 6$ 199.12 204.62 234.96 
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Kelco Co.: Company owns the cogeneration system.
 
Cogeneration System 
Base (2) (3) (5) 
1. Base year 1977 1977 1977 1977 
2. Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977 1977 
operation 
3. Escalation rates: 
a. Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
b. Fuel, % 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
C. 0&M,% 7 7 7 7 
d. Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
4. Investment tax credit, % 10 10 10 
5. Capital cost, 106 -- 8.2 8.2 8.2 
6. 6Electricity cost, 10 $ 1.7 .... 1.7 
7. Fuel cost, 106$ 4.034 6.359 6.359 6.359 
8. 0 & M cost, 106$ 1.59 0.735 0.735 0.735 
9. Receipts from electricity 4.732 1.893 3.548 
sales, 106$ 
10. System life, yr 15 15 15 15 
11. Accounting life, yr - 0 10 10 
12. Discount rate, Z 15 15 15 15 
13. Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 50 
14. Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106 57.01 75.51 75.51 94.31 
Annualized system resultant 9.75 12.91 12.91 16.13 
cost, 106$ 
Net present cost, 10 $ 57.01 23.18 54.57 54.66 
Break-even price for excess by-product power is 1.2¢/kW-h.
 
Kelco Co.: Utility owns the cogeneration system.
 
Cogeneration
 
System
 
Base 	 (4)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. Electricity, % 	 10.5 10.5
 
b. Fuel, % 	 7.5 7.5
 
c. 0 & M, % 	 7 7
 
d. Receipts, % 	 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	Investment tax credit, % 10
 
5. 	Capital cost, 106 $....
 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 1.7 1.7 
7. 	Fuel cost, 106 $ 4.034 6.2 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 $ 0.159 
9. 	Receipts from electricity
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr -- 10 
12. 	 Discount rate, % 15 15
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, %" -- 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 
(ins, & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106 $ 	 57.01 75.36
 
Annualized system resultant 9.75 
 12.89
 
cost, 106$
 
Net 	present cost, 106$ 57.01 75.36
 
Break-even price for steam is $3.18/103 lb.
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Owens-Illinois, Inc.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. 	 Fuel, % . ...... 
c. 	 0 & M, % -- 7 7 
d. 	Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	 Investment tax credit, % -- 10 10 
5. 	 Capital cost, 106 -- 3.7 - 3.7 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 3.0 1.888 3.0 
7. 	 Fuel cost, 106$......
 
8. 	0 & M cost, 10 6 -- 0.102 0.102 
9. 	 Receipts from electricity .... 0.66
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 
12. 	Discount rate:, % 12 12 12
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106$ 40.47 31.40 46.40 
Annualized system resultant 5.94 4.61 
cost, 106$ 
Net 	present cost, 106$ 40.47 31.40 37.50 
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6.81 
Simpson Paper Co.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (2) (3) (5) 
1. Base year 1977 1977 1977 1977 
2. Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977 1977 
operation 
3. Escalation rates: 
a. Electricity, % i0.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
b. Fuel, % 7.5 6 6 6 
C. 0 & M, % 7 7 7 7 
d. Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
4. Investment tax credit, % 10 10 10 
5. Capital cost, 106 -- 8.1 8.1 8.1 
6. Electricity cost, 106$ 5.9 .... 5.9 
67. Fuel cost, 10 $ 3.735 0.507 0.507 0.507 
8. 0 & M cost, 106$ 0.128 0.7 0.7 0.7 
9. Receipts from electricity 1.9 0.65 3.27 
sales, 106$ 
10, System life, yr 15 15 15 15 
11. Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 10 
12. Discount rate, % 12 12 12 12 
13. Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 50 
14. Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop. tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106$ 121.94 23.09 23.09 102.67 
Annualized system resultant 17.90 3.39 3.39 15.07 
cost, 106$ 
Net present cost, 106$ 121.94 2.68 14.32 52.49 
Break-even price for excess by-product power is less than zero.
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Simpson Timber Co.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. 	Fuel, % 6- 6 6
 
c. 	0 & M, % 7 7 7
 
d. 	Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	 Investment tax credit, % 10 10
 
5. 	Capital cost, 106 -- 0.14 0.14 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106 $ 2.15 2.05 2.15 
7. 	Fuel cost, 106$ 0.013 0.016 0.016 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 $ 0.006 0.015 0.015 
9. 	Receipts from electricity 0.061
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr - 0 10
 
12. 	Discount rate, % 12 12 12
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- 25 25 
(ins. & prop. tax),.% 
Life-cycle cost, 106 29.19 28.25 29.47
 
Annualized system resultant 4.29 4.15 4.33
 
cost, 106$
 
Net 	present cost, 106$ 29.19 28.25 28.65 
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Spreckels Sugar Co.
 
Cogeneration System
 
Hypothetical
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. 	Fuel, % 7.5 7.5 7.5
 
c. 	O&M,% 7 7 7
 
d. 	Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. 	 Investment tax credit, % ..
 
*6
 
5. 	 Capital cost , 1065 -- 1.2 1.2 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106$ 1.176 0.12 1.176 
7. 	Fuel cost, 106$ 3.462 0.12 3.462 
8. 	0 & M cost, 106 $ 0.135 0.082 0.135 
9. 	 Receipts from electricity .... 0.590
 
sales, 106$
 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr 10 -- 10 
12. 	 Discount rate, % 10 10 10
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % ......
 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate ......
 
(ins. & prop. tax), %
 
Life-cycle cost, 106 $ 63.35 51.63 68.06 
Annualized system resultant 8.33 6.79 8.95 
cost, 106$ 
Net 	present cost, 106 $ 63.35 51.63 58.88 
Replacement cost specified in site report is used here.
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Union Oil Company
 
Cogeneration System
 
Base (1) (5)
 
1. 	Base year 1977 1977 1977
 
2. 	Year of commercial 1977 1977 1977
 
operation
 
3. 	Escalation rates:
 
a. 	Electricity, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
b. 	 Fuel, % ......
 
c. 	 0&M,% -- 7 7 
d. 	Receipts, % 10.5 10.5 10.5
 
4. Investment tax credit, % -- 10 10 
5.. Capital cost, 10 6 -- 15.4 15.4 
6. 	Electricity cost, 106 12.0 2.313 12.0
 
* 	 06 
7. 	 Fuel cost ,10$ .....
 
8. 	0 & M cost, 10 6 -- 1.209 1.209 
9. 	 Receipts from electricity -- 6.15 
sales, 106$ 
10. 	 System life, yr 15 15 15
 
11. 	 Accounting life, yr -- 10 10 
12. 	 Discount rate, % 10 10 10
 
13. 	 Income tax rate, % -- 50 50 
14. 	 Miscellaneous rate -- 2.5 2.5 
(ins. & prop tax), % 
Life-cycle cost, 106 $ 186.69 70.48 221.18 
Annualized system resultant 24.54 9.27 29.08 
cost, 106$ 
Net 	present cost, 106$ 186.69 70.48 125.50 
Union Oil has indicated that additional fuel would be required
 
for their cogeneration system.
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